Indian Aspiration of Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council and American Stance

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ABSTRACT

India's urge to become a major power is as old as Indian state itself. This desire is pre-dated and Indian leadership wanted to equate it with China in terms of power even before the transfer of power from the British rule. India is trying to seek an international confirmation for its status of a major power. It has strengthened its claim on the basis of its capability to take an active, decisive and even forceful role in South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia, which is vital to Indian rising power as well as for increasingly American anti-terrorism campaign and its search of energy resources. Permanent membership of the UN Security Council has traditionally been considered a key criterion for being counted as a great power. Whether India is able to become a part of the global order with American support on the basis of its potential and capabilities; to answer this question, the paper will examine the Indian claim for gaining this position and to become a global power as well as the US view point in this direction with a view of its impacts on the future world order in general and regional security system in particular.

KEY WORDS: Regional Security, Membership, Power, Global Order, States, Veto, Capabilities, Status, Permanent Member, Dispute, Realities, Contender, Reforms.

Power and Influence of a State

Power is a fundamental concept in international relations. It is the determining factor for position and status of a state in global system. As far as power is concerned, policy makers and analysts have long been puzzled over questions of its amount and nature because international power in general is debatable. There are different assumptions and conclusions about the power of a state. Some states act powerfully while others in a weak manner. As for as power is concerned, it is defined in both the ways. In positive term, power is the ability to influence other's behavior in a manner desired by one wielding power while in negative sense, it is an ability to prevent other from exerting influence on its behavior. In both forms, it is applied to control the weaker and to maintain the prestige of the stronger.

Kenneth Waltz provided a useful definition of power as the "extent that affects other, more than they affected on self". A state's power can thus be understood as combination of its capacities to influence others and to behave as it wants them to do and conversely, to resist the unwelcome influence of others (Waltz, 1979: 191-92).

The most widespread and traditional means of determining the status of states is the power that they possess. The components of power of a state include its geographic location, size of population, industry and natural resources (Spanier, 1993: 65). In other words, these are the capabilities of the state to determine its status in the world order and to measure its strength.

Capabilities of the State

Theories of international relations classify the states on the basis of their capabilities. It is not the size of state that matters but dependence and association with other states as well as its relative strength and capabilities determine its status. It is argued that the states are almost similar in terms of needs but their capabilities for achieving them vary. The position of states in terms of acquiring the capabilities, determines the status of states in the world order. The range of interests of the super and great powers is characteristically global while interests of weak and medium states get marginal importance due to their limited range of power. Norwegian paper defined the capabilities in four dimensions, "reflecting the spectrum from hard to soft power, including:

1) Military
2) Economy/technology
3) Demography
4) Culture

These four dimensions are not distributed equally among the states and there is a need to analyze these dimensions carefully. In the current history, power is multidimensional. The more dimensions a state contains, the more it is able to draw power and will be on today's international scene by translating power into influence (India and the Future.., 2009: 7).

Ranking of States on the Basis of Power

One set never fits to define all types of states, therefore; different criteria is applied to determine the position of states in global arena. Analysts and theorists have given different view points on the power of states, however; there are five categories of states, "super powers, great powers, middle powers, small powers and mini-states" (Handel, 1990: 49-52). To evaluate the relative position of the states on the basis of their characteristics, is not easy as power is not accurately quantified or tabulated in the global system.

Historically, the single yardstick to measure the state power was its economic capabilities with the size of population and in this regard the "effective population" was important that could be equipped properly with different skills to operate and run the system (Kahn & Wiener, 1968: 132-33). To evaluate the actual strength of a state, economic and military structure of a country is significant. Military force is the ultimate instrument of state's power but on occasions, it is applied in wrong manner and may turn out to be counter-productive.

Qualifying the status of a great power, a state has to rank very high in almost all areas of strength. Jack Levy defines a great power that "plays a major role in the international politics with respect to the security related issues and the great power can be differentiated from the other states by their military power, their interests, their behavior, in general interaction with other powers, other perception of them and some formal criteria" (Levy, 1983: 16). According to another definition, "A great power is a state which can not be defeated in war by any other state or coalition of states without it exacting the comparable costs from its opponents" (Vital, 1971). National security and national role are also tied to the acquisition and maintenance of the capabilities of a major power and enable it to protect its security and role. This autonomy is crucial in terms of the military power and "major powers are those states that are least vulnerable to the direct military coercion or attack and are most capable of deterring any potential attack and defending their security from other major and minor powers" (Nayer & Paul, 2003: 3).

The ranking of power is complex but it is easy to calculate the power and predict who will influence whom, and in war who will beat whom. The ranking of state on the basis of power may give an impression of the way through which states are likely to achieve their aims. But even such a ranking is useful though not sufficient to highlight the status of a state. Sometime states may be classified according to the amount of power but interstate relations are complex as economically advance countries sometimes appear politically vulnerable. Levy said that "the great powers continue an interdependence system of power and security relations" (Levy, Op.cit). This is an open rather than a closed system, as it is affected partially by the larger world system of which it is a part. The primary influences on the great power, however, derive from the great power system and their patterns of interaction which can be explained largely by the internal dynamics of that system. The great power system may be a subsystem of the larger international system but in fundamental respects it is a dominant subsystem (Ibid: 53). In the 19th century, despite vast geographic, industrial and social changes in Europe, the stability in ranking of major states remained intact and international system granted them a special place. During 20th century, they became self-appointed leaders of the world to meet the significant political problems and this status was further strengthened by the League of Nations' Covenant which gave such powers a permanent membership in the League Council. Its Assembly was composed of small nations which was expected to meet only every four or five

years (Claude, 1956: 53). In fact, the present great power status is accorded by the international treaties or conferences that also confer them privileges of veto power and permanent membership for decision making in international institutions.

Present System of Major Powers

After the World War II, the US and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers. The winner parties of the war became permanent members of the Security Council under the UN charter having veto power. In 1972, the Socialist China was conferred upon this status in the UN. Japan and Germany lost their status of major power after the World War II, despite surpassing in military and economic capabilities than present P-5 (permanent five members of Security Council). Spain, Portugal and Netherland lost this status in the 18th century. After the World War I, following defeat or loss of colonies, Austria-Hungary was deprived from this status and was removed from the list of major powers (Nayer & Paul, Op.cit: 29).

The European states remained occupied with the notion of power as they were the powerful nations of the world before the emergence of bipolarity which reduced their status to second-ranking powers. They have been working unaltered and no new addition is made despite the fall of Soviet Union and weakness of Russia since 1990 (Ibid: 29, 33). It was expected that these powers would maintain and preserve the world peace. These great powers not only possess great military and nuclear forces but are recognized by other states as the dominant power with an ability to make decision about the global policies through their participation in conferences and congresses (Spanier, 1993: 66). China, India and Brazil emerged as the countries with vast territory and huge population after the World War II. China got the status of a major power while India and Brazil remained regional power. After the World War II, European states felt that for acquiring leading role in superpowers-dominated world, they must pool their resources and conduct united foreign and security policy, otherwise they would remain dependent on the US for their defense. Consequently, European Union was established. But in the Gulf War, when Kuwait was attacked by Iraq, they had to wait and see what US would do and then followed it (the same policy was adopted in the case of 9/11). For the first time, Britain and France sent Military contingents to Saudi Arabia. But Germany and Japan refused to commit politically 'North America' and limited their contribution to the financial support only (Nayer & Paul, Op.cit: 29).

Since the World War II, US is "complete superpower" and other major powers are second- tier powers depending upon the military and economic aid and support of the US in one way or other. According to a definition "a super power is the one, over which the joint military efforts of all non-super powers would be unable to achieve a military victory because the latter are not likely to survive a nuclear onslaught, in other words, a superpower is invincible power in terms of

military" (Reczei, n.d.: 73). The US is fulfilling this criterion and commanding the world with strong military capabilities in all areas of strength and on all four dimensions. So, despite weapons, or military industries, other powers are incapable of securing their interests and dependence and gap between the great powers and superpower is widening (Nayer and Paul, Op.cit: 25). In this hierarchy of the states, US is at the top with vast nuclear forces while other major powers have no match. Not only the nuclear capabilities but many other sources of power are working at its disposal (Ibid, 69-70).

Indian Demand of Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council

India is primarily a regional power but attempting to define itself in terms of global power in maintaining the relationship to other major powers like US, China, Russia and European Union. For most of the 20th century, India's relations with the rest of Asia were limited but it changed them with its rising ambitions, and increased its trade within Asia by changing economic dynamic gradually and tried to translate them into new political realities. Japan has taken place of China as the dominant economic power while China has become the dominant continental power and is important for an overall stability in Asia. Most of the smaller nations are revolving around these Asian powers. India is not a global power but is one of the top contenders of this race. India has the potential as well as the ambition to become a global power in the coming times by fulfilling the required criteria. For permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the order of states today consists of the following three categories:

1) Global Powers or Superpowers
2) Great or Regional Powers, but with global potential and
3) Great or Regional Powers (India and the Future.., Op.cit: 8).

India's urge to become a major power is as old as the Indian state itself. According to S. K. Ghosh, "This dream is pre-dated even the transfer of power from the British." In October 1946, when India was still a British colony, Nehru had the same views. While addressing to army officers, he said, "India is today among the four great powers of the world: other three being America, Russia, and China. But in point of resources, India has greater potential than China". He added that "India is likely to dominate politically and economically, the Indian Ocean region" (Chapman, 2003: 28). India is trying to seek international confirmation for its status of a major power and has strengthened its claim on the basis of its capability to take an active, even forceful role in the two "shatter belts" of Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Indian Claim for Membership in the Security Council

India is demanding status of a major power and has supported its claim through different ingredients and indicators of its eligibility which is yet to be fully recognized by the key actors of the international system. Indian population is next to China and size of its economy is at 4th number in rating due to the purchasing power. It has the 4th largest army with 8th largest industrial economy, having the highest number of scientists and engineers in the world. India's economic growth also supports this claim. Since 1991, following the implementation of the economic reforms, India's economic growth rate is 5-7%, which gave more impetus to India among the regional as well as extra-regional powers, placing India in the world's better performing economics in terms of GDP growth rate (India: sustaining rapid…, 1999; Nayer & Paul, Op.cit: 9). But the fact remains about its size of national economy in comparison with China in the foreseeable future.

India also claims to be an established democracy and 6th largest economy with a voice of one sixth of world population (Nafey, 2005: 4). Henry Kissinger also noted that the international system in 21st century would be dominated by six nuclear powers, US, China, Russia, Europe, Japan and probably India (Kissinger, 1994: 23-24). Samuel P. Huntington also shared this idea and wrote that during coming decade, "India could move into rapid economic development and emerge as a major contender for influence in world affairs". He included India in eight civilizations of the world (Huntington, 1996:121). Seeking an official international confirmation of its claimed status, Indian government has been "single-mindedly" pursuing the status of major power with a seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since long time. This desire is due to the decorative status of General Assembly as actual power is occupied by the five permanent but unelected members of the UNSC.

In the post- Cold War era, India did not diminish its support for the UN extension and demanded for important adjustments with a permanent seat in the Security Council. Its more emphasis is on the pragmatic aspects of multilateralism. India rested its claim on its track record of multilateralism as it had contributed in 41 out of 59 UN peacemaking operations and 9 out of 15 peacekeeping operations. India has been major contributor in peace keeping troops. In 1998, it became the largest troop contributor. Currently, India has over 10 000 personnel in UN-led peace operations and is a champion of the Group of 77 comprising a large number of the developing countries (India and the Future.., Op.cit: 10). These affiliations have made India as one of the largest troop contributors to the UN. The priority on becoming a permanent member on the UN Security Council, is another expression of the same. India is an ardent supporter of UN-reforms, aiming to make the organization responsive to post-Cold War realities.

Expansion of the Security Council and its Requirements

The debate on the expansion of the Security Council started in 1997, when Razali Ismail President of UN proposed the induction of five new non-veto wielding members to reflect the changing global configuration of power. In 2000, the member states stressed the reforms of the Security Council. In 2005, reforms were suggested for improving the present structure of the UN and increasing the number of seats in the Security Council (Nafey, Op.cit: 2). India claimed for this membership and its analysts argued that their country fulfilled the criteria required for this status due to its geo-strategic location, huge size of population, most dynamic economies in the world, and its democratic credentials equal or exceed those of other members and the harmony of interests with the UN objectives (Cohan, 2006, February 28). But these reforms were affected when the Security Council refused to endorse the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the revelation of corruption of the UN oil for food program in Iraq (Nafey, Op.cit: 2).

In September 2005, US announced at UN General Assembly that it would join in reconstituting the Security Council that "looks like the world of 2005". UN listed seven requirements as criteria and authorized US to judge the potential members. These included:

(i)   Commitment to democracy and human rights
(ii)   Size of economy
(iii)   Size of population
(iv)   Military capacity
(v)   Financial contributions to the UN
(vi)   Contribution to UN peace keeping and
(vii)   Record on non-proliferation and counter terrorism.

About these criteria, New Delhi believes that India fits on it and wants the US to endorse it. India views that Britain, France and Russia have publicly extended their support. But the standard American response is different and hence time for endorsing the potential members has not ripened yet. Washington is projecting Japan as a potential member of the Council. Finally, India finds it hard to appreciate the reluctance of the US to support India's bid for the permanent membership of the Security Council (http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1363/(29-04-07).

Expansion of the Security Council was not the American agenda. It stressed on progress in the areas of non-proliferation, human rights and peace building. From the very beginning, US had declared its unambiguous support for Japan and remained evasive on the question of the permanent membership for India. This issue was very hot during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh but he avoided it in his meeting with President Bush on July 18, 2005. An Indian official commented that in the absence of some sort of endorsement, all talks of the US to help India in becoming a major world power would appear meaningless. It was the first test of warm relations but the US could not be seen faltering on the

very first step. US had initially signaled of its support but was reluctant to support openly as Shirin told the G-4 that "we will work with you to achieve enlargement of Security Council but only in the right ways and at the right time" (Times of India, 2005, July 14). Manmohan insisted his case and told President Bush that India had a persuasive case for permanent membership in the Security Council. American official disclosed that Indian Prime Minister got a firm 'no' during his meeting at Oval Office (Nafey, Op.cit: 24). Richard Boucher had clarified that beyond the support for Japan, US has made no further judgment about who else should or should not be added to the Security Council (Times of India, 2005, May 20). However, India remained optimistic of securing US support as it was enhancing its relationship with India, particularly in the field of nuclear technology.

US-India Relations: Transformed-Yet Far from Alliance

During the Cold War era, Indo-US relationship was characterized by estrangement. India sided with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan became an ally of US. The relationship reached an all-time low with the third Indo-Pak War in 1971, when the US deployed warships to the Bay of Bengal (Basu, 2007). It was only with the end of the Cold War and the gradual progress in economic ties that saw warming in relations. Major change came after 9/11 when India offered logistic support for American planes in US-led war on terrorism (Washington Post, 2001, September 17). This laid the basis for transformation of relationship, leading to the cooperation in a broad range of fields including trade, high-technology, nuclear energy, space and defense

There are differences as well as common interests between US and India in current relations. This relationship rests on several pillars. One common interest is the convergence of fundamental values such as democracy and rule of law. Other is the driving force behind the rapprochement as realpolitik. The vivid expression of this was the nuclear agreement in 2006 for the transfer of nuclear technology. The deal is the US recognition of India's new geopolitical significance and bridging the chasm of the Cold War. US-India nuclear deal took years to materialize, much due to the Indian hesitation of accepting American conditions. This reflects an Indian view point of limited partnership rather than an alliance with the US. Both countries recognize the importance of new partnership. For India, it provides leverage against China and confirmation as a major power in future. The strategic interests of the two countries are increasingly congruent in different areas including terrorism and proliferation.

The new relationship is an extension of defense cooperation and joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean and other areas. India is taking benefit of getting weapons and transfer of nuclear technology under this agreement. On the other hand, it has provided a huge defense market to American businesses as well as

serving as a critical supplier of software and other computer products (Raghu, 2005).

India's significance is recognized by different American diplomats as Richard Armitage, former under secretary, shared his views with an Indian newspaper, "India is soon to be the largest country in the world in terms of population. You have a key geo-strategic location, a large growing middle class, a multiethnic multi-religious society and a democracy. These types of the societies that should, we believe, stand miles away-a multi-religious multiethnic democracy, to the extent we can both be anchors of stability in our various regions; we raise the level of achievement of mankind and lower the possibilities of conflict" (Hindu, 2004, October 22). The same view point was highlighted in another study that "India is expected to play its rightful role to ensure peace and stability by the virtue of its size, volume of international trade and transiting facilities through strategic location in the Indian Ocean region" (Raguvanshi, 2004, November 8).

Before coming to India, Robert Blackwill the former Ambassador said that "America and its Asian allies including Australia, South Korea and Japan should collaborate to promote the strategic stability in South Asia and to give greater weight to India's role in Asia and in international institutions" (Blackwill & Dibb, 2000: 129). Ashley Tellis, who served as deputy of Blackwill in 2001-2003 in New Delhi, had the same opinion. He looked India through broad interest and strategically significant for American aims and its economic and military capabilities to strengthen its superiority in geo-political terms in South Asia. Tellis called India as a dominate state in the periphery, directing small states with its "influence outcomes to some degree in more outlying but still relatively near, areas like South East Asia, Central Asia and perhaps even the Persian Gulf, undoubtedly, it will have something like a veto power over South Asian development".

India is much more important for America in overall Asian context. In January 2001, Collin Powell, the then US Secretary of State told Congress that "India has the potential to keep peace in the vast Indian Ocean and its periphery (Ahmed, 2001-02: 80-81)". Even before September 11, US reevaluated its relationship with India as Armitage stated, "one reason for reorientation was, the perceived necessity to have a relationship with India that was not a hyphenated one if a coherent policy against the looming terrorist threat was to take effect" (Times of India, 2001, April 15).

Indian Record on UN Agenda

US has a perceived role and status for India in the evolving strategic partnership but permanent membership lies beyond that policy. In suggesting the UN reforms during 2005, a high level panel reported on different issues including the UN charter. The high level panel reports had mentioned about half-a-dozen times

Kashmir, Palestine and Korean peninsula as issues, without resolution of these issues, no amount of systemic change would enable UN to discharge its role under the charter. In the Panel report, Kashmir was mentioned as one of the oldest disputes which continued to "faster and feed" new threats for world peace and security (Gharekhan, 2004). For the role of UN, the objective of US is different and it wanted to make it an extension of its soft power. It wanted UN to work on the issues like economic development, terrorism and proliferation. It further expected the UN function consistent with US global interests and strategic vision under its leadership. India and other claimants of permanent membership are not part of this plan and US has its own priorities to work in the UN System. As its ambassador to UN, Johan Biotin gave a controversial statement, indicating American intention that "UN need only one permanent member many not be a plain hyperbole". He suggested several changes to the draft of reforms in September 2005. It gave impression that US was sabotaging reforms, many of which were originated in the US itself (Nafey, Op.cit: 33).

Indian Diplomatic Campaign for the Seat in Security Council

India initiated the largest diplomatic campaign adopting different strategies to achieve its objectives. India joined G-4, (a group of four countries), comprising of Japan, Brazil, Germany and India itself for the permanent seat in UN Security Council. Except India, other members did not stress on having the veto power. However, proposal of the G-4 requires two-third majority in General Assembly and the ratification by two-third votes of Security Council including concurrence of P-5 under Article 108 of the Charter. But the group was not succeeded in gaining support of required number of countries (Ibid, 10).

After the improved relations, New Delhi expected that the US would support it for the permanent membership of UN Security Council. However, Washington did not show any sign of backing Indian candidacy or Japan's, Brazil's and Germany's, unless they forgo the right to veto. US attitude on this issue caused deep disappointment on Indian part. New Delhi wants Washington support as it perceives no clash of interests with it. This expectation was not only due to the diplomatic and strategic compensations but also for increasing economic and social ties linking the two countries (Ibid).

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan stated to his parliament that India would accept the Security Council seat with full veto power only. Non-veto membership would mean that India was low in capability than China. It also meant that Indian would get involved in all disputes, many of the peripheral interest to it, while it might not be able to protect its own vital interests. It was further expressed by Natwar Singh that his country would not accept any discrimination between the old P-5 and new members (Hindu, 2005, April 11).

Veto Power and its Usage

Whatever may be Indian calculation and assessment in international system, small countries understand the value of veto. US used its veto in 1990s mostly in favour of Israel in order to secure it from the censures of General Assembly (Nafey, 2005: 7). In such circumstances, insistence on veto power aroused suspicion that this demand was not for the democratization of Security Council but accommodation in an unequal power setup. Moreover G-4 proposal had aroused strong opposition on the ground of regional geo-politics. Each member of G-4 was facing a strong critic in its neighborhood for the permanent membership. Brazil was opposed by Argentina and Columbia, India, Japan and Germany were being opposed by Pakistan, China and Italy respectively. In May 2005, a resolution proposed 25 new permanent members of Security Council without veto power with the same responsibilities and obligations like P-5 but India insisted on veto-power. The US and some potential European supporters opposed the demand of veto power made by G-4. After this opposition, other three members of G-4 decided to dilute their demand of veto power but India was not ready to compromise and viewed it as discriminatory (Ibid: 8). In fact, India's self-image is primarily that of a global rather than a regional power.

Indian limited role is due to power politics. US and its western allies strongly pushed the liberal agenda of democratizing countries and internally, they are against the democratizing of global institutions. Mostly act from the realist view point not on Wilsonian idealist principles of international governance many western liberals also supported the hierarchical nature of international institutional governance (Nayer & Paul, Op.cit).

India and African Union: Global Ambitions

Since the post- Cold War era, India has been increasing its relationship with North America and Europe but African energy and mineral resources became important for Indian booming economy during 90s. India's main stress was on the strategic resources, notably in South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and Gabon. Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean and its participation in anti-piracy operations have also increased its role in security cooperation with countries along the East African Coastal Ocean Rim, including Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Madagascar and Mauritius (India and the Future.., Op.cit: 10).

Africa is also becoming an arena for Indian-Chinese rivalry. China is actually exceeding from India in different areas. In 2006, Beijing hosted China-Africa Cooperation Forum and invited 40 African heads of states. In return, India organized an India-Africa Forum Summit after two years. India's engagement in Africa is an indicator of its increasing geopolitical interests, driven by the access to raw materials as well as a manifestation of great power ambitions (Ibid, 20).

African Union claimed for two seats on the basis of under development and marginalization of its continent. African demand was for an effective role in facing the challenges and threats which were driving UN to reform agenda (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/Reg/unity_to-union/pdfs/au/sirtejuly05/sundeclunref.pd). This decision shocked India due to its relationship, dated back the days of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This decision of AU also put G-4 in a dilemma and G-4 tried to convince AU to drop the demand for veto to add members from Africa. But the problem was not the simple as an Indian official admitted, "I don't think any of the G-4 minds Africa's getting an additional seat but than that would open a can of worms" (Hindu, Op.cit, July 11). When this resolution was introduced on July 11, 2005, China sided with the countries that were opposite to expansion and called the G-4 resolution as an immature formula, which was bound to split the member states and the regional groups (Hindu, Op.cit, July 13).

Regional Actors and Implications for Regional and Global Security

In the light of various sources of power, India claims itself as an undisputed power in the region but this is not true. India and other states regard permanent seat as an opportunity to control the other members of UN through its veto power. Security Council is the ultimate empowerment of NPT while India is not a signatory to this treaty and would put it in an awkward position by approving sanction against the violators or using veto or force against actors newly seeking to acquire nuclear capability (Hathaway, 2001: 21-24). However, this status is not accepted unequivocally by the other regional actors. For India, the greater realpolitick problem is China, that is against an Indian seat because of the long term rivalry of gaining power in Asia. Beijing is also sympathetic to Pakistan's pleas of preventing India from being a permanent member.

India has a turbulent history with Pakistan since independence. During this period, both the countries have fought three major wars and one minor. Tensions once again resurfaced in 2002, after the attack on Indian parliament and resulted in a military stand-off for ten months. The epicenter of the rivalry is the territorial dispute of Jammu and Kashmir region. The conflict is still there and can not resolve despite 40,000 people have lost their lives. India still has nearly 400 thousand troops stationed in the region. The conflict is intimately related to Islam and Hindu nationalism which represent an increasing threat to the internal stability of both countries.

These relations are asymmetric in nature. Pakistan never takes initiative but follows India as it conducted nuclear tests, only following Indian underground nuclear tests of 1998. India and Pakistan are actively improving and pursuing nuclear weapons and missile technology and have not signed CTBT (Talbott, 2004). India and Pakistan seem to agree on the objective of a normalized

relationship but they disagree deeply on how to get it. Pakistan prefers to deal with Kashmir issue first, while India wants to give priority on less sensitive issues and is skeptical of the third party involvement. Conferring this status in UNSC, India would be in a position to block any undesired policy on Kashmir. The UN resolution of 1948 on Kashmir still stands, although India argued that the events of Simla Agreement have over taken this. Veto power is a question in such situation. If India is to take a role beyond South Asia, however, it has to enjoy peaceful relations with its neighbors. Peace process has been started to improve the relations since 2003 but uncertainty of the peace process and insurgency in Kashmir have the potential to keep India in tension. Pakistan opposed the expansion of the UNSC with veto power to counter India (News Time, 2010, January 12). Pakistan might also be able to rally other Muslim states to block India in General Assembly.

China and India remained hostile to each other during most of the post-war period. The relations between the two countries were never free from memories of the border war of 1962. A change occurred only with the visit of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. Following the rapprochement, the economic cooperation increased and trade became an important factor in the bilateral relationship but at the same time, proved an irritant and the source of friction.

India and China also have a number of territorial disputes. The 4 500 km frontier between India and China is still disputed. Talks on territorial settlements have gone on for a quarter of a century. The gridlock was partly broken in 2003 when China extended recognition to India for Sikkim and in return, India recognized Tibet as part of China (India and the Future, Op.cit: 22).

Looking ahead, India and China are redefining their strategic roles and adopting an assertive military strategy. Increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is a challenge for the traditional dominance of India in the region. In this situation, China is emerging as the dominant continental power and US is seeking a number of countries on the Asian-Pacific Rim to strengthen its relation in the region. India is trying to play a balancing role in the Indian Ocean where it has to cooperate with other littoral states and powers. The rivalry is increased by the triangular nature of Asian politics as this triangular relationship is a key factor in the security dynamic of South Asia. That is why Indo-US agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation led Beijing to offer, the one to Pakistan. India's increasing involvement in Central-Asia may be seen in connection with its involvement in Afghanistan. India's engagement in Afghanistan since 2001 has been of a non-military nature. Afghanistan has become an important part of Indian security calculus for South and Central Asian Region and an expression of regional competition with Pakistan. Central Asia has been re-affirmed as a region of great geo-strategic significance, not only due to the energy resources but its location in neighbouring of Afghanistan and its emergence as a source of regional instability and an area of increasing great power rivalry.

Future Multi-Polar World Order and India

During the last decade of the 20th century, the western hemisphere has been the global centre of gravity led by US. At the beginning of the 21st century, major geo-political changes have occurred in the region. The most important is the growth and increasing global influence of China. It is reinforced by Europe's increased role through EU. As a consequence of all this, a uni-polar world, under US leadership is no longer valid and the global politics is moving towards a multi-polar system. The future system will most likely be dominated by more than five great powers with US and China as contenders for domination of the globe and to a lesser extent European Union and Russia while India, Brazil and Japan would be its part. A multi-polar world order may serve Indian interests of securing its place among the major powers.

No doubt, a multi-polar world order would be peaceful due to the competition and cooperation. The basis for such a system would be, the larger degree of economic interdependence between US and China and the absence of an expansionist foreign policy. Hopefully, the consequences for the world at large would be positive. Such a world order would also serve India's interests. It would facilitate India with its emphasis on non-military means to emerge as a global power, but without being perceived as a threat.

Assessment of Indian Desire in Recent American Support

Assessment of Indian desire indicated that its efforts are to enhance its power and influence to play an active role in regional and international order by applying its skills. It also wants to have the support of US, EU, China and Russia as well. Italy, Germany, India and Brazil are large countries and competitors for this status. US seems comfortable with its hegemony, while India is seeking a world of six or seven superpowers with one itself. It suggested working with the other powers cooperatively in the UN Security Council in their respective regions for peace and stability without meddling in other affairs. But both countries have differences on makeup of Security Council as US is reluctant on the expansion of Security Council and a permanent seat for India. From American perspective, Indian demand is problematic and its entry to the club is suspicious. There is no Indo-US history of collaboration in this quest of the seat. Keeping in view, the nuclear program of India, threats of nuclear weapons would further accelerate and nations like Japan would raise questions, which is also seeking a Council Seat. It was also viewed in America that after gaining a membership, India would become less sensitive to US interests and this policy would be that of France, which is opposing and harmful to the American interests occasionally. But France is embedded in EU and NATO membership, while India is not restricted by such framework. The question is also about veto power in the areas of peace-keeping

and humanitarian interventions. Indian efforts are likely to go unrewarded (Nafey, op.cit.).

Recently, US has committed for the consideration of India as a permanent member of the Security Council and Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, pointed about her country that it would support India (Washington Post, 2010, June 3). However, it is still doubtful that India would be successful in gaining US favour unconditionally. India has also cited Chinese opposition to Japan to convince the US but China is in favour of a non-permanent membership for new candidates (*Dawn* 2010, May 27). Apart from US, other Council Members are reluctant but not saying categorically 'no' to India, as French President recently supported India on this issue (Times of India, 2010, June 4). However, there is still a policy of wait and see, while China though publicly none committed but certainly has reasons to oppose India. In UN structure, it is easier to accomplish than to change it. In this scenario, it would be difficult for India to get the required support of the developed nations. While India strengthens its claim of having characteristics required for this status.

Conclusion

Today's institutional framework of UNSC is based on the realities of Post-World War II period, which are required to change according to challenges of 21st century. Since 90s, UN agenda has been suggesting reforms and extension of the Security Council with a hope of change in the existing global order. The key issue is to integrate the all emerging powers into international system. Among these powers, India is one of the top contenders of becoming a major power as it claims to have the potential and the ambition to achieve this status. But the path to be a global power, is yet a far cry and it depends on a large number of internal and external factors. India has to take a prudent approach towards becoming a global power. Today, the world is confronting with a number of emerging powers, all demanding a seat at the table. Apparently, it seems as an opportunity but it also means new challenges. Many challenges today, are global in nature. The events of 9/11 have changed the world and security challenge like terrorism has taken place of the containment of communism. India and Brazil were seen at distant and irrelevant actors in the past but in recent situation, NATO's area of operations is touching the Indian borders and threats are being felt in Brazil equally, as these are not regional but global in nature. All the powers have to participate to solve them as western countries alone are not in a position to counter them. India is the most likely candidate to support an international architecture built on good governance and multilateralism and may be a part to solve a number of key security issues, including Afghanistan, piracy and terrorism. The other side of this equation is that it cannot expect emerging powers like India to take full responsibility for the international order. India's demand for a permanent seat at UN Security Council is

a clear indication of the country's desire to be ranked among the major powers. At present situation, India and the US are increasing mutual relations and the statements are indicating that in the coming times, US would support India but P-5 are not in favour of conferring veto power to new entries. India should not make veto power as its priority to take a seat in the Council. Instead of seeking support from the US, India needs to settle the disputes and territorial issues with neighbouring countries particularly Kashmir dispute which requires to resolve according to aspirations of its people. After settling disputes at home, path to global power will be easier.

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