

Delimitation of Sea Zones between States with Opposite and Adjacent Coasts with Special Reference to Bangladesh and India

M. HABIB-UR-REHMAN

INTRODUCTION

The law of the sea has remarkably developed. The latest document concerned is the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea.¹ As time passed, the sea zones ranging from internal waters to 200 nautical miles (n.m.) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and the continental margin exceeding this zone became conventionally formulated and the question of the delimitation of sea zones, particularly between opposite and adjacent coastal states, has been a problem-creating topic of international law of the sea. As a practical consideration, the delimitation of sea zones has been effected by agreements between the coastal states concerned, taking into account the equi-distance principle or the equitable principle. The present approach is to make an acquaintance with the agreements which have been effected for the delimitation of maritime boundaries between coastal states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other. In the light of these agreements, the paper will suggest what principle should be applied in the delimitation of sea zones between Bangladesh and India.

M. Habib-ur-Rehman is Associate Professor of Law in the Rajshahi University, Rajshahi, Bangladesh.

Internal Waters

In the case of two adjacent coastal states every sea zone² comes into question for delimitation. But in the case of two states whose coasts are opposite to each other no question of delimitation arises unless these states are situated at a distance less than twice the breadth of the sea zones concerned. That is to say, internal waters enclosed by baselines between two adjacent coastal states require to be delimited between them.

According to the Geneva Convention³ and the LOS Convention⁴ a coastal state can prescribe baselines and these lines will be the outer limit of internal waters. It is noticeable that though the conventional provisions are concerned with the delimitation of baselines of the coastal state but there are no provisions specified in the conventions for delimiting internal waters between states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other. The delimitation of internal waters between two adjacent coastal states is to be effected from the outer land boundary of this state to the baselines. If the coastline is the baseline then there will be no internal waters enclosed within baselines. That is to say, no question as to the delimitation of internal waters between coastal states will arise.

According to the conventional provisions coastal state can prescribe a considerable part of the coastal sea as internal waters. In other words, the laws of the sea conventions have enabled the coastal states to prescribe baselines by which a considerable part of the coastal sea can be regarded as internal waters. This results in drawing the assumption that there should be provisions for dealing with the delimitation of internal waters between two coastal states.

In the absence of conventional provisions, it is now questioned as to what principle should be applicable to the delimitation of internal waters between states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other. Needless to say that the coastal state has absolute jurisdiction over internal waters. Except agreement between these states no state can exercise a right in the internal waters of the coastal state. In effect, the coastal state assumes the internal waters as part

of its land territory. Taking this into account and historic rights if any, it would not be irrational to suggest the equidistance principle to be effected for the delimitation of internal waters between two coastal states.

As time passes, states are taking an interest in extending sea zones within national jurisdiction. Since the LOS Convention has prescribed breadths of the sea zones such as the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and the continental shelf, there is no scope to exercise a right arbitrarily for an extension of these zones. It is then the baselines by which a coastal state can extend the sea zones within national jurisdiction. In general, it is the tendency of the coastal states to regard a large part of the coastal sea as internal waters. Therefore, there will certainly arise the necessity of provisions for dealing with the delimitation of internal waters between coastal states. At the present stage, the delimitation of internal waters depends on the agreement between these states. What will be adopted in the agreement should be honoured as the best solution for the boundary of sea zones between states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other.

Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone

Article 12 of the Geneva Convention and Article 15 of the LOS Convention deal with the delimitation of the territorial sea between states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other. The two articles are indetical. That is to say :

“Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.”

It is clear that the delimitation of the territorial sea between two coastal states should be effected by (i) agreement, (ii) equidistance principle and (iii) special circumstances principle. The most general device applicable to the delimitation is the agreement in which the states can adopt any principle. There is no binding for the states to accept a particular principle for the delimitation of the territorial sea between them. The principle which will be adopted in the agreement will be applicable for the delimitation. As a matter of fact, the states will be the final authority for the delimitation of the territorial sea between them. In the agreement the states can adopt equidistance principle or any other principle for the delimitation. There is no bar if the delimitation is effected by an arbitrary line, but this line must be accepted by the states concerned.

As regards special circumstances the two articles have specified 'historic title.' The legal validity of accepting 'historic title' in the delimitation of territorial sea results from the assumption of the law of nations that "a state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible."⁵ Except historic title the articles have not specified other circumstances which would also be regarded as special circumstances. Anyway, peculiar configuration of coastline, great variety of complex geographical situations, presence of islands, and the economic value of proven deposits of minerals in the maritime zones are regarded as constituting "special circumstances."⁶ If the coastal states agree, there is no bar for the delimitation of territorial sea by equidistance principle. But the general assumption is that in the existence of special circumstances the equidistance principle has little scope of application in the delimitation of sea zone between opposite or adjacent coastal states. Speaking otherwise, the legal validity for not applying equidistance principle in the delimitation of maritime zones result from the existence of special circumstances. In special circumstances the delimitation of sea zones is to be effected by some line other than the equidistance line. But it should be noted that special circumstances do not restrict the states with opposite or adjacent coasts to delimit the sea zones by the combination of the equidistance line and some other line as well.

According to the Geneva Convention the contiguous zone between coastal states is to be delimited by agreement between the states.⁷ In absence of agreement neither of the coastal states is entitled to extend the contiguous zone beyond the equidistance line.⁸ It seems that in the agreement the coastal states can adopt any principle for the boundary of the contiguous zone. However, the equidistance principle appears to be the general principle for the delimitation of the contiguous zone between two coastal states.

The LOS Convention has not provided provisions for delimiting boundary of the contiguous zone between the states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other. To this end, questions arise as to what principle would be applicable for the boundary of the contiguous zone. According to this convention, the contiguous zone extends to 24 n.m. from baselines. There are provisions for the delimitation of 12 n.m. territorial sea and 200 n.m. EEZ between two coastal states. In both these cases agreement can be regarded as the common criterion for the delimitation. It signifies that the coastal states would have the scope of delimiting the contiguous zone by agreement between them. That means, the principle which these states would adopt in the agreement would be the best for the boundary of the contiguous zone.

EEZ and Continental Shelf

The 200 n.m. EEZ has made a number of coastal states neighbour to each other.⁹ As a result, delimitation of EEZ between the coastal states with opposite or adjacent coasts has been inevitable to these states. The minimum extent of the continental shelf is equal to the extent of the EEZ. In straightforward words, every coastal state is entitled to extend the continental shelf to 200 n.m.¹⁰ Where the continental shelf extends exceeding 200 n.m. the coastal state is required to fix the outer edge of the shelf subject to paragraphs 4¹¹ and 8¹² of Article 76 of the LOS Convention. Speaking specifically, the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 n.m. from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 n.m. from the 2500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2500 metres.¹³ Compared to the EEZ the

continental shelf has made a greater number of coastal states neighbour to each other. Thus the delimitation of the continental shelf between states whose coasts are opposite and adjacent has been a conflicting topic in the law of the sea. The delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf is to be effected by Articles 74 and 83 the extracts of which are identical. That is to say :

“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”

It signifies that the purpose of the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf is to achieve an equitable solution. There is nothing specified about the equidistance line to the effect of the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf between opposite or adjacent states.

As a practical consideration, the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf between opposite and adjacent coastal states is subject to the outcome of Article 38 of the Statute which deals with the principles applicable to the settlement of disputes. Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention practically do not carry any express provision as to the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf between states whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other. However, the impact of the two articles is to promote peaceful settlement for achieving an equitable solution. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice gives rise to a number of methods to be effected to the settlement of disputes. Accordingly ;

1. “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply ;

- (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states ;

- (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law ;
- (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ;
- (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59 judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the determinations of rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case *at aequo et bone* if the parties agree thereto."

It seems that the article cannot specify what kind of boundary line should be effective to the delimitation. It also shows that no principle can be regarded as a predominant principle to be applicable to the delimitation. There is no doubt that the equidistance principle cannot be treated as a predominant principle to the effect of the delimitation. The equidistance principle can be applicable if the delimitation of the continental shelf between the states is equitable.

In point of fact, the equidistance principle can lead to an 'equitable solution' in the case of simple geographical configuration. In the version of Shigeru Oda :

"The fact is that situations and conditions in different parts of the world are too varied to permit a categorical adoption of the equidistance or median line as a rule for boundaries. The cases where the equidistance or median line offers an equitable solution are likely to occur infrequently and exceptions will probably be more numerous than the rule."¹⁴

Needless to say, dissimilar configurations create a grant many exceptions in the delimitation of the continental shelf between two states. Therefore, no principle such as the equidistance principle can be uniformly applicable. In other words, engineering 'equality' in a specific situation is notoriously difficult : one man's compensatory discrimination may seem like a privilege to another.¹⁵

Achievement for Agreements

It is worth noting that the treaty between the United Kingdom and Venezuela on the Gulf of Persia, 1942 is one of the first of its kind regarding delimitation of the submarine areas between two states. The treaty referred solely to the Gulf. Nothing in regard to the status of islands, islets or rocks above the surface of the sea was considered in the delimitation. The delimitation was effected simply by 'mathematical half' formula.¹⁶

The agreement between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia is of interest as representing the first attempt in the Persian Gulf with the proposal of the International Law Commission, later incorporated into Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf for the delimitation by agreement of the continental shelf of states whose coasts are opposite each other.¹⁷ The delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between the two countries employs a variation of the equidistance principle. The boundary line is not a median line based on the configuration of the coastline, but rather a line midway between predetermined landmarks on both Bahrain and Saudi Arabian territory.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by agreement divided the neutral zone into two equal parts.¹⁸ In delimiting the off-shore zone, Abu Dhabi did not depend on any principles. The delimitation was effected by their own agreement.¹⁹ The 1968 agreement on the continental shelf boundary between Iran and Saudi Arabia made some modification of the median line agreement initiated by the two countries on 13 December 1965 but was never ratified. The 1965 agreement was never ratified because of the reluctance of the Iranians, who apparently felt that the agreement did not provide an equitable division of the seabed resources; this view predominated after new mineral resources were discovered in the northern zone of the continental shelf boundary.²⁰ Although the continental shelf boundary is not precisely a median line in its entirety, there is an effort to approach such a line wherever feasible.²¹ From the subject matter, the agreement appears to have deviated from the stringency of equidistance

principle. As a matter of fact, there is no doubt that the delimitation of submarine areas between the countries took place in harmony with the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Cases*.²²

The agreement regarding delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between Abu Dhabi and Qatar does not contain a specific treatment of an island problem. The two terminal points of the boundary are equidistance points, but one point coincides with an oil-well and there is a special treatment of the island of Dyyinah, which the agreement acknowledges to be under the sovereignty of Abu Dhabi. This treatment is to distort the straight line by an arc of 3-mile territorial sea round the island. However, the Qatar Island of Sharaiwah is about 6 miles from Dyyinah, so that this is really another version of a local median in between two opposite islands.²³

The Iran-Qatar continental shelf boundary based on the equidistance principle, with the exception that the presence of all islands in the Persian Gulf was disregarded.²⁴ The agreement between Bahrain and Iran is not based solely on the equidistance principle.²⁵ Such a trend was identically followed in the agreement between Iran and Oman. It gave emphasis to just, equitable and precise manner in accomplishing the boundary line between the respective areas of the continental shelf.²⁶ The boundary agreement between Iran and the United Arab Emirates regarding the boundary line for the continental shelf also was not based on the equidistance principle.²⁷

The agreement between Netherlands and United Kingdom,²⁸ Norway and United Kingdom,²⁹ Denmark and Norway,³⁰ Denmark and United Kingdom³¹ and Denmark and Netherlands³² adopted equidistance principle for delimiting the continental shelf. Furthermore, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom provided provision giving effect to the deviation of the equidistance line for the delimitation of the continental shelf between them. This was actually made to help exploit the resources of the shelf between the countries. In this regard Article 1 of the agreement³³ says :

"If any single geographical mineral oil or natural gas structure or field extends across the dividing line and the part of such

structure or field which is situated on one side of the dividing line, the contracting Parties will seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure field shall be most effectively exploited."

It shows that no boundary such as the equidistance line was treated as binding upon the parties.

The equidistance method was incorporated in the agreement of 1 December 1964, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands for the delimitation of the continental shelf up to 54° N latitude.³⁴ The agreement of 9 June 1965, between Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany,³⁵ governing a small part of the Gulf in the immediate vicinity of the two states, contains an identical provision, but for a larger area no solution could be found during the negotiations in 1965 and 1966, and so, early in 1967, it was decided by special agreement between Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany³⁶ and between Federal Republic of Germany and Netherlands that their disputes would be settled by the International Court of Justice.³⁷

The Federal Republic of Germany signed treaties in Copenhagen and the Hague on 28 January 1971, whereby disputes were finally settled between Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand³⁸ and between the Federal Republic and the Netherlands on the other,³⁹ regarding the delimitation of the North Sea Continental Shelf. These treaties which had been initiated on 30 October 1970, followed the judgment of the International Court of Justice on the continental shelf originally allotted the Federal Republic of Germany comprised 23700 square kilometres. This was expanded by 35600 square kilometres by the cession of about 5000 square kilometres on the part of the Netherlands and of about 7000 on the part of Denmark zone to adjoin the British area in the centre of the North Sea.⁴⁰ The judgment brought forth some deviation of the equidistance principle as provided in the above agreement for delimiting the continental shelf in the North Sea.

The agreements of Denmark and the Netherlands with the Federal Republic of Germany followed the ruling of the Court. Accordingly, the delimitation should be effected subject to a "reasonable degree of proportionality . . . between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the states concerned and length of their respective coastlines."⁴¹

In consequence of the judgment the boundary of the continental shelf bordering, the British zone under the North Sea though remained unchanged, Denmark⁴² and Netherlands⁴³ had to make amendments to their earlier agreements with the United Kingdom. As a result, the Federal Republic of Germany was required to enter into an agreement with the United Kingdom.⁴⁴

Finland and Soviet Union delimited the continental shelf by the boundary line drawn according to the agreement between them.⁴⁵ The two countries determined the boundary of the continental shelf in the Baltic Sea by median line as adopted in the agreement.⁴⁶ In 1969, the agreement enforced between Norway and Sweden concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf basically provided the principle of equidistance for casuring the shelf between the countries, but from strict point of view, the principle could not be exercised.⁴⁷

The three countries, German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union agreed the continental shelf to be determined by bilateral or multilateral treaty.⁴⁸ Poland and Soviet Union⁴⁹ determined the boundary of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Gdanask and the south-eastern Baltic Sea by the line equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial waters of each of the contacting Parties is measured. Furthermore, an insignificant deviation of the equidistance line was given effect to the delimitation.

The agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia prescribed some lines not being based on the true equidistance line. Article 2 of the agreement speaks of the validity of a deviation from the equidistance principle applicable to the delimitation.⁵⁰

An agreement between Italy and Tunisia of 20 August 1971, is of extreme interest. It prescribed a boundary some 13 miles seaward

where the Italian islands of Lampedusa, Linosa and Pantellaria face the Tunisian coast⁵¹. The choice of 13 miles indicates an institution to accord the island same shelf, outside the 12-mile territorial limit, but of course, the solution is not a strict median line solution.⁵²

France and Spain on 29 January 1974, signed two agreements on the delimitation of their continental shelf and territorial waters in the Bay of Biscay. Under the agreements, the first which France had signed on her continental shelf, the seabed and subsoil of which she was already permitted to exploit under the 1958 Geneva Convention—the dividing line would begin at France-Spanish border at Irun-Hendaye, bisecting the virtual right angle formed by the coasts of France and Spain, and then running almost parallel to the northern coast of Spain for about 300 kilometres. A special zone was established, some 5 kilometres square, in which the two countries would cooperate in the exploitation of hydrocarben resources.⁵³

Canada and Denmark by their agreement of 1974, established the dividing line in the area and the Canadian Arctic Islands for the purpose of each Party's exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of that part of the continental shelf which in accordance with international law appertains to Denmark and to Canada respectively, is a median line which has been determined and adjusted by mutual agreement.⁵⁴

The Senegal-Guinea-Bissau agreement of 26 April 1960,⁵⁵ does not adopt an equidistance line, nor do the many islands off the Guinea-Bissau shore influence the boundary. The boundary is a straight line, projected seaward from the land boundary along 24.0 azimuth. A somewhat similar method is seen in the Colombia-Ecuador agreement of 23 August 1975,⁵⁶. In that, the boundary is a straight line projecting from land boundary along the geographical parallel 1.27 "24 N."

The agreement between Brazil and Uruguay of 21 January 1972, provides a rhumb line (a straight line on a projection) from the land boundary, but "in a direction nearly perpendicular to the general

line of the coast" (the words used in the agreement) so, that, in effect, the line is modified equidistance line. It should be noted that there are no off-shore islands to complicate matters in this case, nor in the case of the Colombia-Ecuador agreement.⁵⁷ The Argentine-Uruguay agreement of 19 November 1973, is similarly uncomplicated by islands and adopted a straight line which is a projection at right angles from the midpoints of a straight closing line across the estuary of the *Rio de la Plata*. The boundary is described in Article 70 as an equidistance line, determined by the adjacent coasts method.⁵⁸

An agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) for the joint development of the continental shelf adjacent to the two countries was signed in Seoul on 5 February 1974. Described by the *Korean Newsreview* (Seoul) as the "first case of joint development of a continental shelf in the history of the world", the agreement provided for the joint exploration and exploitation by the two countries of the seabed of the continental shelf, where large quantities of petroleum and natural gas are believed to exist. The Joint Development Zone covers an area of 10000 square kilometres lying south-east of the Korean Peninsula and west of Kyushu the southern-most of the main islands of Japan, the area in question being divided into nine subzones.⁵⁹

The continental shelf boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia in the straits of Malacca and the South China Sea were fixed by geographic coordinates.⁶⁰ The two countries provided provision similar to Article 1 of the 1965 agreement between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.⁶¹ That is to say, the equidistance line cannot be regarded to have been followed strictly in the agreement. According to the 1971 agreement,⁶² Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand decided to measure the respective area of the continental shelf by means of straight lines extending from a common point whose coordinates are latitude 5.57'N longitude 98.01'E. The median or equidistance line was not considered to be the sole basis for delimiting the continental shelf. Similar to this agreement, Australia and Indonesia delimited the seabed by the agreement in 1972.⁶³

The 1974 agreement⁶⁴ between India and Sri Lanka concluded the historic waters to be delimited between them on the principle which would be 'fair and equitable' to both sides. India and Indonesia redefined their respective sea boundaries extending the existing median line 48 n.m. of the coast of both the (Indian) Nicobar Islands and Sumatra (established under a 1974 agreement) north eastwards into the Andaman Sea (towards the Islands of Kra) to a possible tri-junction point between the waters of India, Indonesia and Thailand, and south-westwards into the Indian Ocean up to a distance of 200 miles from the countries respective coasts. Each country would be able to exercise sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf and to exploit or explore seabed resources falling on its own side of the agreed boundaries.⁶⁵

Maldives and India came into an agreement on the delimitation of maritime boundaries from the tri-junction point with Sri Lanka along the median line between the west coast of India and the Maldives and between Minicoy Island in the Lakshadweep archipelago and the northern atoll of Jhavandiffulu in the Maldives, extending westwards into the Arabian Sea up to 200 n.m. (320 kilometres) from Minicoy and the western atoll of the Maldives. According to the agreement, each party would have sovereignty over all the islands on its own side.⁶⁶ India and Thailand determined the seabed boundary in the Andaman Sea in 1978. The delimitation of the seabed between them was effected by straight lines joining some geographical coordinates.⁶⁷

The agreement between India, Indonesia and Thailand resolved the tri-junction point and delimited the related boundaries of the three countries in the Andaman Sea in 1979.⁶⁸ Article 4 of the former agreement and 3 of the latter equally provided the geological petroleum or natural gas structure or other mineral deposit of any character, if at any time extending across the boundary lines, the three Governments decided, such structures, field or deposit to the equitably shared by the agreement to be reached in the future.

From the above discussion, it can be viewed that the equidistance

principle was applied in different agreements not as the only principle for delimiting the continental shelf between opposite and adjacent states. Actually, the equidistance line was adopted in the agreements where the delimitation of the continental shelf by this line resulted in an equitable solution. As a practical consideration, the common means for delimiting the sea zones as has been provided in the LOS Convention is 'agreement'. What has already been adopted in an agreement for the boundary, the Convention feels, should be undisturbed. In the case where there is no agreement, the states are not restricted to formulate the same. The states concerned are free to formulate an agreement for determining the sea boundary. It seems that the best boundary between the states is one that both the states accept peacefully.⁶⁹

Bangladesh and India Situation

Bangladesh and India are two adjoining coastal states. They border each other with the Bay of Bengal. The Bay of Bengal occupies an area of about 879375 square miles;⁷⁰ and its mean depth is 2586 metres.⁷¹ The continental slope terminates at less than 3000 metres depth.⁷² To the west of the Bay are Indian states—West Bengal and Orissa. In its southern part are Sri Lanka and Andaman and Nicobar group of Islands (India) and to the east lies Burma. To the north and east lies Bangladesh.

The rivers of Bangladesh and India flowing from the highest mountain of the world—Himalayas—carry down to the Bay a colossal discharge of silts. Its effects together with a heavy monsoon rainfall, cyclonic storms and tidal surges have contributed to a continuous process of erosion and shoaling both in land and in the mouth of the mighty rivers. Now islands are being formed in this area, for example—'Purbasha', 'Moore', and 'South Talpatty'. The shoaling bed of the bay is believed rich in resources—both food and mineral.

As Bangladesh and India are adjoining coastal states, every sea zone requires to be delimited between them. The configuration of the coast of Bangladesh is concave. The coast is broken, irregular, indented and unstable as well. The coast of India bordering its states

of West Bengal and Orissa is convex. The sea zones relating to this coast require to be delimited between Bangladesh and India as adjacent states. The Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta of the Bay of Bengal located at the combined mouths of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers is a subject important for the delimitation of sea zones between the two countries.

Geographical features play a major role in the evolution and behaviour of the coastal regions of Bangladesh. The rivers of Bangladesh carry down to the bay a colossal discharge of 2 billion tonnes of silt and combined flow of the river system during monsoon is about 5 million cubic feet per second.⁷³ All such deposits have resulted in the formation of deltas near and off the coastal bay. According to F.P. Shepard :

“There appears to be no place in the deep ocean where the topography has been so influenced by deposition coming from the adjacent land as in the Bay of Bengal. The gently sloping plain, extending for 2000 km. from the slope base off the great Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta to the 5000 km. contour far south of Ceylon, is unique. The slope has an almost even gradient of 1.5 m/km. and the fan is crossed by many anastomosing channels with low levels on the side.”⁷⁴

Outside the 450 km. wide Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta a trough shaped marine valley, called the Swath of no Ground crosses the shelf diagonally in a south westerly direction.⁷⁵ It is clear that the Ganges trough has a seaward continuation for almost 2000 km. down the Bay of Bengal in the form of fan valleys with levees. This can be detected even south of Ceylon.⁷⁶ As a matter of fact, there are a great many variations in the topographical features of the Bay of Bengal. Thickness of its sediments as has been known is 16.5 km. the thickest of any place in the world.⁷⁷

To the east, Bangladesh has some little border with Burma. The topography of the coastal sea bordering Bangladesh and Burma is also peculiar.⁷⁸ To the south of Burma, there exists Indian occupied Andaman and Nicobar group of Islands in the Bay of Bengal. These

rocky and hilly islands geologically are regarded to be the submerged continuation of the outer fold ranges of the Arakan Yoma (Burma).⁷⁹ The fact that the fluvial activities of the great rivers, Ganges, Brahmaputra and their tributaries primarily have resulted and been resulting sediment deposits in the coastal bay.

As a practical consideration, any formations under and above the bay waters would be a concern mainly of the coastal land territory whose fragmentary soil components in different forms such as mud, sands, and silts are deposited there. The Ganges-Brahmaputra plain is subject to excessive flooding by storms surges. The plain is also subject to tectonic activity and shall recent faults are found, some of them producing basins.⁸⁰ The cumulative effects of monsoon rainfall, cyclonic storms and tidal surges have contributed to a continuous process of erosion and shoaling. All these have made the entire coast of Bangladesh to be unstable. They have also resulted and are resulting in irregular formations in the coastal bay. As time passes, such formations are emerging in the form of islands constituted of different components.

The sediments deposits have made the continental shelf extensive in the Bay of Bengal. Ultimately, the continental shelf in the bay requires to be delimited between Bangladesh and Andaman Island. In respect of this island the delimitation of the continental shelf is to be effected between Bangladesh and India as opposite states.⁸¹

Factors such as the peculiar configuration of coastline, presence of islands near and off the shore and deposits of sediments in the coastal bay give rise to the sea zones between Bangladesh and India to be treated under special circumstances. That is to say, the delimitation of sea zones between the two countries is to be effected by special circumstances. In consideration of these situations, the equidistance principle cannot be made binding upon them unless it is accepted peacefully.

Still Bangladesh and India have not been able to enter agreement on the delimitation of sea zones between them.⁸² The two countries are now in question—whether the 'equidistance' or the 'equitable'

principles will be applicable to the delimitation. Bangladesh suggests that the delimitation should be effected by 'equitable principles'. The country comes into view that the concave configuration of its coast against the convex configuration of the coast of its counterpart gives reasons for the application of 'equitable principles'. On the other hand, India speaks for 'equidistance principle' to give effect to the delimitation of maritime boundaries with Bangladesh.

If the delimitation of maritime boundaries is effected by equidistance principle, Bangladesh takes the view that the result of the delimitation will not be equitable. The reason arises mainly out of the concave nature of its coast against the convex nature of Indian coast. From this consideration, Bangladesh assumes that the country will suffer if equidistance principle is applied to delimit the maritime zones. As regards the configuration of the coasts, Bangladesh is undoubtedly in a disadvantaged position. The Bangladesh position can be compared with that of the Federal Republic of Germany against Denmark and the Netherlands in the *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases*.

As far as the configuration of the coast is concerned, India is in a favourable position. Because of the convex configuration of the coast, it is convenient for India to delimit the maritime boundaries by equidistance principle.

The geographical, geological and geomorphological peculiarities in the Bangladesh-India situation can be described as chaos in the law of nature. In this regard an attempt to deal with the law of the sea means to deal with the chaos of nature. But the science of this law is to maintain order which is the dream of man.

As a matter of fact, the Bangladesh-India situation corresponds with the subject matter involved in the *North Sea Cases*. Consequently, the judgment in these cases can give guidelines as to the delimitation of maritime boundaries between the countries. The International Court of Justice, by eleven votes to six found that the use of the equidistance method of delimitation was not obligatory to the parties.⁸³ In effect, "... the concept of special circumstances is

more limited in scope and less open to arbitrary concretion than the general principle of equity as interpreted by the Court.”⁸⁴ Taking into account the geographical, geological and geomorphological factors that have made the Bangladesh and India situation a peculiar case the delimitation of sea zones between them cannot be effected equitably by equidistance principle. But what kind of boundary will be applicable—it is really difficult to specify. However, in the words of France Florio :

“If general principles are understood as an indication of contemporary social needs and trends that direct the interpreter in the application of conventional rules the principles set forth for delimiting continental shelf between Bangladesh and India may be used as a starting point for further studies. Finally, if the interested parties substantially agree on the need for common objectives and concerted action, only technical rules are needed nor general principles.”⁸⁵

In consideration of the geographical, geological and geomorphological peculiarities it is fair to suggest that in delimiting the sea zones between Bangladesh and India ‘technical rules’ should be taken into account.

The Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (Article 74, 83) has given stress on the impact that the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf should be equitable. In these articles there is no specification of the equidistance principle to be effective to the delimitation. Nevertheless if the equidistance principle can effect the delimitation equitable, then this principle can be applicable to the delimitation.

From the observations throughout this study, it should bear in mind that the equidistance principle cannot lead to an equitable solution in the delimitation of sea zones between Bangladesh and India. Because of the geographical, geological and geomorphological peculiarities it is required to reduce the factors—technical and general to help peacefully settle the delimitation dispute between the two countries. In so doing, a joint survey if accepted might bring out a

peaceful solution of the dispute between them. Irrespective of any circumstances the delimitation of sea zones will not be questioned if it is effected by agreement between the parties. But the peaceful settlement of a dispute depends on the goodwill of the parties concerned. Short of this, it is not possible to settle the dispute peacefully.⁸⁶

As far as the agreements on the delimitation of sea zones are concerned there is little indication of the application of a principle such as the equidistance principle to be accepted to its entirety. The application of equitable principles does not mean to reject the equidistance principle entirely to be applicable to the delimitation.⁸⁷ Where the equidistance principle results in an equitable solution the principle will automatically be a part of equitable principles. Terminologically, the equidistance principle is specific whereas the equitable principles are abstract but the application of both principles is to substantiate equitable solution.

Persuant to the special circumstance, it would not be wise to suggest equidistance principle for the delimitation of maritime boundaries between Bangladesh and India. Finally, there is no reservation to conclude that the delimitation of sea zones between the two countries should be effected by 'equitable principles.'

REFERENCES

1. UNDoc. A/CONF. 62/122, 7 October 1982, hereafter cited as the LOS Convention.
2. Internal Waters, Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, EEZ and the Continental Shelf.
3. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, UNDoc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, 28 April 1958 ; Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13.
4. Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13.
5. *Grisbadtna Arbitration (Norway v. Sweden)*, 23 October 1909. See 4(1910), *American Journal of International Law*, pp. 226-233.

6. In order to be well-acquainted with the special circumstances, see E.D. Brown, "The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case," 16/3(1979) *The San Diego Law Review*, pp. 486-496; M. Habib-ur-Rehman's unpublished thesis, *Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries with Special Reference to the Bangladesh-India Situation* (1982), University of Wales, U.K., pp. 323-331.

7. Article 24.

8. Ibid.

9. Lewis M. Alexander and Rober D. Hodgson, "The Impact of the 200-Nile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea", 12/3 (1975), *The San Diego Law Review*, pp. 572-573.

10. LOS Convention, Article 76 (1).

11. 4 (a) "For the purpose of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either :

(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope ; or

(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope.

(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base."

12. "8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding."

13. Para 5.

14. Shigeru Oda, "International Law of the Resources of the Sea", 127/2 (1969) *Hague Recueil*, p. 447.

15. Ian Bnowalie, "Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law", 162/1 (1979) *Hague Recueil*, p. 302.

16. United Kingdom-Venezuela : Treaty Relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Persia signed at Caracas, 26 February 1942. 205 (1944) *LNTS*, p. 121.

17. Bahrain-Saudi Arabia : Agreement of Delimitation of Adjacent Parts of the Continental Shelf signed at Riyadh, 22 February 1958, enforced on 26 February 1958. 7(1958) *ICLQ*, p. 519.

18. Kuwait-Saudi Arabia : Agreement Relating to Partition of the Neutral Zone signed at Al-Hadda, 7 July 1965 enforced on 25 July 1966. 5 (1977) *New Directions in the Law of the Sea*, p. 212. See also Syed M. Hsne, "The Partition of the Neutral Zone", 60(1966) *AJIL*, pp. 735-749.

19. Abu Dhabi-Dubai : Agreement Regarding Off-Shore Boundary signed at As-Samah, 18 February 1968, enforced on the same date. 5(1977) *New Directions in the Law of the Sea*, p. 214.

20. Iran-Saudi Arabia : Agreement concerning Sovereignty over Al-Arabiyyah and Farsi Islands Delimitation of Boundary Line separating Submarine Areas signed at Tehran, 24 October 1968, enforced on 29 January 1969. 8 (1969) *International Legal Materials (ILM)*, p. 493. See also (1967-68), *Keesings's Contemporary Archives-Record of World Events, (KCA)*, 23072.

21. 5(1977) *New Directions in the Law of the Sea*, p. 222.

22. Richard Young, "Equitable Solutions for Off-Shore Boundaries : The 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement", 64(1970) *AJIL*, p. 156.

23. Abu Dhabi-Qatar : Agreement for Settlement of the Off-Shore Boundary and Ownership of Islands between Abu Dhabi and Qatar signed on 20 March 1969, enforced on the same date. See Shingeru Oda, *The International Law of the Ocean Development : Basic Documents*, 1 (1972), p. 419.

24. Agreement concerning the Boundary Line dividing the Continental Shelf between Iran and Qatar signed at Diha, 20 September 1969 enforced on 10 May 1970. 5(1977), *New Directions in the Law of the Sea*, p. 226.

25. Agreement concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Bahrain and Iran signed on 14 May 1972 enforced on the same date, *Ibid.*, p. 235.

26. Agreement concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Iran and Oman signed on 28 May 1975, enforced on the same date. *Ibid.*

27. Agreement concerning the Boundary Line dividing Parts of the Continental Shelf between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The agreement was ratified by Iran on 15 March 1975. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

28. Netherlands-United Kingdom : Agreement relating to the Delimitation

of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea between the two Countries signed at London, 6 October 1965, enforced on 23 December 1966. 595 *UNTS*, pp. 113-115.

29. Norway-United Kingdom : Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the two Countries signed at London, 10 March 1965, enforced on 29 June 1965. 551 *UNTS*, p. 213. The Protocol supplementary to this agreement was signed at Oslo, 22 December 1978 and enforced on 20 February 1980. 1980 *UKTS Cmd.*, p. 7853.

30. Denmark-Norway : Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf signed at Oslo, 18 December 1965, enforced on 22 June 1966. 634 *UNTS*, pp. 71-76.

31. Denmark-United Kingdom : Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the two Countries signed at London, 3 March 1966, enforced on 6 February 1967. 592 *UNTS*, pp. 207-209.

32. Denmark-Netherlands : Agreement concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea between the two Countries signed at the Hague, 31 March 1966, enforced on 1 August 1967. 604 *UNTS*, pp. 209-214.

33. Netherlands-United Kingdom : Agreement relating to the Exploitation of Single Geological Structures extending across the dividing line on the Continental Shelf under the North Sea signed at London, 6 October 1965, enforced on 23 December 1966. 595 *UNTS*, pp. 105-107.

34. Federal Republic of Germany-Netherlands : Treaty concerning the Lateral Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Vicinity of the Coast signed at Bonn, 1 December 1964, enforced on 18 September 1965. 550 *UNTS*, pp. 123-128.

35. Denmark-Federal Republic of Germany : Agreement (with Protocol) concerning the Delimitation, in the Coastal Regions, of the Continental Shelf of the North Sea signed at Bonn, 9 January 1965, enforced on 27 May 1966. 570 *UNTS*, pp. 91-96.

36. Denmark-Federal Republic of Germany : Special Agreement for the submission to the International Court of Justice of a dispute between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Continental Shelf in the North Sea signed at Bonn, 2 February 1967, enforced on the same date. 606 *UNTS*, pp. 97-98. Protocol to the agreement between the Countries was signed at Bonn on this day and enforced as well. 606 *UNTS*, pp. 89-93.

37. Federal Republic of Germany-Netherlands : Special Agreement for the Submission to the International Court of Justice of a difference between the

Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Delimitation, as between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea signed at Bonn, 2 February 1967, enforced on the same date. 606 *UNTS*, pp. 105-108.

38. Denmark-Federal Republic of Germany : Treaty relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea signed at Copenhagen, 28 January 1971. Protocol to the Treaty was signed on the same day. 10(1071) *ILM*, pp. 600-603.

39. Federal Republic of Germany-Netherlands : Treaty relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea, signed at Copenhagen, 28 January 1971. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

40. (1971-72) *KCA* 24718 ; A Denis Clift, "North Sea Gas : A Case-Study in International Cooperation", 23(1967), *The World Today*, p. 149.

41. *ICJ Reports*, 1969, p. 54, para 3.

42. Denmark-United Kingdom : Agreement relating to the Delimitation of Continental Shelf between the two Countries signed at London, 25 November 1971 enforced on 7 December 1972. 1973 *UKTS* 6 Cmnd. 5193.

43. Netherlands-United Kingdom : Protocol amending the Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea between the two Countries of 6 October 1965. Instruments of the Protocol were exchanged on 7 November 1972 enforced on 7 December 1972. 1973 *UKTS*, 130, Cmnd. 5173.

44. Federal Republic of Germany-United Kingdom : Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea between the two Countries signed at London, 25 November 1971, enforced on 7 December 1972. 1973 *UKTS*, Cmnd. 5192.

45. Finland-Soviet Union : Agreement concerning the Boundaries of the Sea Areas and of the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Finland, signed at Helsinki, 20 May 1965 enforced on 25 1966. 566 *UNTS*, p. 31.

46. Finland-Soviet Union : Agreement on the Continental Shelf Boundary in Baltic Sea signed at Helsinki, 5 May 1967 enforced on 15 March 1968. 7(1968), *ILM*, p. 560.

47. Norway-Sweden : Agreement concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf signed at Stockholm on 24 July 1968 enforced on 1 March 1969. See Shigeru Oda, *International Law of the Ocean Development—Basic Documents*, Sijthoff, 1 (1972), p. 391.

48. German Democratic Republic-Poland-Soviet Union : Declaration on the Continental Shelf on the Baltic Sea signed at Moscow, 23 October 1968. 7(1968), *ILM*, p. 1393.
49. Poland-Soviet Union : Agreement concerning the course of Continental Shelf Boundary in the Gulf of Gdansk and the Southeastern Part of the Baltic signed at Warsaw, 26 August 1969 enforced on 13 May 1970. 9(1970), *ILM*, p. 695.
50. Italy-Yugoslavia : Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf done at Rome, 8 January 1968. 7(1968), *ILM*, p. 547.
51. D.W. Bowett, *The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law*, Ocean Publications, 1979, p. 176.
52. Panteivaria is 38 miles from Tunisia (and 54 from Sicily) ; Lampione is 60 miles from Tunisia (and 118 from Sicily). Note that the Tunisian islands of La Galita, which lie 20 miles off the Tunisian coast, seem to be taken fully into account. *Ibid*.
53. (1974) *KCA* 26377.
54. Canada-Denmark : Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada signed at Ottawa, 17 December 1973 enforced on 13 March 1974. 13(1974), *ILM*, p. 506.
55. The agreement originally took place between France and Portugal but the same is presumed to be operated between Senegal (independent 1960) and Guinea-Bissau (independent 1975) as successor states. See D. W. Bowett, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
56. *Ibid*.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
58. *Ibid*. See also (1973) *KCA* 26233 ; Shigeru Oda, *The International Law of Ocean Development—Basic Documents*, Sijthoff 2(1975), p. 72.
59. Japan-South Korea : Agreement on Joint Development of Continental Shelf. (1974) *KCA* 26396 ; Shigeru Oda, *Ibid.*, p. 95.
60. Indonesia-Malaysia : Agreement on Continental Shelf Boundaries signed at Kualalampur, 27 October 1969 enforced on 7 November 1969. 9(1970), *ILM*, p. 1173.
61. See note 43 above.
62. Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand : Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundaries in the northern part of the Straits of Malacca signed at Kualalampur, 21 December 1971. Shigeru Oda, *The International Law of the Ocean Development-Basic Documents*, Sijthoff, 1(1972), p. 428.

63. Australia-Indonesia : Agreement on certain Seabed Boundaries, done at Jakarta, 9 October 1972. 11 (1972), *ILM* 1272.

64. India-Sri Lanka : Agreement on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the two Countries and related Matters, done at New Delhi, 26 June 1974 and at Colombo, 28 June. 13 (1974), *ILM* 1442.

65. India-Indonesia : Agreement on Sea Boundaries signed at New Delhi, 14 January 1977. (1977) *KCA* 23244.

66. Maldives-India : Agreement on Maritime Boundaries signed at New Delhi, 28 December 1976. (1977), *KCA* 28243.

67. India-Thailand : Agreement on the Delimitation of Seabed Boundary between the Two Countries in the Andaman Sea done at New Delhi, 22 June 1978, ratified on 15 December 1978. 19 (1979), *Indian Journal of International Law*, p. 297.

68. India-Indonesia-Thailand : Agreement concerning the Determination of the Tri-junction Point and the Delimitation of the related Boundaries of the three Countries in the Andaman Sea done at New Delhi on 22 June 1978, ratified on 2 March 1979. 19 (1979), *Ibid*, p. 297.

69. M.H. Rehman, "The Regime of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—A Critical Study with Particular Reference to its Delimitation between Bangladesh and India", 6 (1982-83). *The Journal of the Institute of Bangladesh Studies*, p. 54.

70. Rhodes W. Fairbridge (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of Oceanography*, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York, 1 (1966), pp. 110-118.

71. Rhodes W. Fairbridge (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of Geomorphology*, Reinhold Book Corporation, New York, 3 (1968), p. 186.

72. *Ibid*.

73. It was mentioned in an article "Law of the Sea : Certain Issues Relating to Deltaic Countries" by the Director-General of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented in 1976 UNITAR—ESCAP International Law Refresher Course Seminar held at Dacca from 7-20 December 1976.

74. Francis P. Shepard, *Submarine Geology*, (1973), Third Edition, Harpar & Law Publisher, New York, p. 394.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

76. *Ibid*.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 418.

78. David G. Moore and Ors, "Large Submarine Slide (Ölistöströme) Associated with Sunda Arc Subduction Zone, Northeast Indian Ocean", 21 (1976), *Marine Geology*, p. 211.

79. F. J. Monkhouse, *Principles of Physical Geography*, (1972), Fourth Edition, London University Press, p. 211.
80. F. P. Shepard, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
81. M. H. Rehman, "Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries : A Survey of Problems in the Bangladesh Case", 24/12(1984), *Asian Survey*, p. 1316.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 1308.
83. *ICJ Reports*, (1969), p. 53-54.
84. E. D. Brown, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases", 23 (1970), *Current Legal Problems*, p. 214.
85. Franco Florio, "Water Pollution and Related Principles of International Law", 17 (1979), *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, p. 155.
86. M. H. Rehman, "The Law of the Sea and Settlement of Maritime Disputes", 5/1 (1984), *Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies*, p. 71.
87. As a matter of fact, 'special circumstances' justify a departure from an equidistance line. But in order to achieve an equitable solution there is no bar to apply a principle being the combination of equidistance and some other principles for the delimitation of the sea zones concerned. E. D. Brown, "The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case", 16/3 (1979), *The San Diego Law Review*, p. 472.

Towards Punjabi Suba

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF SIKH
POLITICS DURING 1953—64

MOHAMMAD JAHANGIR KHAN

It took about five years for the Sikhs in independent Bharat to adjust themselves in the new environment, making up for the past mistakes and organizing themselves in order to get a respectable place in the country of their own choice. For this purpose they adopted legal methods and kept their struggle within constitutional limits. This period was mostly spent in issuing statements, convening meetings, passing resolutions and taking out processions. But their efforts remained fruitless and the majority community remained indifferent to their aspirations, and even ridiculed their basic demands. Naturally, their bitterness increased. Some of the Sikh leaders still nurtured the idea of independent status. According to a Hindu author, before independence, a reasonable part of Akali Dal and other Sikh intellectuals were intensely committed to the idea of a Sikh state and this segment still held a dominant position among the community.¹ Even Akali Dal itself had advocated the idea of Azad Punjab in 1943. In a statement issued after its meeting in June, its President, Master Tara Singh, elaborated that Azad Punjab should comprise Ambala, Jullundhur and Lahore divisions and Lyallpur, (now Faisalabad) Montgomery (now Sahiwal) and Multan districts. The same year Akali Dal published a short pamphlet pressing their demand. It was argued in the pamphlet that the primary purpose of the formulation of Azad Punjab was to break the Muslim majority in

Mohammad Jahangir Khan is Senior Research Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

the province and to give balance of power to the Sikhs. According to the pamphlet Sikhs would still comprise 20 per cent of the population in the proposed Azad Punjab.²

As their bitterness increased, some of the Sikh leaders began to think in terms of total independence. But they could not advocate their thoughts openly, as majority of the Sikh community and their leaders were still hopeful of some understanding and getting a fair deal. Most of these leaders, led by Tara Singh, were of the view that Sikhs could preserve their rights and identity in a separate province based on their own culture and language and their stand in this respect could succeed through peaceful means. Akali Dal fixed Punjabi Suba as its goal. An important reason to adopt this stand was that the government at that time had begun to think about the demarcation of provinces on linguistic basis. So Sikhs thought that the attainment of a province based on language could be an easy job.

It was against this background that Akali Dal decided to contest first general elections in East Punjab, in 1952. In its election manifesto, the Akali Dal made it clear that "to bring home the sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is vital that a Punjabi speaking province should be carved out from the different states of the country on the basis of Punjabi language and culture—Shiromani Akali Dal holds it as a question of life and death for the Sikhs."³ Thus Akali Dal entered the electoral arena with twin issues of Punjabi Suba and the independent political entity of the Sikh Panth. But Master Tara Singh could not manage the electoral strategy well and Akali Dal put up a poor show. Moreover, majority of the Sikh community was not able to understand this issue as it was presented in very vague terms. The Congress on the other hand was lucky enough to rally the support of many Sikh leaders, who were still critical of Tara Singh's performance during the crucial phase of pre-independence period. Sikh leaders who supported the Congress included Partap Singh Kairon, President of Punjab Congress Party. The elections resulted in a majority for the Kairon group in Congress legislative party. But Congress high-command at New Delhi pushed him aside and installed a Hindu leader, Bhim Sen Sacher as Chief Minister.

This step was a clear betrayal and caused much resentment among Sikhs who took it as an insult. Thus by 1953, Sikhs were convinced that they could not get their reasonable grievances redressed through legal procedures and peaceful means. Naturally they were compelled to adopt the same methods that the Congress itself had employed against the British, i.e., mass and violent agitation, coupled with non-cooperation and courting arrests. So Akali Dal having decided in favour of Punjabi Suba as its main objective, adopted the course of mass movement.

The demand for the Punjabi Suba was formally raised in 1953 and the same year, Akali Dal made its first systematic representation. In a memorandum to the States Re-organization Commission appointed by the central government to look into the matter of re-drawing states boundaries, Akali Dal urged the formation of a Punjabi Suba by merging together the Punjabi speaking areas of the Punjab, PEPSU and Rajasthan. The idea of Punjabi Suba instantly captured the imagination of the vast majority of the Sikhs. "The demand became so much popular in the Punjab that the government banned even raising slogans in its favour."⁴

Another reason for the ban is said to be an episode that happened during Pandit Nehru's visit to Patiala in December of the same year, which has been described by Hindu press as "an ugly demonstration." As Nehru rose to speak at a meeting, the Akalis near the platform attempted to shout him down with the slogans, "we will wrest Punjabi Suba by force," and "long live Master Tara Singh." Then Master Tara Singh himself appeared in the meeting and shouted a few feet away from Nehru "I will not allow Mr. Nehru to speak." Finally, Nehru left without proceeding any further in his speech. The meeting then broke up in confusion, while brick-bats were thrown at the police.⁵

The Sikhs showed a sharp reaction against this ban. Akali Dal had recently emerged victorious in Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) elections, contested on Punjabi Suba issue. Now it was planning to raise the same issue in provincial elections and had campaigned for it for about a year. So it took the ban as an attempt by the government to keep it outside the election arena. It is strange

that Hindus on the other hand were not checked to raise the anti-Punjabi Suba slogans. This partisan attitude infuriated the Sikhs. Akali Dal decided to defy this ban and Master Tara Singh issued an ultimatum to the Punjab Government to withdraw this ban or face a Morcha (agitation).

Akali Dal made a thorough preparation for the Morcha, as it was going to give a test to its power for the first time. Master Tara Singh assumed the responsibility of running the day to day affairs as its 'Dictator'. Akali Dal also announced a long list of militant leaders who were to succeed Master Tara Singh in case of his arrest.

The Morcha was launched on May 10, 1955. Master Tara Singh as its first 'Dictator' was first to court arrest. Before that, he addressed a huge congregation in Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, declaring that the time had come for the Sikhs to offer their heads in sacrifice in order to maintain their honour and freedom. He declared, "... we are not satisfied with the present situation and ask for Punjabi Suba. But they stop us even from propagating the demand for Punjabi Suba. They have imposed a ban on raising slogans for this demand. Khalsaji ! take it from me that all this is designed to finish our honour. This is all we have, if this is gone all is gone. So take every step to maintain our honour. In the present time we should offer our heads peacefully like Guru Tegh Bahadur. The rivals are haughty rulers, but we have faith in the Guru."⁶

The strategy for the Morcha was well planned and it proved Masterji's ability to lead a mass movement. For two months volunteers continued coming out of Gurudwaras, shouting slogans. They were arrested instantly and despatched to far away places. But the momentum was maintained. Volunteers also came from different parts of the province, who, after having stayed for one or two days, went out of Darbar Sahib in a disciplined manner and offered themselves for arrest. Nayar says that "despite various measures adopted by the government, Morcha continued."⁷

The momentum and force of the Morcha unnerved both central and provincial governments. There was fear that administrative

machinery in the province might break down. The troops in the province were alerted and the strength of para-military force was increased.

The Sacher government in sheer panic let loose police oppression. Sikh volunteers were lathi-charged ruthlessly. Tear gas was used indiscriminately. Some of the gas shells fell in sacred temple near Darbar Sahib. All known Sikh leaders, except Hukam Singh, President of Akali Dal, were arrested. Even cooks of langar at Akal Takhat, Amritsar were not spared. But all these oppressive measures proved futile. Sikh passions were at their height. The Morcha continued for about two months. Despite large scale arrests, volunteers continued pouring in to court arrest. The provincial government was left with no alternative but to make a rash move to order an attack on Darbar Sahib itself. A large police force, heavily armed, entered the premises of Darbar Sahib and arrested Akali leaders and volunteers—police used tear gas and engaged in some shooting.⁸

The government justified their move by describing it as a necessary step to deal with law and order situation but the Sikhs took it as desecration of their holiest shrine. The police action in Darbar Sahib infuriated the whole Sikh community and it seemed that every Sikh in Bharat had turned against the government. The wave of resentment among the Sikhs was so wide-spread that Hindus in Punjab began to feel themselves insecure, while the whole Sikh community seemed to be on the verge of open revolt. The *Daily Tribune* commented editorially, "A great tragedy is being enacted in the Punjab—the Punjab is facing the greatest crisis in its history."⁹ This situation perturbed even Pandit Nehru and his cabinet colleagues, as they feared that loyalty of the Sikhs in the army might be affected. Other Congress and Hindu leaders were also worried. But extremist Hindu leaders raised a hue and cry and tried to convince the government that any more concession given to Sikhs would mean their total dominance in the strategically important border province. Some Sikh leaders in the Congress fold charged that Akalis were violating the sanctity of the Gurudwaras. Partap Singh Kairon declared that the

government could not be cowed down by this reactionary and anti-social Morcha. But he was rebutted by many Sikh Congressites who argued that the Sikh community was rightly or wrongly frustrated.

Within a few days both central and provincial governments were left with no alternative but to bow down. Chief Minister Mr. Sacher lifted the ban on slogan raising and offered an apology. "Akali Dal interpreted it as a surrender by Sacher and a victory for the Akalis."¹⁰ This claim of Akali Dal was right to some extent, as Sacher went to Golden Temple in the humblest manner and offered apology before a large congregation. Prime Minister Nehru in order to appease the Sikhs and diffuse tension, made Sacher a scapegoat. He ordered Sacher to quit as Chief Minister. Sacher was succeeded by Partap Singh Kairon, now a lieutenant of Master Tara Singh, later to become his staunch adversary. In July 1955, formal orders for the withdrawal of ban were issued but it took two months for the release of all arrested volunteers.

As a whole, the Morcha proved a mile-stone in the long struggle of Sikhs. They were able to convince the government that they could not be ignored or by-passed so far as Punjab was concerned. Moreover, Sikhs achieved a sense of confidence. A few days later, Master Tara Singh made it clear that, "Sikhs can not save their religion without attaining political power in the Punjabi speaking region."¹¹ In a statement he emphasised that "we must achieve Punjabi Suba at all costs and without it Sikh Panth will certainly perish."¹² But the unity shown by the Sikhs during the Morcha proved to be short-lived. The failure of a mass movement led to allegations and counter-allegations amongst the leaders. But it is strange the success of the first Morcha launched by Sikhs resulted in a serious rift in their ranks. Master Tara Singh and his close comrades were bitterly criticised for having ended the Morcha without getting any important concession from the government. This bickering among the Sikhs dealt a heavy blow to their cause. Khushwant Singh has rightly commented : "At this critical juncture Sikh leaders exhibited lamentable absence of unity. The chief supporters of Master Tara Singh in his demand for Punjabi Suba were Giani Kartar Singh and Hukum

Singh. But at this crucial stage both of them joined hands with the government. The former was rewarded with a ministerial post in the provincial cabinet, while the latter was made speaker of the Lok Sabha."¹³ It may be recalled that Giani Kartar Singh had deserted the Akali Dal in 1948 after sharp differences with Master Tara Singh, but after having been disillusioned with Congress policies, he staged a come-back in 1951 and with its support got elected to the Punjab legislative council. He took active part in 1955 Morcha and was arrested.

Another important leader to leave Tara Singh at a later stage was Sant Fateh Singh. He was not a seasoned politician like Tara Singh but had spent most of his life as a preacher and social worker in the country-side, thus wielding great influence among Sikh masses. He entered active politics as Tara Singh's disciple and there was a widespread impression that he was being groomed as his successor. He made valuable contribution to the Punjabi Suba Movement, leading the campaign from Akal Takhat. Soon his call for the Punjabi Suba became a holy cause. At one stage he described the plight of Sikhs in these words: "The Punjabi is proud of himself outside Punjab but ashamed in his own province."¹⁴ Sant Fateh Singh soon became critical of secular approach adopted by Tara Singh at that time. He dubbed Tara Singh's ideas as alien to Guru's teachings. P.C. Joshi has commented that two trends had grown up inside the Akali Dal by that time. One, being communal, reactionary and pro-imperialist was led by Tara Singh. The other had anti-feudal and anti-imperialist approach advocating Hindu-Sikh unity. This trend was represented by Sant Fateh Singh, who is said to have a humanitarian approach. He aroused no religious fanaticism, no separatism and no communalism.¹⁵ This comment by Joshi reflects the particular thinking of Hindu intelligentsia about Sikh aspirations. He has tried to minimise the importance of their struggle by dubbing Tara Singh as a stooge of imperialist and communal forces. But his comments give some credence to the assertion that Sant Fateh Singh was brought into politics by Congress to sow discord among the Sikhs. Anyhow, at this critical juncture most of the top Akali leaders sharply differed. Though Sant Fateh Singh

had not quitted Akali Dal as yet, he became strong opponent of Tara Singh. And without his three main supporters, Tara Singh was left virtually alone to lead the struggle for the Punjabi Suba. However, it goes to his credit that in the face of heavy odds, he kept the torch burning and put all his career at stake for the cause. He rightly pointed out, at a later stage, saying : "Now my whole life, at least my public life, is tied up with this demand (of Punjabi Suba). If I give up this demand, I cannot live physically, not at least in the political field."¹⁶

But these differences in the Akali Dal had not surfaced as yet and the government at Delhi as well as the provincial administration still considered it as a powerful factor in the Punjab's politics. Nayar, describing the 1953 Morcha as a tremendous success, confirms the change in overall attitude of the government and Congress leadership. He says, "apparently this agitation convinced the government that Akali Dal was a political force and it made conciliatory gesture to bring the agitation to a close."¹⁷ Akali Dal also softened its stand and its executive committee announced after a meeting on July 14, 1955 that its leaders were willing, if invited, to meet Pandit Nehru and discuss with him the problems of the Sikh community.¹⁸ The government seized this opportunity and a meeting with the Akali leaders was convened. Their delegation in the talks consisted of Master Tara Singh, Sardar Hukam Singh and Mr. Gian Singh Rarewala.

The efforts for re-conciliation between the government and Akali Dal were still in their initial stage that States Re-organisation Commission announced its verdict in October, 1955. The Commission, as has been pointed out earlier, was appointed in 1953, to look into the matter of re-adjustment of boundaries of different provinces. In South, Gujrati and Tamil speaking people were pressing for their separate provinces. So Sikhs had also decided to raise the issue of Punjabi speaking state. Though no Sikh was nominated to the Commission, Akali Dal preferred to present its case. In its memorandum, the Akali Dal argued that its demand was in line with the demand in other parts of Bharat for the re-organisation of states on linguistic basis. The memorandum made it clear that Punjabi is

a distinct language and is recognized as such in the Indian constitution. It has its own script, Gurumukhi, derived from Brahmi and not from Devanagari script of Hindi. Hukam Singh in his pamphlet made clear that the citizens of Punjabi speaking areas . . . come from common stock and have common peculiarities of culture, dress and way of life. They have common traditions and history, inter-marriages are common. There are common achievements and failures.”¹⁹ The Commission had not heard the arguments from the Akali Dal’s representatives as yet, that all the Hindu organisations began to oppose its contention. The Hindu press vitiated the atmosphere to the extent of ever-present possibility of a violent communal flare-up. And when the Commission announced its verdict, the Sikhs were totally bewildered. It had outrightly rejected the demand for Punjabi Suba and recommended the merger of PEPSU into Punjab.

The Government was quick to implement the latter clause. Master Tara Singh, earlier, had boasted that Sikhs were going to have two provinces. PEPSU has already Sikh majority and Punjabi Suba will be another state with majority of Sikhs in population. But the latter had not seen the light of day as yet, the former ceased to exist while still in its infancy.

There was a great deal of rejoicing on the part of Hindus in Punjab. But the Sikhs felt totally frustrated and betrayed. Master Tara Singh denounced the Commission’s report as a “decree of Sikh annihilation.”²⁰ Hukam Singh described it as another deadlier blow to Sikhs.²¹ Tara Singh rightly argued that the Commission had not only betrayed the Sikhs but had caused a permanent rift between Hindus and Sikhs. This bitterness led to Hindu-Sikh rioting in many towns.²² Many Sikhs argued, and rightly to some extent, that the Commission was not sincere regarding Sikh aspirations. It was easily convinced by the extremist Hindus that a Sikh majority province, in a sensitive border area, will always remain a threat to India’s integrity. Sant Singh Sekhon rightly commented, “unfortunately the Commission could not get over the suspicion that demand for Punjabi Suba was just a new garb in which the Sikh state is sought to be dressed.”²³

For the time being the Commission's report proved a boon for the government and facilitated its talks with the Sikh leaders. The negotiations proved to be a bit longer and the government maintained a stiff posture at the initial stage. So the Akali Dal, in order to convince the government of its popularity among the Sikh masses decided to put up a show of its strength. In February 1956, Dal organized an impressive procession at Amritsar, to coincide with the annual session of the Congress. A few days earlier, Pandit Nehru, in his usual philosophical strain, had commented that the place of swords and stricks was in a museum.²⁴ But the Sikhs demonstrated that they could rely on their traditional weapons in modern age as well. Their three-mile long procession consisted of blue-turbaned volunteers, carrying shining swords and axes. They were led by Master Tara Singh, seated on an elephant. This was really an impressive show and Hukam Singh rightly commented that "the procession was a proof that the Sikh community stood united behind the demand for Punjabi Suba, Akali Dal was its only representative body and Tara Singh was its undisputed leader."²⁵

This demonstration of Akali strength had some good effect on their talks with the government, who hastened to conclude the parleys at the earliest. These negotiations resulted in a compromise, known as Regional Formula. The Akali Dal announced to accept it on March 11, 1956 but its spokesman made it clear that it was only a first step towards the final goal of Punjabi Suba.²⁶ For the time being both the government and Akali Dal felt relieved. The government was happy that a long and tortuous agitation had come to an end, while Dal was contented that its show of strength had produced some soothing effect on the government and the Sikh community, now solidly united behind it. Thus there was great deal of jubilation in Punjab. The Sikhs expressed gratitude for Giani Kartar Singh, presumably the father of the Formula.

But a few days later, truth dawned on them that Regional Formula gave them nothing as compared to the sacrifices rendered by them during the Morcha. The only positive aspect of the Formula

was that Punjabi was given the status of official language in the province. Moreover, the government had promised to establish a Punjabi University and undertook to promote Punjabi language written in Gurumukhi script. Another concession that the government agreed to give reluctantly was that the regional committees, set up under the Formula, were empowered to make recommendations, though only regarding the matters other than financial ones. But for these minor adjustments, the Sikhs had to pay a high price. Under the terms of the Formula, Akali Dal was forced to quit the political arena, with a solemn pledge not to indulge in any political activity in future, but to concentrate on social and religious matters only. All its members of the provincial assembly joined Congress party en masse. Though declared bi-lingual, Punjab retained its unitary form of government with single governor, cabinet and assembly. What confused the matter most was that the Sikhs were deprived of the chance of taking part even in ordinary law-making process by introducing group system in the provincial assembly. Under this system MLAs were divided in two groups : one elected from Punjabi speaking areas, the other representing Hindi speaking constituencies. Any measure affecting one arena was to be considered by respective MLAs before being put to debate in the house. Thus the working of the provincial assembly with adequate Sikh representation was made meaningless. The most grievous blow that the Formula dealt to the Sikhs was that PEPSU, where Sikhs formed majority, was abolished and merged with rest of the province. Thus Sikhs, totally non-plussed, were at the cross-roads. Having given tremendous sacrifices, they could achieve nothing substantial. Khushwant Singh rightly comments : "The truth dawned on them (the Sikhs) after a few months. Having acquiesced in the liquidation of PEPSU, they were even further away from achieving their goal."²⁷ This Congress-Akali accord, or the Regional Formula, was not based on sincerity, but was a product of expediency. Both the Congress and the government had entered the accord only to avert the direct clash and they did not care to honour it, but efforts were made to undo it. A Hindu author admits that "the Punjab Government did not

really implement it either in spirit or letter. The Regional Committees were reduced to the level of sub-committees of the Punjab legislature, their powers were curtailed and they hardly functioned.²⁸ It was also admitted that, "the ruling party neither acted upon it, nor genuinely implemented it."²⁹

At this stage it also came to light that the government and the Congress were trying to undermine Master Tara Singh and sow seeds of discord among the Akali ranks. They also interfered in the Gurudwara elections by putting up their own candidates. These tactics enraged the Sikhs. The tussle between the government and the Sikhs continued for about a year and the tension between them surfaced at the issue of distribution of tickets for the 1957 general elections. The Congress offered to allocate a quota of 25 seats to Akalis in addition to the Rarewala group. At the same time, it felt reluctant as this would make Akalis a powerful group in the regional committee for the Punjabi speaking region and thus provide them a chance to make it an effective body.³⁰

Tara Singh, totally disillusioned, announced that : "The Regional Formula is dead."³¹ He later revived Akali Dal as an opposition political party and pressed for Punjabi Suba. Akali Dal, under his guidance, decided to contest Gurudwara Elections. He termed it a matter of life and death for the Panth and started vigorous election campaign. Despite his failing health, he vastly toured the rural areas, declaring that the election results would be considered as plebiscite on the demand for Punjabi Suba. About one year was spent in electioneering. His efforts bore fruits. In 1957 general elections, the Akalis were able to sway public opinion in the predominantly Sikh constituencies in their favour and captured 19 seats.³² Lala Brish Bhan, former Chief Minister of PEPSU and a strong supporter of its merger, was defeated by an Akali candidate.³³ Though ruling party could not be defeated and twenty-three out of twenty-nine Congressite Sikhs were declared elected, but Master Tara Singh was not deterred. He continued his crusade to organise the Sikh masses, and ultimately succeeded in winning over their confidence.

In three years time, he was able to overcome the combined strength of the Congress, communists and other anti-Suba elements in Sri Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee elections by capturing 136 out of 140 seats.³⁴ This was clear proof that vast majority of Sikh masses supported him and his demand for the Punjabi Suba. The SGPC results were announced in January 1960, and he spent next three months in consolidating the results of this victory. But the government was still reluctant to adopt a reasonable course. Tara Singh, having lost all hopes of patch-up, announced that all doors of negotiations were closed. He expressed total lack of confidence in Congress leadership, as well as the central and provincial governments and decided to launch a movement.

The Sikhs were so bitter that they had started to prepare for the campaign even before its formal announcement. The campaign was termed as *Dharam Yudh* (Religious War). Akali Dal issued posters warning the Sikhs that the Hindus were out to destroy them. A call to the rural areas said that "Panth is in danger and unless Punjabi Suba is secured, there will be no security and protection for the community."³⁵ Akali workers toured the province with a message that it was the last struggle and a fight to the finish. In April 1960, Master Tara Singh resigned from the Presidentship of SGPC to devote himself entirely to the movement.³⁶ He extolled the Sikhs to prepare for the holy war and come out with their heads on their palms.³⁷ On April 30, 1960 the Akali Dal passed "Now or Never" resolution.³⁸ Next month, Dal organised a convention of various political parties, supporting the demand for Punjabi Suba. In the convention held at Amritsar, Dal made it clear that the demand for Punjabi Suba was a matter of life and death for the Sikhs.³⁹

A few days later, Akali Dal came out with a plan to organise a *Shaheedi Jatha*. According to the plan, the *Jatha* was to start from Akal Takhat, Amritsar, under Tara Singh's command, to reach Delhi after having roamed leisurely through Punjab for about two weeks. At Delhi, a mass demonstration was also to be organized.⁴⁰

The government, on the other hand, was fully alert and had

made thorough preparations to meet any challenge. It had also started a propaganda campaign to malign the whole Sikh community as anti-India. It was publically alleged that Sikhs have been instigated by certain foreign powers to press their demand for the Punjabi Suba. The names of the USA and Pakistan were particularly mentioned.⁴¹ Mr. U. N. Dhabre, a former Congress President, claimed in a signed article that "the demand for Punjabi Suba runs counter to the very basis of Indian Union. The Sikhs demand a theocratic state while the Congress is committed to the *Qom* (Nation)."⁴² Mr. Darbara Singh, the Punjab Congress Chief, alleged in a public speech at Amritsar that "Sikhs were putting pressure on the government only to get it to renounce its non-aligned policy and join the American block."⁴³ Side by side this vicious campaign rumours were spread to cast doubts on the intentions and sincerity of the Sikh leaders. *Daily Hind Samachar* Jullundhur commented on 28 July, 1960 that "the Akali leaders did not want the Sikh agitation to result in the achievement of Punjabi State."

The provincial government was also fully prepared and Chief Minister Kairon was not un-nerved like his predecessor, Bhim Sen Sacher. He decided to deal with the situation with an iron hand. The *Shaheedi Jatha* had not started as yet, that Tara Singh was arrested under the Preventive Detention Act on the plea that the step had become necessary to save the state from getting too chaotic. Tara Singh was also charged with "indulging in such activities so as to arouse religious sentiments of the Sikhs against the Hindus."⁴⁴ This step was followed by large scale arrests of Akali leaders and workers. But Sikhs were not deterred. Remaining Akali leaders, entrenched at Darbar Sahib, Amritsar. They sent forth a call to the rural areas. Akali workers spread throughout the countryside with a message of *Dharam Yudh* calling for the last struggle.

After Tara Singh's arrest, his place was filled by Sant Fateh Singh. "Masterji before going to jail had appointed Sant Fateh Singh as Dictator of the Morcha."⁴⁵

Sant Fateh Singh, was basically a religious preacher and a social worker. He had spent most of his life in the countryside preaching

Guru's Ideas, thus wielding great influence on the Sikh masses. He had recently been brought into politics by Tara Singh and was at that time Vice-President of Akali Dal."⁴⁶ Sant, though of a peaceful nature, proved his skill as a leader of a mass movement. He adopted the same tactics that the Congress had employed against the British. He organised passive resistance on a mass scale.⁴⁷

Having generated considerable enthusiasm among Sikh community, Akali Dal gave a call for another Morcha. It was formally launched in June 1960, with a warning that "Hindus wanted to destroy Sikhs. Akali Dal termed it as the last struggle."⁴⁸ Sant Fateh Singh, having assumed the responsibility of directing the Morcha, established his headquarters at Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, where most of the un-arrested Akali leaders had assembled. They established contact with their field organisations to mobilise volunteers and Akali workers were able to generate considerable enthusiasm in rural areas."⁴⁹ Inside Darbar Sahib, there was a great deal of activity. The *Jathas* from different parts of the province began to assemble in the Holy Shrine. The *Jathas* stayed there for two or three days, offered prayers and took oath at the Akal Takhat that they would not return home until Punjabi Suba was achieved. After having been blessed by Sant Fateh Singh, *Jathas* marched out of the temple, shouting Punjabi Suba slogans. By that time, there had been some change in the thinking of Sikh community itself and many Sikh leaders had been fed up with the policy of permanent confrontation with the government, pursued by Master Tara Singh and his group. All the previous Morchas had caused sufficient loss in terms of men and material. And the business of Sikh shopkeepers, labourers and merchants had suffered a lot. As the Sikh community, as a whole, became increasingly conscious of the need to have a respectable place and felt the necessity of concentrating on education and business, the leaders like Hukam Singh, Swarn Singh and Partap Singh Kairon, with a good social and educational background and having commendable record of serving their community, became critical of the Jathedars, holding complete grip over Akali Dal and

its policy. As they played a decisive role in the Sikh politics, their background requires some elaboration. Khushwant Singh and Baldev Raj Nayar have given a brief account of their career which is as follows :

Hukam Singh, an Arora lawyer from Montgomery (now Sahiwal) had a good record of serving his community. He, alongwith Giani Kartar Singh and Master Tara Singh, first put forward the demand for Punjabi Suba, but after getting disillusioned with both, withdrew active support of Suba Movement in 1961. Next year he was elected as Speaker of Lok Sabha with Congress support. His magazine, *Spokesman* rendered valuable service for the Punjabi Suba Movement.

Swarn Singh was a Jat lawyer belonging to district Jullundhur and had his education at Lahore. In 1946, he was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly and served as Development Minister. In 1952, Pandit Nehru took him in his cabinet and he rendered valuable services to counter Tara Singh and his colleagues. He was given the portfolio of works. He was made Minister for Steel, Mines and Fuel in 1977 ; Minister for Railways in 1962; Minister for Food and Agriculture in 1963 and Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1964. This brilliant public record is sufficient to show that he enjoyed some confidence of his community. He also did a lot to keep Sikh educated class away from Akali agitation.

But the strongest opponent of Tara Singh, Akali Dal and the Punjabi Suba Movement proved to be Partap Singh Kairon. Though he met a tragic and ignominious end, he had a brilliant record in education and politics, as well as of serving his community. When in 1959, he assumed the responsibility as Chief Minister, he had a vast experience in political and administrative fields. Born into a Jat Sikh family of village Kairon in Amritsar district, he had the opportunity of associating himself with the Sikh politics at an early stage. His father had been an influential leader in Singh Sabha Movement, so from the very beginning, he took active part in social and political activities of his community. After having studied at Khalsa College, Amritsar, Kairon proceeded to USA and for about

nine years stay there, he received his Master's degrees in economics and political science, worked on an assembly line in Ford Motor Company and established closer relations with Indian revolutionaries there. On his return to India in 1929, he joined Akali Dal under influence of Tara Singh, edited a newspaper *New Era*, took part in civil disobedience movement in 1931 and was sentenced for five years imprisonment. In 1934, he became General Secretary of Akali Dal, beginning his active apprenticeship under Tara Singh. In 1937 elections, he ran as Akali candidate and defeated veteran nationalist leader Baba Gurdit Singh. In 1937, he alongwith other Akali leaders, joined All-India Congress to become its General Secretary in Punjab about four years later. It was during this period that he differed with Tara Singh over the issue of collaboration with British in war efforts. So he broke away from Akali Dal in 1947 and entered into an alliance with the Unionist government. After independence, he served as a Minister in the East Punjab Cabinet. He made valuable contribution in re-organising the provincial administration and rehabilitating refugees coming from Pakistan. It was at this stage that he attracted the attention of Pandit Nehru, who began to take special interest in him. With Nehru's blessings, he was elected to the working committee of All-India Congress. He proved his skill in organising the party in Punjab. In 1950, he was elected its Provincial Chief and five years later became Chief Minister of Punjab, thus bringing both party and the government under his personal control. This arrangement, though unconstitutional, was accepted by Nehru and the Central Government as it had given Kairon sufficient power to deal with the Punjabi Suba Movement. And Kairon, on his part gained sufficient strength from the Regional Formula. Now he was determined to crush what called the anti-social Morcha. And his determination had some solid ground. His government had brought considerable prosperity for the province, opening vast opportunities for the Sikh community. It was during his tenure as Chief Minister that Punjab became self-sufficient in food production and was able to feed other grain-deficit provinces.

Like all leaders with some commendable record, Kairon had a

large number of foes and friends, critics and admirers. His adversaries blame him for corruption and political manipulation. Nayar had quoted two examples to illustrate this thesis. He has quoted a cabinet minister as saying: "His technique is manipulating and setting one leader against another, that is what I found. Just to illustrate it, I am elected from a particular constituency. I will not get all the help indeed, but the person who opposed me, and who can be considered my rival in that constituency will get all support from him. He undermines everybody in that manner. He is particular to see that a person does not go beyond certain limits. Every one should be kept in limits, that has been his policy. He is a shrewd politician. He has the inclinations of a fascist or a dictator. An important Akali leader, who later turned his admirer stated ; "His major technique is to solve personal problems—personal economic problems, immediately. He will give you a job, and permit, a job to your wife, a membership in some board, some contract. He must deal with it immediately, and he is a great leader who makes decisions himself. He is a dictator, a king."⁵⁰ A former colleague of Kairon, but later his vigorous opponent, said, "This is his biggest technique to corrupt politically. Every one can be purchased, this is his thesis."⁵¹ He is also described to be "well-known as an administrator of dash, drive and decision, having handled successfully a number of agitations in Punjab."⁵² According to Nayar, "he built for himself an image of being a second Ranjit Singh. Kairon was also said to be delighted in handling emergencies and political crisis. He is given the credit of being the true son of the soil. Though he spent some nine years in the United States, he kept close to his soil. He was easily accessible to the villagers of the province and was considered to be a peasant at heart and genuinely concerned with the welfare of Punjab peasantry."⁵³ Such was the person, who was entrusted with the task of dealing with the Sikh agitation. It is an irony that the man with such an ability and initiative was compelled to take action against his own community. The responsibility for it rests only with Master Tara Singh and his colleagues. Knowing well that its agitation could not succeed so long as Kairon is in power, Akali Dal made him a special target and tried its utmost to dislodge

him but failed.⁵⁴ Kairon on his part vowed that he would not allow even a single leaf to stir in the Punjab. The agitation became for him as a "struggle between good and evil."⁵⁵ The government and the Congress leaders at the Centre, had so much faith in his ability that they decided not to interfere directly, but preferred to remain in the background, though provincial government was entrusted with vast power to deal with the situation. Moreover, Kairon had the personal support and blessings of Prime Minister Nehru. Thus strongly fortified, Kairon took up the challenge boldly and acted swiftly. He declared that as long as he remains in power, he would not allow further vivisection of Punjab as these are the days of expansion and not narrowing down of boundaries.⁵⁶ In an interview, he said :

"I am playing for high stakes. On one side is the integrity, unity and prosperity of my dear community and on the other are communal and disruptive forces, coming in various forms and changing slogans, which wish to pull my country down... I fight against them, because I love my country and my people. If in the fight I have to face death, I would welcome it, because it would be a glorious death. What is my life after all when millions of lives are at stake."⁵⁷

The Morcha, was formally launched in June 1960 and dragged on for nearly six months. During this span of time about 57000 volunteers courted arrest. It was the largest ever mass mobilisation with largest ever arrest in any other earlier struggle launched in the Punjab.⁵⁸ By that time Sant Fateh Singh had retired to the top-storey of Akal Takhat for meditation and no outsiders were allowed to disturb him. The story was spread that he had gone underground to seek Guru's guidance.⁵⁹ It was interesting to note that the same tactics were employed by M. K. Gandhi many times during his long public life and had proved to be a great success. The Sant's move also inspired the simple Sikh masses while the government was hoaxed and be-wildered about his real intention, not knowing whether he was inside or outside the temple.⁶⁰ Sant made his formal appearance in August and addressed a press conference declaring that the Morcha

was for a Punjabi speaking state. It was directed not against Hindus but the government. He also spoke of communal harmony saying that the Sikhs had come from Hindu stock, were born of them. Sant vowed to keep the Morcha peaceful despite any sort of provocation saying that he himself was too poor and small a man to lead the Morcha. He had gone to seek Guru's guidance and had got it. Now the Guru himself was leading the Morcha. So he had come out.⁶¹ But the determination of Kairon government convinced the Akali Dal that it was not an easy prey like that of *Sacher Ministry*. With the passage of time not only did the flow of volunteers slow down, but those already arrested petitioned to be pardoned and released . . . government on its part made large scale releases of those arrested during the agitation. All the resources of the Akali Dal were nearly exhausted and the agitation seemed headed for complete failure.⁶²

Sant Fateh Singh, in order to avert complete defeat, decided to go on fast unto death. In November, 1960, he wrote to Prime Minister Nehru informing him of his intention to go on fast and his determination to remain on fast untill he became a Martyr or Nehru formed the Punjabi Suba. After having waited for about a month, Sant started his fast at the Akal Takhat, Amritsar, taking an oath on December 18th. Nehru made a number of appeals to give up his fast, promising to do every thing for the advancement of Punjabi language but remained adamant on the issue of Punjabi Suba. His argument was that Punjabi Suba will prove harmful for the Sikhs, Punjab and India.⁶³

Nehru again repeated his appeal, saying, that non-formation of Punjabi Suba was not due to any discrimination against the Sikhs. He repeated his argument that Punjabi Suba would prove harmful for all concerned.⁶⁴ His anxiety increased to know that Giani Kartar Singh (a member of Punjab Cabinet), Mr. Hukam Singh (then Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha) and Mr. Gurmakh Singh Musafir (President Punjab Congress Committee) were planning to resign their respective positions. So he went to Rajpura, an important centre of the Movement lying mid-way between Ambala and Ludhiana on G.T.

Road, and made his famous announcement about Punjabi being dominant language of the Punjab state. He also instructed Kairon to declare Punjab a uni-lingual state within next two or three days, thus demolishing the very foundation of demand for the Punjabi Suba.

Kairon pleaded for few days more . . . But secretly told Nehru : Do not bother about making the uni-lateral Punjabi Suba announcement. This Morcha is already over or will soon be so.⁶⁵

Though the pace of agitation had slackened by that time ; Sant Fateh Singh remained adamant. So Nehru was greatly worried apprehending that agitation might be activated again. What perturbed him most was the solid unity prevailing in Akali ranks. So he decided to try his trick, i.e., putting one Sikh leader against other, thus sowing discord in Akali ranks.

It was against this background that government made a tactical move by releasing Tara Singh on January 4, 1961. Sant Fateh Singh had kept the movement totally peaceful and had maintained communal harmony. His daily fervent appeals for Hindu-Sikh unity prevented any communal clash and Morcha remained totally peaceful. But Tara Singh soon after his release and in a special meeting with Nehru, gave the movement a communal touch by describing it as *Dharma Yudha* (The Holy War). Joshi describing his release as opening of Pandora's Box, says that he began making violent speeches that Sikhs will sacrifice their lives for the Panth. He also declared that after Fateh Singh's death he would be next on the list and that a series of fasts would continue until Punjabi Suba was attained. Such reckless utterings naturally vitiated the atmosphere and sabotaged the movement. He totally made it a communal movement, directing it against Hindus rather than the government.

Sant Fateh Singh told at a later stage that Tara Singh's release was a political manoeuvre. Government knew the mind of Master Tara Singh and also knew that his release would spoil the atmosphere of Hindu-Sikh unity—and that is what exactly happened. The moment Master Tara Singh was out of jail, he raised the slogan of

Dharma Yudha. On entering the enclosure I was fasting in, the first thing he said was : "Who says this is not a *Dharma Yudha*. It is a holy war, without winning which Khalsa cannot survive."⁶⁶

Anyhow, the government had succeeded in creating a rift in Akali ranks and the tussle between the Sant and the Teacher had reached the point of no return. Tara Singh, by now had begun to feel that he was losing ground. And this feeling had some background. He had lowered his prestige among his masses by having accepted the release from jail and a meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru without pressing for his minimum demands. The Sant, on the other hand, had attracted the attention of the whole country and sympathy of his community by having undertaken fast unto death. Government was also giving him more weight than Tara Singh and Nehru was prepared to have some understanding with him. Joshi rightly comments : "Tara Singh also knew that the real cause of Sant's popularity was the ordeal of fast unto death he was passing through. So he decided to adopt the same course. But before it he persuaded Fateh Singh to give up his own fast. Tara Singh's immediate aim at this stage was to queer the pitch for any Sant-Nehru concord. He set out to demolish all positive stances in Fateh Singh's stand."⁶⁷ Tara Singh succeeded in persuading the Sant to give up his fast, who did so on January 9, 1961. And obeying dutifully his leader's instruction, he quietly retired. He did not fight back the Master and his demagogic tricks.⁶⁸

For next six or seven months, there prevailed a great confusion in the Akali ranks. Tara Singh was rightly blamed for having persuaded the Sant to give up his fast, without gaining any substantial gains. But Master Tara Singh on the other hand, began to assert his leadership more vehemently and continued making unreasonable demands. Sant Fateh Singh, on the other hand, tried his level best to ease the tension. For this purpose he, after giving up his fast, went to see Pandit Nehru and tried to find some way out. But Tara Singh confused the matter by insisting that Fateh Singh was only a Vice-President of Akali Dal and, therefore, could not negotiate independently with Prime Minister Nehru.⁶⁹

Moreover, Sant Fateh Singh had succeeded in keeping the Punjabi Suba issue purely an administrative and political one, but Tara Singh made it totally a religious demand, thus creating a strong resentment among Hindus. He increasingly linked Punjabi Suba with Sikh religion.⁷⁰ He even persuaded Akali Dal to pass a resolution declaring, "Nothing less than Punjabi Suba will be acceptable and it should consist of pure Punjabi speaking areas of the state."⁷¹ And within few minutes after the resolution had been adopted, he declared that the struggle for Punjabi Suba was a *Dharma Yudh*.⁷²

This reckless attitude, naturally, offended the government and the talks between Nehru and Fateh Singh ended in a failure. A senior Akali leader Sarup Singh blamed Tara Singh for it, but he was soon expelled from the Dal.⁷³ Having demolished all hopes of a patch-up and creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension, Tara Singh announced his intention to undertake fast unto death. In order to coerce the government into conceding Punjabi Suba. He argued that "it was out of discrimination against the Sikh community that this just demand is not acceded. It was the last struggle and would continue until the objective was achieved."⁷⁴

Tara Singh spent about two months in formal arrangements and consultations with his colleagues. Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, again became a centre of hectic activity. All his close comrades assembled there issuing violent statements. He began his fast unto death on August 15, 1961 taking an oath before a large gathering in Golden Temple, not to break his fast until Nehru accepted the demand for Punjabi Suba. His fast was given wide publicity and for a few days he remained the centre of attention for the whole country. But the government again remained unmoved. Even Pandit Nehru took his fast very lightly saying, "so far as one can see, this fast may indefinitely go on and on."⁷⁵ The fast, as was expected, created wide-spread uneasiness in the Sikh community. For some time Tara Singh seemed to have regained his lost prestige. But as the government gave no weight to his ordeal, his bitterness increased and his colleagues were greatly perturbed. His supporters threatened the government with violence in case Tara Singh died. Punjab Public

Relations Department, side lights on Akali strategy and Nayar has summed up the mood prevailing amongst Akali ranks at that time that Akali leaders made strong speeches accusing Nehru, Kairon and their colleagues. They stressed the importance of bloodshed to achieve Punjabi Suba and urged the Sikhs to smear their weapons with blood. They warned that Sikhs would first deal with Hindus, would bring Nehru on a nose-string to the Golden Temple and there would have him beaten with shoes by the congregation, Sikhs would take to swords and devour Congress leaders and if Tara Singh died then neither Nehru nor Kairon, nor railways and post offices would survive. Some Akali leaders declared that Nehru would not be able to find refuge any where and asked him to learn a lesson from the hanging of Mendrees of Turkey. Harcharan Singh Hudiara, now a close confidant of Tara Singh, declared that Akali Dal wanted to turn the whole of India into a Sikh state. He called Kairon a mad dog and Nehru a cowardly, dishonest and mischievous person. He warned that the Sikhs would resort to swords. There would be an upheaval in the country and neither Nehru nor his agents would be found on earth.⁷⁶

Sant Fateh Singh, on his part, did not slacken his efforts to cool down the tension. He had further talks with Nehru. Though the latter did not go further than a promise of high level inquiry into the charges of discrimination and willingness to consider measures for the advancement of Punjabi language, Sant succeeded in keeping the agitation within the bounds of peaceful means. Tara Singh, on the other hand, tried his level best for a direct confrontation with the government stressing the need of a *Dharm Yudh* and expressing his determination to lay down his life for the Panth. He outrightly rejected Nehru's offer for a high level inquiry and "threatened to take the case of Punjabi Suba to the United Nations."⁷⁷

In an interview with foreign correspondents on September 2, 1961 he put two conditions to break his fast. One was a solemn pledge from Great Britain or some other Nation to raise the Punjabi

Suba issue in the United Nations while the other condition he put was that either of the two former British officers should be made arbitrator for the issue. The names of these two officers proved somewhat intreaguing. One of them was Sir Ivan Jenkins, the other being Mr. Penderel Moon. The former had been the last Governor of undivided Punjab and in that capacity he had fully collaborated with the Sikhs in their mad game of loot, murder and arson by providing all sort of help and full protection. The later gentleman had served as a Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar and in that capacity had developed close relations with all notable Sikh leaders, earning their confidence. Master Tara Singh also showed his willingness to entrust this job to Major Billy Short, an important personage in the old British military-political espoinage set up in India.⁷⁸ Major Short also had a pretty long experience of dealing with the Sikhs. He had been largely responsible for encouraging Sikh recruitment in the British Army and was thus considered as their well-wisher. Later, he was attached to Cabinet Mission to advise it about Sikh affairs. In that capacity, he had tried his best to keep the Punjab province intact as he had rightly apprehended that its division would prove disastrous for the Sikhs.

As the government remained adamant and the agitation began to fizzle out, Tara Singh and his colleagues tried to push Sant group out of the arena. Rumours were spread that the government was trying for a patch-up with the Master. At one stage, an impression was created that Pandit Nehru had assured him to consider his demand very sympathetically. But he immediately denied having given any assurance to the Sikhs. On the other hand, he expressed regret "to find some confirmation of the feeling that it is very difficult to deal with the Akali Dal or its representatives."⁷⁹ This statement greatly perturbed Tara Singh, who had given the impression of some understanding with the government. So in sheer vengeance, he tried his best to undo whatever concessions had been gained by them. Thus when the government announced the names of persons constituting the Inquiry Commission, Tara Singh boycotted it saying that he would not be bound by the Commission's findings as the names conveyed

by him had not been included. An expelled Akali leader commented that Tara Singh felt that the appointment of the Commission would fully expose him before the Sikh masses of the country as he could not prove the allegations of discrimination against the Sikhs.

This somersault totally alienated Tara Singh and gave a boost to the revolt already brewing in Akali ranks. Sant Fateh Singh and his comrades totally broke away from him and established a rival Akali Dal in 1962. And soon most of the worth-wile Akali leaders, enjoying support of the Sikh masses gathered round him. Inside the SGPC, Sant group isolated the hitherto dominant Master group gaining an overwhelming majority. A few months later, both SGPC and Akali Dal voted him (Tara Singh) out of power. Sant Fateh Singh took over as the leader of the Sikhs.⁸⁰

By that time, Indo-Chinese relations had begun to deteriorate. And Nehru's ambition for the leadership of whole Asia had perturbed Chinese leaders as they rightly calculated that Nehru was being groomed by western powers and USSR to assume a dominant role in the Third World in order to alienate China. Nehru's haughty attitude and unrealistic policy brought the two neighbouring countries to the brink of total war. After the initial border skirmishes in 1959, India began to feel insecure from the north. So many sane and far-sighted leaders within and outside the fold of Congress, realised the importance of harmony between all the communities and tension free relations with all neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Tara Singh tried his best to exploit this situation. He again raised the bogey of Sikh grievances and created an impression of his links with some foreign friends, thus casting doubt on the integrity of his community and implicating Pakistan as well. It is said that many second rank Sikh leaders had begun to see outside the four walls of India and some of them were openly talking of foreign support for their struggle. Fateh Singh hastened to contradict such reports but Tara Singh tactfully kept silent. His anti-Congress friends denounced non-alignment and openly pleaded defence pact with Pakistan, thus providing an excuse for extremist Hindus to denounce Sikhs and creating embarrassment for Pakistan.

In October 1963, Pandit Nehru invited Chinese wrath by ordering his generals, in his usual arrogant style, to throw aggressors outside the Indian soil. But when India's best army units clashed with advance Chinese troops in NEFA, they met a shameful defeat and made a hurried retreat leaving the battlefield replete with their belongings. There arose a world-wide apprehension that Chinese troops might thrust into Assam to reach Calcutta, thus cutting north-east India from rest of the country. Russia openly denounced her communist ally and comrade, while President Kennedy of USA offered India military and economic aid on a large scale. Nehru, true to his traits, exploited his situation and assumed the role of the leader of the largest democracy in the Third World fighting communist onslaught.

At this critical juncture, Sikh community, as a whole was at a loss to understand its future course. Tara Singh had brought it on the verge of total confrontation with the government. But in the country resounding with slogans of unity, Sikhs could not follow his unrealistic policy without being dubbed as anti-Indian. Sant Fateh Singh at this stage adopted a cautious and a statesman-like attitude. With his saintly wisdom, he foresaw the shape of things to come and concluded that the cause of community can only be served by allaying all doubts about its integrity. So with his unconditional support to Nehru, campaigned vigorously for communal harmony and appealed to the Sikh officers and *jawans* in the Indian Army to defend their motherland. This stand taken by Sant Fateh Singh, not only enhanced his personal prestige, bringing him at par with other leaders of national stature, but provided him the same base for talks with the government. Instantly, he came to be recognized as the only Sikh leader with real backing from his community. This is evident from the result of a by-election. Joshi has rightly commented that, "the results of an important by-election in Patti about early 1963, demonstrated that it was Sant who counted, Tara Singh, had virtually become zero in the Sikh peasantry."⁸¹

Now Tara Singh, totally alienated, became more bitter and desperate but without any support from the Sikh masses. So in a

fit of fury, "he advanced the slogan of self-determination for the Sikhs, declaring that he was not averse to seeking and soliciting foreign aid and intervention if the Indian government turned down his demand."⁸² But this threat fell totally flat without making any impact on the government or the Sikh masses.

Pandit Nehru could not bear the shock of Indo-Chinese conflict. Confrontation with China proved to be a sort of personal shock to him and a last debacle in the long series of his political mistakes. He is painted as the most enlightened leader in Asia and he presumed to be as such, but his whole career is replet with glaring disparities. An ardent champion of socialism and poor masses, he led a life of a typical oriental aristocrat. His *Khaddi Sherwani* and Gandhi Cap were only a garb to conceal his highly sophisticated western way of life. His Anand Bhavan (Allahbad) was not less than a palace. A Sikh scholar has rightly commented that during his tenure as Prime Minister, the poor grew more poor and capitalists amassed more wealth—food problem reached enormous proportion."⁸³ Having passion of United India, Nehru had to acquiesce in the creation of Pakistan.

In spite of being a Kashmiri by birth, he brought death and destruction to the land of his forefathers. His secularism was badly shattered by anti-Muslim riots that ravaged India throughout nineteen years of his reign. How his non-alignment lay bleeding at the heights of NEFA. And last but not the least, his policy about Sikhs proved to be a total failure. No doubt he kept the boiling pot of Punjab tightly shut, but at what cost? And when it exploded only fifteen years after his death, it brought tremendous loss of prestige to Bharat, untold miseries to the people of Punjab and an ignominious death to his loving daughter. At the time of his death in 1964, the Indian masses were more poor, more divided and with more problems than what they had seen on the eve of independence. Bhulair is true while saying: "In fact Nehru remained anti-Sikh throughout his life. No doubt he patronised Sikh leaders like Partap Singh Kairon, but his elevation to Chief Ministership was also a part of the game. Kairon as a strong Sikh leader worked to crush Akali agitation

without implicating Nehru at any stage—Nehru considered him a good *Muneem*/accountant—who implemented his policies efficiently.”⁸⁴

With the death of Nehru, an important chapter in the history of Sikhs came to a close. The entire period beginning from the British withdrawal up to the death of Nehru, can be called a dark chapter of Sikh history. The stress, strain and set backs suffered by them during this period have no parallel in their whole political life.

It was during this period that Sikh masses, as a whole, had begun to feel perturbed and question the very wisdom of their leaders to throw their lot with the Hindus. Moreover, during this period of about fourteen years, the ability and sincerity of every Sikh leader of note was tested and Sikh masses came to believe that all the old guards, including Tara Singh, Fateh Singh and Kartar Singh, etc.—could not go beyond the petty power politics and were quite unable to lead their community according to the requirements of later twentieth century.

For Sikh youth, with more education and with more experience of dealing with Hindus in day to day life, the politics of Gurudwaras and Garanthis had lost relevance. What they wanted was a respectable place in Bharat, while Sikh leaders were still crying of *Dharam Yudh* and Panth is in danger. The new generation and Sikhs that came to face during this period was far more advanced in education, politics and economic activity. Thus it began to reject the policy of its predecessors. This feeling later led to the circumstances that gave rise to people like Sant Bhindaranwale.

REFERENCES

1. Nayar, Baldev Raj, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*. New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1966. p. 76.
2. Gurbachan Singh, *The Idea of the Sikh State*. Lahore : Lahore Book Shop, 1946. p. 6.
3. *The Spokesman*, August 29, 1951. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 40.

4. Bhulair, Narindar Singh, *Sikhon Ka Liay Hindu Achay Ya Musalman* (Urdu). Jullundhur : Mohan Press, 1966. p. 125.
5. Nayar, op. cit., p. 240.
6. Ibid., p. 242.
7. Ibid., p. 243.
8. Ibid., p. 244.
9. *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, July 6, 1955. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 244.
10. Nayar, op. cit., p. 244.
11. *The Times of India*, September 12, 1955. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 108.
12. *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, September 26, 1955. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 108.
13. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol. II. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. p. 298.
14. Balraj Sahani, *A Plea for understanding, Punjabi Suba ; A Symposium*, New Delhi : Navin Press, (n.d.). p. 16.
15. Joshi, P.C. *Triumph of a Just Cause*, Punjabi Suba : A Symposium, New Delhi, Navin Press, (n.d.). p. 59.
16. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, June 18, 1959. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 102.
17. Nayar, op. cit., p. 221.
18. *The Times of India*, New Delhi, July 13, 1955. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 244.
19. Hukam Singh, *A Plea for Punjabi Speaking State*, Amritsar : Shiromani Akali Dal, (n.d.). p. 12.
20. *The Spokesman*, October 19, 1955. Quoted in Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 297.
21. *The Spokesman*, October 12, 1955. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 245.
22. Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 297.
23. Sant Singh Sekhon, *The Problem of a Punjabi State*, Punjabi Suba ; A Symposium, New Delhi : Navin Press, (n.d.). p. 31.
24. *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, February 12, 1956. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 246.
25. *The Spokesman*, February 27, 1956. Ibid., p. 246.
26. *The Times of India*, New Delhi, March 12, 1956. Ibid., p. 246.
27. Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 298.
28. Joshi, op. cit., p. 66.

29. Ibid., p. 78.
30. Nayar, op. cit., p. 228.
31. Master, Tara Singh, *Sant Sipahi*, (Gurumukhi), Amritsar : November, 1959.
32. Nayar, op. cit., p. 228.
33. Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 298.
34. Ibid., p. 298.
35. *The Spokesman*, February 13, 1961. Quoted in Nayar, op. cit., p. 249.
36. Nayar, op. cit., p. 248.
37. Iqbal Singh, *Facts About Akali Agitation in Punjab*. Chandigarh: Fairdeal Press, 1960. p. 6.
38. Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 299.
39. Nayar, op. cit., p. 248.
40. Ibid., p. 248.
41. Joshi, P.C, op. cit., p. 57.
42. Ibid., p. 58.
43. Ibid., p. 74.
44. Nayar, op. cit., p. 249.
45. Jakhmi Karam Singh, *Punjabi Sube de Morche da Atihad* (Gurumukhi), Amritsar : Panthic Treat Society, 1955. p. 24.
46. Nayar, op. cit., p. 249.
47. Joshi, op. cit., p. 77.
48. Nayar, op. cit., p. 249.
49. Ibid., p. 249.
50. Ibid., p. 157.
51. Ibid., p. 157.
52. Punjab Vidhan Sabha, *Who's Who 1960*, Chandigarh : Controller, Printing and Stationery, 1960. p. 93.
53. Nayar, op. cit., p. 155.
54. Ibid., p. 247.
55. Ibid., p. 156.
56. Joshi, op. cit., p. 76.
57. Nayar, op. cit., p. 156.
58. Joshi, op. cit., p. 68.
59. Ibid., p. 67.
60. Ibid., p. 67.
61. Ibid., p. 67.
62. Nayar, op. cit., p. 251.

63. Ibid., p. 252.

64. Ibid., p. 252.

65. Joshi, op. cit., p. 69.

66. Anand, Jagjit Singh, *Sant Fateh Singh on the Suba*. Punjabi Suba : A Symposium, New Delhi : Navin Prees, (n.d.). p. 8.

67. Joshi, op. cit., p. 69.

68. Ibid., p. 70.

69. Nayar, op. cit., p. 253.

70. Ibid., p. 254.

71. Ibid., p. 254.

72. Ibid., p. 254.

73. Ibid., p. 254.

74. *The Spokesman*, June 5, 1961. Quoted in Nayar, Ibid., p. 254.

75. Nayar, op. cit., p. 255.

76. Ibid., p. 257.

77. Ibid., p. 257.

78. Joshi, op. cit., p. 71.

79. Nayar, op. cit., p. 261.

80. Joshi, op. cit., p. 74.

81. Ibid., p. 75.

82. Ibid., p. 76.

83. Bhulair, Narinder Singh, *Sikhon Kay Liay Hindu Achay Ya Musalman*, (Urdu). Jullundhur : Mohan Press, 1966. p. 64.

84. Ibid., p. 111.

Human Resource Accounting

KHAWAJA AMJAD SAEED

PRELUDE

The subject of Human Resource Accounting¹ is of growing importance in developing countries. An effort has been made to survey literature contributed on this topic, define the concept, introduce arguments for and against HRA, identify areas of application, name major valuation approaches and deal with kindred-areas. Various annexes have been included and useful selected bibliography has been added for continuing future interest in the topic.

CONCEPT OF HRA

HRA was defined in the Report of the Committee on HRA as under :

“The process of identifying and measuring data about human resources and communicating this information to interested parties.”²

Another definition is given below :

“HRA is a term used to describe a variety of proposals that seek to report and emphasise the importance of human resources-knowledgeable, trained and loyal employees in a Company's earning process and total assets.”³

RATIONALE FOR NO HRA

HRA was not much talked about until the middle of 1960s. The reason for this is well explained below :

Dr. Khawaja Amjad Saeed, Professor and Chairman, Department of Business Administration, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

“The reason why accountants have failed to recognise human capital as an asset may be explained in terms of the manner in which accounting developed historically. Accounting information originates essentially from the results of financial transactions—the only transaction which is recognisable (in the case of human resources) is the contractual obligation to make a periodic payment in return for periodic services under a wage payment wage agreement. Hence, wages and salaries are treated as current costs in the manner as rent payments for land leased by the firm, for neither is owned as assets.”⁴

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

We have made an effort to read available articles on HRA in accredited journals of professional bodies of international repute. Publications of above bodies were also consulted and a great benefit was derived from the *Handbook of Modern Accounting*. There is an exclusive chapter on HRA contributed by R. Lee Brummet which is of excellent nature and requires to be read for comprehension and application.

GROWING IMPORTANCE IN HUMAN RESOURCE INVESTMENT

Mechanisation process has been contributing considerably in the past. Today is the age of computerisation. However the central importance has all along to be given to investment in human resources. All discussions, innovations and inventions have primarily been due to human mind which has hit new and creative ideas. Therefore it is stressing an obvious to lay emphasis on investment in human resources and give the importance that it deserves.

There is a need to identify wheather the investment in human resources remains unchanged, is decreasing or increasing.

Hitherto this question had been ignored in actual accounting as the future benefits of such an investment have been ignored and the expenses incurred has been charged to consumption. Questions have

been raised relating to treating some expenditure as capital which results in benefits to be recouped in future.

Attention needs to be paid to three aspects of human resources, i.e., acquisition cost, replacement cost and economic value.

OBJECTIVE OF HRA

Inter-disciplinary approach has been of vital importance in the past. The interaction amongst disciplines has been of significant nature. HRA represents a unique opportunity of extending the frontiers of accounting to personnel management. This correlation was necessitated due to the following major reasons :

- (a) Cost of personnel turnover needs to be computed for understanding the financial implications of the phenomena.
- (b) Trend in the ratio of investment of human assets has been emerging in its importance.
- (c) Human resources need to be priced and efforts made to quantify the qualitative factors in the best possible manner.
- (d) A continuous research in extending the use of accounting to new frontiers has been actively going on.

Consequently HRA was initiated. It is not intended to be designed for use in published financial reports but is meant to be used as a managerial tool with the object of satisfying information needs faced by operating management. Informed judgements and decisions can be well taken in the light of information needs with timely, quantifiable and verifiable information about human resources.

PIONEERING WORK OF R. G. BARRY CORPORATION

R. G. Barry Corporation was a leisure footwear manufacturing concern having their headquarters in Columbus, Ohio (USA). It did pioneering work in introduction of HRA. Major milestones are listed below :

| Year | Milestone |
|-------------|---|
| 1966 | Began development of HRA system involving monitoring of human resource investments through capitalisation and amortisation of certain human resource costs. |
| 1968 | Cost-based HRA was implemented to include 96 individuals making up the managerial personnel of the corporation. |
| 1969 | The Annual Report of the Corporation included amounts capitalised as human resources. The system was refined and expanded to include a majority of the employees of the Corporation. The balance sheet showed "net investments in human resources" and income statement included an adjustment for the "net increase human resource investments." |
| 1973 | The Balance Sheet and Income Statement showed figures in conventional form and in conventional and human resource form. Annex 'A' gives details of balance sheet and income statement for 1973 in conventional and conventional human resource figures. Annex 'B' states narrative included in the above report. |
| 1974 | The Corporation discontinued publication of formal HRA reports and stated that it continues to use the data internally. |

Eric G. Flamholtz and William C. Pyle served as Assistant Directors in the Institute of Directors in the Institute of Social Research and were doctoral candidates in 1968 in the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan (USA) under the supervision of R. Lee Brummet who was Professor of Accounting in the above school. Since October 1966, the above scholars were associated with a top management group of R. G. Barry Corporation in the development of first human resource accounting system. This was believed to be the pioneering effort for developing HRA system.

Elements of the System are listed below :

- (a) Effort was made to identify human resource costs and separate the same from other costs of the firm.

- (b) Human assets were later categorised into recruiting, hiring, training, development and familiarisation. Explicit details in this respect are given on Annex 'C'.
- (c) Amounts in the above functional asset accounts were then allocated to personalised assets accounts for individual managers. It may be mentioned that focus was first upon developing a human resource accounting system for managerial personnel. Annex 'D' shows generalised model of the flow of data through the above system.

The HRA was operationalised on January 1, 1968. The beginning balances for the personalised asset accounts were entered as account balances with a credit to a category designated as "Capital Invested in Human Resources."

The firms in our region can learn from the above experience and may start thinking for developing HRA for internal use. Due to tax constraints, it may not be advisable to reflect the value in balance sheet as incidence of income tax will go up because as against the current practice of charging acquisition and management development cost to profit and loss account, the investment will be capitalised.

HRA AND PRACTISING ACCOUNTING FIRMS


HRA has been practised by CPA firm of Touche Ross & Co., Canada. Annex 'E' states the redeeming features of the system in operation. Salient features are, however, summed up as under :

- (a) HRA has been used as part of Management Information System (MIS).
- (b) HRA has provided information of vital importance for short and long term decision making and performance measurement.
- (c) Special attention was given to calculating cost of turnover, and establishing correlation between management development and performance measurement.
- (d) Each manager is explicitly responsible for human resource

investments within his organisation in the same way that he is responsible for planning and accomplishing a certain level of chargeable hours.

The above annexure presents interesting details and practising firms of Chartered and Cost and Management Accountants can find it interesting for creating an awareness of HRA in the first phase and later SAFA may initiate research to develop HRA in the light of obtaining conditions in the region of its operation.

Mr. Pekin Ogan defended his doctoral dissertation on *A Human Resource Value Model and its Operationalisation in a CPA Firm* in the University of North Carolina in 1974. His model is used to sum the discounted 'certainty equivalent net benefits' with determinants which are shown below :



He developed a movement chart through which current human resource value was calculated. He quantified increases in human resource value by such factors as : new employees, increase in value of current employees, and employees transferred in and also quantified decreases in human resource value by considering such factors as : termination, retirement, death, employees transferred out, and decrease in value of current employees. This is well illustrated in Annex 'F'.

HRA AND AN INDIAN EXAMPLE

We had an access to the study of Financial Report of Cement Corporation of India (CCI) for 1983. Four pages were allocated

for giving pertinent information relating to human resources which were classified as 'Our Greatest Assets.' The following redeeming features are summarised covering snapshot of their contents :

- (a) Human resources are considered as 'mother resource' and outstanding features of personnel policies were briefly highlighted.
- (b) A three year commercial data relating to employees with twelve categories were incorporated. Emphasis was placed on the fact that 33% of the total employees strength represented technically and professionally qualified personnel.
- (c) Age analysis of all employees under six categories, i.e., executives, supervisors, artisans semi-skilled workers, electrical and unskilled workers was included with class interval of 5 years except for age group of 18-20 years.
- (d) Computation of value of employees was based on the guidelines and principles enunciated in the economic models developed by Leu and Schwartz (1971), Eric Flamholtz (1974) and Jaggi and Lau (1974) with appropriate modifications found necessary. In brief an attempt was made to assess the economic work of human assets by calculating the present value of the anticipated future earnings of employees taking into account the present pay scales and the promotional policies being followed.

To illustrate the total values for above six categories of employees were reported as under :

| Year | Employees (Number) | Value Million (Indian Rupees) |
|------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| | 6,094 | 665 |
| 1982 | 5,493 | 467 |

Details in this respect are given on Annex 'G'.

- (e) Other areas covered were training needs, conferences held, industrial relations, employees participations, welfare activities and activities and performance per employee.

In Pakistan enlightened companies are also giving pertinent information regarding personnel and industrial relations. However, we need to make a good beginning in developing HRA. SAFA can provide a pioneering lead in this respect for benefits to be shared later in our South Asian region.

APPROACH TO HRA

In the beginning there has been a greater emphasis on cost based HRA system. Later stress has been made on value based HRA system. A comprehensive list of human resource valuation models⁵ is given below :

- (a) Harmanson's Unpurchased Goodwill Model.
- (b) Harmanson's adjusted discounted Future Wage Model.
- (c) Hekiman and Jones Competitive Bidding Model.
- (d) Lev and Schwartz's present value of Future Earnings Model.
- (e) Brummet, Flamholtz and Pyle's economic Value Model.
- (f) The Likert Cassual Intervening and End-Result Model.
- (g) Myers and Flowers Fine Dimension Model.
- (h) Ogan's Discounted Certainty Equivalent Net Benefits Model.
- (i) Brummet and Taylor's Human Resource Value Index Model.

The above measurement techniques have been well illustrated in the *Modern Handbook of Accounting*. Moreover, readers are also recommended to read Human Resource Accounting Measurement which was authored by R.W. Sydenham (FCA) and published by the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of London as an occasional paper in 1979. This was a dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Social Sciences, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Commerce and Social Science, University of the Birmingham (UK).

However, beside illustrating cost based approach earlier, one valuation approach is now illustrated. This relates to calculation of unpurchased goodwill for valuation of human assets.

CALCULATION OF UNPURCHASED GOODWILL FOR VALUATION OF HUMAN ASSETS

The calculation of cost of human assets and its inclusion in the net assets of a firm changes the return on combined investment. This point is well illustrated below :

Income Statement for Year Ended

| | <i>Million Rupees</i> |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Sales | 60 |
| | — |
| Materials and other Expenses | 30 |
| Wages and Salaries | 15 |
| | — |
| Total Expenses | 45 |
| | — |
| Profit | 15 |
| | — |

Wages and salaries constitute 1/3rd of the total expenses. We assume that the above profit is a maintainable profit and can be sold for twelve years purchase. Accordingly the total value will be Rs. 180 million. If the net assets are Rs. 120 million, the goodwill will be Rs. 60 million of which 1/3rd may relate to wages and salaries, i.e., Rs. 20 million.

Calculation on rate of return will be made as under :

1. Return on Assets :

Percentage of Rs. 15 million on Rs. 120 million = 12.5%.

Works out to :

$$\frac{15 \times 100}{120}$$

2. Return on Combined Investment :

| | <i>Million Rupees</i> |
|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Net Assets | 120 |
| Add : Human Assets | 20 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total Assets | 140 |
| | <hr/> |
| Profit | 15 |
| Wages and Salaries | 15 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 30 |
| | <hr/> |

New return on combined Investment has been calculated

$$\text{as : } \frac{33 \times 100}{100} \quad \underline{21.4\%}$$

The above method takes into account unpurchased goodwill and puts a price tag on it as value of human assets.

FRAMEWORK FOR HRA APPLICATION

There is no need to necessarily reflect the value of human assets in balance sheet. This can find mention in the chairman's review or directors report or as a supplementary disclosure. Therefore, HRA is not to be constrained or affected by accounting conventions, legal restrictions on tax laws. Each firm can benefit by understanding the measurement models and develop the application of HRA.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

HRA is an excellent tool. It develops a sharp focus in respect of manpower. In India the use of HRE is gaining popularity ; in Bangladesh, people have started talking about it and it is hoped that in the early 1990's its application will gain ground. In Sri Lanka, literature is being prepared and it is expected that HRA will be operationalised in the near future. This tool needs to be introduced in Nepal and Bhutan. In Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, HRA is being talked about in seminars and institutions of higher studies, which may be a prelude to its adoption.

Indications clearly exist highlighting that HRA is the subject of 1990's and will be operationalised both for internal use and for public disclosure.

LIST OF ANNEXES

| Annex | Particulars |
|--------------|---|
| 'A' | Details of Human Resource Cost in R. G. Barry Corporation. |
| 'B' | R. G. Barry Corporation and Subsidiaries : Disclosure in Financial Statements for 1973. |
| 'C' | Generalised Model of Human Resource Accounting System for Investment in Managers. |
| 'D' | Narrative Included in the 1973 Annual Report of R. G. Barry Corporation. |
| 'E' | HRA and Touche Ross & Co. Canada. |
| 'F' | Statement of Changes on Human Resource Value (HRV). |
| 'G' | Valuation of Human Assets of Cement Corporation of India. |

ANNEX 'A'

Details of Human Resource Cost in R. G. Barry Corporation

| Cost | Composition |
|--|--|
| Recruiting | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Search Fee 2. Advertising 3. Interviewer and/or interviewee travel expenses 4. Allocations of personnel and acquiring department time for internal screening, interviewing, testing and evaluation expenses. |
| Investment Building Experience (Development) | Development of a capability which would not reasonably be expected as a normal part of the persons job. |

ANNEX 'B'

R. G. Barry Corporation and Subsidiaries
Disclosure in Financial Statements for 1973

(Billion US Dollars)

| Particulars | Conventional and Human Resource 1973 | Conventional Only 1973 |
|-------------|---|------------------------------|
|-------------|---|------------------------------|

BALANCE SHEET

| | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| Assets | | |
| Total Current Assets | 18.31 | 18.31 |
| Net Property, Plant and Equipment | 3.50 | 3.50 |
| Excess of Purchase Price over Net Assets Acquired | 1.29 | 1.29 |
| Deferred Financing Costs | 0.17 | 0.17 |
| Net Investments in Human Resources | 1.96 | — |
| Prepaid Income Taxes and other Assets | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| | 25.44 | 23.48 |

(Continued)

Liabilities and Stock-Holders Equity

| | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|
| Total Current Liabilities | 3.91 | 3.91 |
| Long Term Debt, Excluding Current Instalments | 6.97 | 6.97 |
| Deferred Compensation | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| Deferred Income Tax Based Upon Full Tax Deduction for Human Resource Costs | 0.98 | — |
| <i>Stockholders Equity :</i> | | |
| Capital Stock | 1.90 | 1.90 |
| Additional Capital in Excess of Par Value | 5.68 | 5.68 |
| Retained Earnings Financial | 4.88 | 4.88 |
| Human Resources | 0.98 | — |
| | <u>25.44</u> | <u>23.48</u> |


Statements of Income

| | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|
| Net sales | 43.16 | 43.16 |
| Cost of sales | 28.62 | 28.62 |
| <i>Gross Profit :</i> | <u>14.54</u> | <u>14.54</u> |
| Selling, General and Administrative Expenses | 10.78 | 10.78 |
| Operating Income | 3.76 | 3.76 |
| Interest Expenses | 0.60 | 0.60 |
| Income before Income Tax | 3.16 | 3.16 |
| Net Increase in Human Resource Investment | 0.18 | — |
| Adjusted income before Income Tax | 3.34 | 3.16 |
| Income Tax | 1.61 | 1.52 |
| Net Income | <u>1.73</u> | <u>1.64</u> |

Source : Extracted from Chapter 37 entitled "Human Resource Accounting contributed" by R. Lee Brummet, pp. 37-39 as included in *Hand-Book of Modern Accounting*, edited by Sidney Davidson and Roman L. Weil.

Annex "C"

GENERALISED MODEL OF HUMAN RESOURCE ACCOUNTING
SYSTEM FOR INVESTMENTS IN MANAGERS



Source R.Lee Brummet, Eric C. Flamholtz and William C Pyle, "Human Resource Measurement- A Challenge for Accountants" *The Accounting Review*, Volume XLIII, April 1968, No.2, p 222.

ANNEX 'D'

**NARRATIVE INCLUDED IN THE 1973 ANNUAL REPORT
OF R. G. BARRY CORPORATION**

"Beginning in 1966, Barry began the development of an information system designed to provide data about human resources in dollar terms. This effort was undertaken because it is our belief that management is the process of planning, organising and controlling a complex mix of resources to accomplish the objectives of the organisation. Conventional accounting provides adequate information on the physical and financial resources of the business. Our interest was to develop an information system which would provide data on the condition of human resources of the business in the language of other business information, namely dollars.

Human resource accounting is an attempt to identify quantify and report investments made in recruiting, acquiring, training, familiarising and developing people. Outlay costs connected with activities are accumulated and capitalised where they are expected to have value beyond the current accounting period. The basic outlays in connection with acquiring and integrating new people are amortised over their expected tenure with the company. Investments made for training or development are amortised over a much shorter period of time. Total write-off of an individual's account occurs upon his departure from the company.

During 1973, total investments in management and non-management resources exceeded total amortisation and write off by \$184,293. The investment amount represents the outlay to bring people on board and orient them to the organisation and their work, in addition, a major portion of the investment total reflects the development activities undertaken by people within the organisation.

This past year saw a sizable number of people participating in development activities which will provide Barry with a strong corps of people for future growth.

In the 1972 Annual Report, an explanation of human resource accounting—related activities foretold of increased reliance on growth and development of internal human resources for staffing future positions. In 1973, openings were filled from our current ranks at a rate substantially higher than past. As a result economics of external recruiting and orientation was realised as well as providing advancement opportunities for current Associates. In 1974, efforts to systematically plan and evaluate formal and informal development activities will be increased. Furthermore, the financial accounting of development efforts will allow us to capture the dollar investments as well as provide a means to prepare cost benefit analysis of comparable programs. Development activities will focus on providing available resources for forecasted positions. Preparing back-up people to assume key positions and to provide training for individuals that is responsive to their job and career interests. As we have said in previous annual reports, the impetus for the development of an information system to account for human resources was provided by a perceived need for the information internally.

As a result of pioneering activities of R. G. Barry in this area, many other companies are now beginning to apply HRA measurements. Some are using our approach, others are investigating alternative systems.

We are pleased that more and more companies recognise the need for this kind of information in order to improve effectiveness of internal management decision making processes."

ANNEX 'E'

HRA AND TOUCHE ROSS & CO., CANADA

The CPA firm of Touche Ross & Co., Canada has introduced HRA as part of its management information system in the belief that a good human resource accounting system can provide information of vital importance for both short term and long term decision making and performance measurement. In the initial stage the focus was on using the already available information as input to the system. Thus, the information on investments in human assets has been based on historical costs.

Some of the efforts in the initial development phase have been directed to specific managerial problems. One such problem is the high turnover of personnel. The cost associated with the high turnover rate could not be readily ascertained from conventional accounting data. Another set of problems refers to relationship between performance measurements and costs involved in developing the firm and human resources.

It is normal practice in a public accounting firm to measure performance in terms of chargeable hours, i.e., the time spent on work in rendering service to the clients. This single measure does not allow for adequate recognition of the factors, such as investments in human resources, that are not directly related to chargeable hours.

In terms of short run performance results, it is, therefore clearly undesirable to have any potentially productive hours that cannot be charged to clients. Most of the training and development of human resources, however, will necessarily come at the expense of chargeable hours. This means that conventional accounting measure, in the absence of other evaluators of human performance, may actually encourage a manager to neglect investments in human resource, yet

there can be little doubt that it is these very resources which determine the long-run survival and success of a public accounting firm. The Touche Ross system is designed to modify the firm's performance measurement by adding an additional dimension—changes in the condition of human assets.

The investment in each employee is calculated in terms of both out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs (Chargeable hours foregone). These data are used in developing reports which provide information such as : (a) comparison of dollar value of planned versus actual hours of staff time devoted to investments in human resources and (b) changes in human resource, account balances including increases (due to investments for recruiting, orienting, formal training etc.), and decreases (due to transfers, terminations, and amortisation). Under this system each manager is explicitly responsible for human resource investment within his organisation in the same way that he is responsible for planning and accomplishing a certain level of chargeable hours.

Source : Edwin H. Caplan and Stephen Landekich, *Human Resource Accounting : Past, Present and Future*, National Association of Accountants, New York, 1974, pp. 68-69.

ANNEX 'F'

Statement of Changes on Human Resource Value (HRV)

| | | |
|---|------------|------------|
| Human Resources were increased by : | | |
| New Employees | \$ 300,500 | |
| Increase in value of current employees | 8,000 | |
| Employees transferred in | 175,000 | |
| | | |
| Total increase | | 483,500 |
| Human Resource values were decreased by : | | |
| Termination | \$ 23,000 | |
| Retirement | 75,000 | |
| Death | 45,000 | |
| Employees transferred out | 38,000 | |
| Decrease in value of current employees | 52,500 | |
| | | |
| Total decreases | | \$ 233,500 |
| | | |
| Net increase | | 250,000 |
| Add : Previous HRV Balance | | 500,000 |
| | | |
| Current Human Resource Value | | 750,000 |

Source : Pekin Organ, *A Human Resource Value Model and its Operationalisation in a CPA Firm*, doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1974, p. 162.

ANNEX 'G'

Valuation of Human Assets of Cement Corporation of India

(Million Indian Rupees)

| Categories of Employees | Employees (Number) | Value | Employees (Number) | Value |
|---|-----------------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|
| 1. Executive | 541 | 115 | 459 | 85 |
| 2. Supervisors | 561 | 88 | 486 | 64 |
| 3. Skilled Workers | 1,766 | 175 | 1,495 | 114 |
| 4. Semi Skilled Workers | 1,108 | 101 | 1,046 | 69 |
| 5. Clerical and other supporting Staff | 819 | 86 | 727 | 59 |
| 6. Unskilled | 1,299 | 100 | 1,280 | 76 |
| | 6,094 | 665 | 5,493 | 467 |

Source : Extracted from *CCI Annual Financial Report for 1983*, p. 106.

REFERENCES

1. To be later read as HRA.
2. American Accounting Association, Committee on Human Resource Accounting, "Report of the Committee on Human Resource Accounting," *The Accounting Review*, Supplement, 1973, p. 169.
3. Sidney Davidson, Clyde P. Stickney, James S. Schindler, and Roman L. Weil, *Accounting: The Language of Business*, 2/e, New Jersey: Thomas Horton and Daughters, 1973, p. 25.
4. P. J. Taylor and MWE. G. Lautier, "Accounting Information and Industrial Relations: Social Implications and Cost and Benefit Considerations," *Economic Research Papers*, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 1974, pp. 7-8.
5. Brief description with critical appraisal of the above model is available on pages 37-12 to 37-19 of Chapter 37 of *Handbook of Modern Accounting*.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Articles from Professional Journals

1. American Accounting Association, Committee on Human Resource Accounting, "Report of the Committee on Human Resource Accounting," *The Accounting Review*, Supplement, 1973, pp. 168-185.
2. Baker, Geoffrey M. N., "The Feasibility and Utility, of Human Resource Accounting," *California Management Review*, Vol. XVI. No. 4, Summer 1974, pp. 17-23.
3. Banner, David and Geoffrey Baker, "Human Resource Accounting: A Critical Review," *M. S. U. Business Topics*, Autumn, 1973, pp. 45-52.
4. Brummet, R. Lee, Flamholtz, Eric G., Pyle, William C., "Human Resource Measurement: A Challenge for Accountants," *The Accounting Review*, April, 1968, pp. 217-224.
5. Brummet, R. Lee, "Accounting for Human Resources, *The Journal of Accountancy*, December, 1970, pp. 62-66.
6. Hekimian, James and Curtis H. Jones, "Put People on your Balance Sheet," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1967, pp. 105-113.

7. Likert, Rensis and William C. Pyle, "A Human Organisational Measurement Approach," *The Financial Analysis Journal*, January-February, 1971, pp. 75-84.

8. Pyle, William C., "Human Resource Accounting," *The Financial Analysis Journal*, September-October, 1970, pp. 59-78.

9. Woodruff R. L. J., "Human Resource Accounting," *The Canadian Chartered Accountant*, September, 1970, pp. 156-61.

10. Zacks, Gordon, "Report of the American Accounting Association Committee on Human Resource Accounting," *The Accounting Review*, supplement to Volume 49, 1979.

B. Publications of Accredited Professional Bodies

1. Caplan, Edwin H. and Stephen Landekich, *Human Resource Accounting: Past, Present and Future*, National Association of Accountants, New York, 1974.

2. *Human Asset Accounting*, Joint Publication of the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants, London, October, 1972.

3. Sydenham, R. W., *Human Resource Accounting Measurement*, An Occasional paper published by the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants, London, 1979.

C. Book and Annual Report

1. Davidson, Sidneo (E), Weil, Roman L. (AE), *Handbook of Modern Accounting*, New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, Chapter 37: "Human Resource Accounting" by R. Lee Brummet, pp. 1-29.

2. *Annual Report of Cement Corporation of India for 1983*, Section "Our Employees—Our Greatest Assets," pp. 66-69.

India's Foreign Relations with special reference to South Asian Countries (January—June 1986)

MOHAMMAD SARWAR

This article is a brief but comprehensive survey of India's foreign policy initiatives, covering the period, January—June 1986. We propose to give such surveys on half-yearly basis.

(Editor)

During the period under review, the foreign relations of India witnessed the continuation of dialogue with Pakistan, marked by a highly disappointing anti-climax in the mediation process between the Tamil minority and the Sri Lankan Government and, a significant tilt towards United States of America causing some concern from Soviet Union. The Indian Parliament during its budget session discussed in detail the foreign policy initiatives tabled before the House as the annual report of the Ministry of External Affairs. The report tried to "spread an impression that change more than continuity was the name of the game in foreign policy and that it should be changed for better . . ."

LOK SABHA ON FOREIGN POLICY

In the budget session of the Indian Parliament in March 1986, the External Affairs Minister presented his ministry's budget demands for the year 1986-87 along with the annual report for 1985-86. The report tried to "spread an impression that change more than continuity was the name of the game in foreign policy and that it should be change for the better—warmer ties with Pakistan, a more productive dialogue with China, a more constructive attitude towards Sri Lanka on the Tamil Question and a greater friendliness with Bangladesh and Nepal . . .¹"

Mohammad Sarwar is Senior Research Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

The focus of the debate was on Sri Lanka. Later on, on this issue there was a consensus, indeed striking unanimity, that cut across party lines and regional representation. The members unanimously blamed the government for being 'too trusting' of Mr. Jayewardene and urged it to take a 'tough' stand with Colombo. Although "Rajiv Gandhi dismissed the possibility of Indian military intervention"² yet the "opposition urged the government to consider economic measures against Sri Lanka, shed its role of the mediator and identify itself with Tamils in the Island."³ Besides this, there was a general feeling, for the first time since independence, that India's bilateral relations with its neighbours were showing signs of definite improvement.⁴ But, for the future of these relations Mr. B. R. Bhagat, the External Affairs Minister, stressed on some heavy 'if's' on the side of neighbouring countries, i.e., if Colombo did not opt for military solution, if President Zia did not go for nuclear option and if the question of Indian territory under Chinese occupation was settled.⁵

On the Indo-USA relations, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, himself, the first in thirty-nine years after Indian independence, made a strong statement in the Rajya Sabha that 'basic mistrust' between India and USA had been removed and only some questions, presumably unimportant, remained to be sorted out,⁶ such as "the American policy towards South Africa."⁷

PAKISTAN

Since Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq met in New Delhi last December, the progress towards normalization of relations between the two countries has been negligible. The gap between the perceptions and approaches has been so wide that bridging it would not be an easy task. The major initiatives for normalization, put forward by both sides, were a no-war pact by Pakistan and a treaty of friendship by India. There has not been much advance, during the period under review, in the efforts to reconcile their perceptions on the form and content of the friendship arrangement. The process of dialogue continued to thrash out different issues at different governmental levels.

Zia-Rajiv Talks

On 17 December, President Zia-ul-Haq made a brief stop-over at New Delhi on his way back home after a tour of Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Both President Zia and Premier Gandhi held two rounds of talks and addressed a joint press conference. The two leaders agreed upon not attacking each other's nuclear installations, a package deal on economic cooperation, merger of the proposals of no-war pact and peace and friendship treaty, and implementation of these decisions, after formal discussions on Premier Gandhi's proposed visit to Pakistan in the first half of 1986.

Finance Ministers Meeting (8—10 January)

The December Delhi Summit's decision was reciprocated in January by Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq and V.P. Singh, the Finance Ministers of the two countries, who held talks in Islamabad and agreed to increase the volume of trade and to allow the private sector to import on both sides. They also hoped to strengthen telecommunication, telex and air links and shipping arrangements. However, at the end of these high level talks on trade and economic relations, no memorandum of understanding after discussions between the two sides was signed by the Ministers.⁸

Defence Secretaries Meetings

Keeping the spirit of Delhi Summit alive, the Defence Secretaries of the two countries held talks (11-12 January) in Islamabad to discuss the Siachen Glacier issue. The meeting ended inconclusively because the earlier meetings of the area commanders had failed to bring peace. Nevertheless, they decided to meet again in March or April in Delhi. The April talks at New Delhi concluded with an agreement to continue dialogue over Siachen, in accordance with the Simla Agreement, in Islamabad.

Foreign Secretaries Meeting

The Foreign Secretaries of both the countries met in Islamabad (17—19 January). The Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ramesh Bhandari, on his arrival in Islamabad said that his approach in the talks would be two-fold ; to deal with all the issues causing mis-understanding and tension between India and Pakistan and, to try to build trust

and confidence to expand and diversify relations in all fields.⁹ About the draft of no-war pact and a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation, he said that the text of these two drafts would be discussed with a view to merging them into one.¹⁰ Sticking to their usual manner of backing out at convenience from a stance while alleging others, Mr. Bhandari, conferred that the issues of India's insistence on bilateralism and Pakistan's reluctance to commit itself on the alleged issue of not giving bases to any foreign power on its soil, would be taken up in the next meeting of Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission in March. It was also disclosed "that except for some technical portion and preamble, the operative aspect of the text of an agreement for not attacking each other's nuclear installations has been agreed upon."¹¹

Premier Rajiv Gandhi's Proposed Visit to Pakistan

Although Mr. Ramesh Bhandari was very hopeful and wished it to be a unique and historic occasion and even more than the Simla Agreement,¹² yet suddenly after his return to India, these sentiments shifted to an anti-climax. The Indian External Affairs Minister on February 25 and 27 and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi himself on 11 March¹³ launched a series of accusations against Pakistan for not being interested in normalising relations with India. Surprisingly, Rajiv Gandhi not only pointed it out personally to Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo, the Prime Minister of Pakistan,¹⁴ but to President Zia-ul-Haq also, in a message¹⁵ that what Pakistan was doing in Kashmir and, in respect of the Sikh Terrorists, could not be conducive to the normalisation process and that his visit to Pakistan was difficult. Meanwhile, the Indian External Affairs Ministry in its annual report, Chapter, "Indian Neighbours", came out with yet another allegation against Pakistan, that of growing military connection between Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi went further to accuse Pakistan of collaborating with Israel in Sri Lanka. In this mood of distrust Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan was postponed indefinitely.

Yaqub Khan's Visit to India

In April, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, paid a five-day visit to Delhi to attend the Non-aligned Ministerial

meeting and also held talks with his Indian counterpart and discussed, among other things, the measures to resolve certain concerns of the two sides. Talking to reporters at Islamabad airport after his visit to India, Mr. Yaqub Khan said that he had a strong impression that there was a desire on the part of Indian leadership to resume the normalisation process with Pakistan. Yaqub Khan's visit to Delhi was followed by that of Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Niaz A. Naik. He rebutted Indian charges that Pakistan was manufacturing a nuclear device, and made it clear that Pakistan had made a number of proposals to achieve the objective of keeping South Asia free from Nuclear weapons.

SRI LANKA

Citizenship and Repatriation Agreement (January 15)

The story of Indo-Sri Lanka relations is marked by highly disappointing anti-climaxes. Although the major problem affecting Indo-Sri Lanka relations was significantly eased on January 15, 1986 with an agreement on the status of Tamil plantation workers of Indian origin, by which India agreed to "grant citizenship and repatriate those 600 thousand people along with their natural increase, identified under the previous two agreements of October 1964 and January 1974.¹⁶

Postponement of Bhandari's Visit (February 2)

However, the relations remained deteriorated during January and February when the Indian Government expressed concern over : (1) what it considered to be Sri Lanka's increasing militarisation of the ethnic conflict and (2) Sri Lankan Government's intransigence in the face of TULF's federalist demands.

On the other hand, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, the President of Sri Lanka, "urged India to shut down terrorist bases in Tamil Nadu, send the Sri Lankans back to Sri Lanka and stop them from using Indian soil as a base for their violent activities against Sri Lanka. And this is the best way India could help Sri Lanka to resolve the conflict."¹⁷ The already tense situation was further fuelled by the sudden postponement of the proposed visit of Mr. Ramesh Bhandari,

to Colombo, when he was en-route via Madras (February 2). After the deadlock in the Thimpu negotiations (October 85) between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan Government, India assumed the role of a mediator and earned some development in this respect. The sudden postponement of the visit "earned in disregarding the progress made in the talks rather than permitting diplomatic stains to grow."¹⁸ It was a second setback to the dialogue on the ethnic problem of the Island. The Sri Lankans considered it a "hostile development from across the Palk Strait" by an 'honest broker' and thought that it would "compound the crisis and aggravate the situation,"¹⁹ and emphasised on the need of a political solution because otherwise the "militarism . . . will be disastrous." Realising the positive role of the mediator, the Sri Lankan *Daily Sun* (Colombo) stressed that :

"The 'honest broker' must ensure that it remains absolutely impartial and understand the problem in a realistic and non-partisan manner. Needless to say that India has the main key to end the proliferation of violence in the North and East by denying the 'Launching pad' facilities now enjoyed by the guerrillas on its own soil. India must remember that Sri Lanka has sought its help to solve the problem and not to make it simmer into the crisis."²⁰

Mr. B. R. Bhagat's Statement (February 28)

Later, in late February, Mr. B.R. Bhagat, Indian Foreign Minister, in his speech to Rajya Sabha accused the Sri Lankan security forces of 'genocide' and called for a "time frame for a political settlement of the ethnic issue," and announced the Indian Government's decision to direct its representatives in Geneva to raise the killing of 'innocent Tamils' at the Human Right Commission's meeting.

Sri Lankan Rejoinder (March 1)

The Sri Lankan Government strongly and promptly dismissed such accusations as 'baseless' in a point by point rejoinder and conveyed it to New Delhi. The statement took special note that the

terrorist challenge in Sri Lanka stemmed from "a movement which has logistical training and operational base facilities, propagandist mechanism and a sanctuary in the state of Tamil Nadu in India."²¹ The statement also categorically refuted the Indian charges about the refugees²² and complained that "the value of the 'preferred good offices' of Indian Government stands impaired and its credibility diluted," but continued to "look to the cooperation and assistance of the Indian Government."²³

Indian Opposition's Joint Statement

It is interesting to note that the Indian parliamentary opposition on this issue, not only endorsed Mr. Bhagat's accusations but further "urged the government to consider economic measures against Sri Lanka," and advised the government to "shed its role of a mediator and identify itself with the Tamils in the Island,"²⁴ and called for the "recognition of Tamil Eelam Movement on the lines of SWAPO and PLO."²⁵

Indian Rejoinder to the Sri Lankan Note (March 4)

The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ramesh Bhandari, called the Sri Lankan High Commissioner Mr. Bernard Tilkaratna to the foreign office (March 4) and delivered him a long note which expressed dismay at the "baseless allegations and intemperate language used" in the note that Sri Lankan Government had sent on March 1. It was surmised that the "Sri Lankan statement was an attempt to find an alibi for the failure to engage in constructive negotiations," and Sri Lankan attitude was an act of "prolongation of agony and deepening of the tragedy faced by Sri Lanka and its people" but even then "India is committed to extend their good offices to Sri Lanka in order to help in resolving the crisis."²⁶

Reaction in Sri Lanka

The tone of the Indian note was not conciliatory but hostile. Consequently it was answered in Sri Lanka with the same words by the *Daily Sun*, (Colombo) as "The Indian Unity is built on sand, and the internal situation of India is such that, if it sows the wind of separatism in other countries, it will reap in full measure the

whirl-wind of its own destruction as a nation state."²⁷

Premier Rajiv Gandhi on Sri Lanka

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told Lok Sabha (April 8) that "Pakistan and Israel were working in Sri Lanka together hand in hand ; and that this is an extraordinary situation where politics makes strange bed fellows."²⁸ On the demand of the opposition to recognise Tamil Eelam Movement, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. B.R. Bhagat, ruled out the demand on the grounds that "it favoured a political solution to the ethnic problem within the framework of the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka"²⁹ and that India was eagerly waiting for fresh Sri Lankan proposals by the 16th of April, when Mr. A.C.S. Hameed, the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, would reach Delhi to resume talks.

A.C.S. Hameed's Proposals (April 16)

The Sri Lankan Foreign Minister at the time of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned movement at Delhi, also met the Indian officials, including Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and outlined new Sri Lankan proposals to resolve the issue. Mr. Hameed handed over a two page document outlining the fresh Sri Lankan proposals for settlement. The proposals, based on the lines of the union territories in India, offered a substantial degree of autonomy to Tamil People.³⁰ Although the details of the document were not released but Mr. Amrithalingam, the spokesman of Tamil militants, 'described' the proposals as being 'very vague', but did not dismiss them totally and declined to resume talks on these proposals.³¹

Mr. P. Chidambaram's Visit to Colombo (April 27)

Indo-Sri Lankan relations seemed to improve towards the end of April when an official Indian delegation visited Colombo for discussions on the new set of proposals put forward by the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister in mid-April. The delegation led by Mr. P. Chidambaram, Indian Minister of State for Personnel, along with Mr. Romesh Bhandari in his new capacity of special envoy to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The delegation held talks with the Sri Lankan authorities and the opposition leaders, like the Sri Lankan Freedom Party

(SLFP) leaders—Mrs. Srima Bandaranaike and her son Mr. Anura Bandaranaike. Mr. Anura, the leader of opposition in the Parliament, told the Indian delegation (April 28-29) that “while the SLFP accepted the role of India as a mediator, even then it was not prepared to agree to every thing put forward by India.”³² On the side of Sinhala, there is a popular demand which has been repeatedly put forward by Mr. Jayewardene himself that India should “send the Sri Lankans back to Sri Lanka and stop them from using Indian soil as a base for their violent activities.”³³ Replying to this demand, the leader of the Indian delegation told Mr. Anura Bandaranaike that “India could not ask the terrorists, there, to leave now, because of Indian public opinion, it could have done so four years ago.”³⁴

The absence of a joint statement at the end of this visit and the non-committal replies by Mr. Chidambaram indicated the initiative to be abortive and the Indian diplomacy over-taken by shifts on the part of the Tamil leaders and the Sri Lankan Government.

Although Indian leaders described the initiative as ‘an advance’ and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi himself confirmed (May 12) the recent parleys as “a marked improvement on Colombo’s earlier position”,³⁵ and the Sri Lankan High Commissioner in Delhi (May 13) put forward some clarifications about Colombo proposals, but it was declared (May 14) ‘inadequate’ by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Shiv Shankar.

On the other hand, the Sri Lankan President at the same time continued accusations against India “for supporting the Tamil militants and threatened to unleash the troupes.”³⁶ So, until May 22, when New Delhi conveyed to Colombo that “India sees no point in continuing with its peace efforts in the face of military offensive,”³⁷ Colombo made no effort to pick up the negotiation thread where it was dropped after Mr. Chidambaram’s visit and launched a military offensive in the Eastern Province and mounted aerial attacks on Jaffna.

Review of Relations

India’s relations with Sri Lanka and its mediatory role in

the ethnic crisis faced a setback at the close of the period under review. The cause of this setback was very much in the process, nature and perception of the problem under mediation. The role of a mediator in any problem demands an impartiality in (a) the perception of the problem and (b) handling of the problem.

As far as the first, impartiality, is concerned, India could not by any standard be called the third party. Tamil militants operated, trained and established logistics in Tamil Nadu on the Indian soil. India always condemned the actions by Sri Lankan armed forces and remained silent about the killings of Sri Lankan citizens by the militants to the extent of creating a state within a state. Indian attitude about the Tamil militants in Madras had been different from the corresponding attitude to much smaller presence and activity of Sikh militants in other countries. This contrast damages the Sri Lankan Government's faith in the impartiality of India's good offices who encourages the Tamil Militants and stands behind them in their demand for Eelam.

The second impartiality concerns the negotiation procedure. India has frequently pressed Sri Lankan Government for proposals, modifications, clarifications, and, on several occasions has obtained and passed them on to Tamil Militants for their consideration. Senior representatives of the Sri Lankan Government have been frequently called in for consultations. But the Tamil militants have never been asked to put down their minimum terms of settlement. This makes the traffic of proposals one sided and the negotiating procedure less than even-handed.

INDIA AND U.S.A.

The first half of the period under review witnessed a very significant change in Indian foreign policy or could be safely called a major "departure from Mrs. Indira Gandhi's foreign policy," a heavy tilt towards the United States.

B. R. Bhagat's Visit to Washington

The Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. B.R. Bhagat visited

U.S.A. (February 7—10), Co-Chaired Indo-U.S. Joint Commission meeting and conferred with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, Vice-President Mr. George Bush, a courtesy call on Mr. Ronald Regan and a meeting with the members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The joint statement issued noted that "trade and investment continued to be promising areas for strengthening bilateral relations,"³⁸ and both countries agreed to increase bilateral trade and promote American investment in the coming years.

Super Computer Deal

During this visit, Mr. Bhagat also signed a computer deal, worth \$500 million, that proved a Centre peace of increasing close Indo-U.S. relations and an "aim to reduce Indian dependence on the Soviet Union."³⁹ Super computer is supposed to serve a dual purpose, i.e., to speed up nuclear manufacturing calculations to the extent of whole year's work in hours and to accelerate India's nuclear programme.

American Defence Team in New Delhi (February 20)

Mr. B. R. Bhagat's visit was reciprocated by a high level 20-member American Defence Team, led by Mr. Talbot Lindstorm, Deputy Under Secretary of Defence, one of the biggest ever, for New Delhi. The delegation, during its six-day visit, concentrated only on working out details of Indian Defence requirements for sub-systems and components of defence related equipment. Only days after, (February 29) another U. S. delegation led by Robert Dean, Deputy Secretary of State for Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs told news men in Delhi, that his country had granted a licence to import general electric engines to India for light combat aircraft, scheduled to be made in Bangalore by 1990 and to surpass F-16's performance, including speed.

Charges in Indian Policy Perspective

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's U-turn towards U.S.A. not only resulted in the immediate role of U.S. arms, including Sonar systems for anti-sub-weapons to sophisticated electronic equipment for sensitive weapon technology, but also shifted Indian perspective on other international issues away from USSR. Mr. B. R. Bhagat, at George

Town University Centre for Strategic and International Studies, declared (February 8) that the "Indian Government favoured the Finlandisation or Austrianisation of Afghanistan as a way to render that country neutral and non-aligned."⁴⁰

The policy shift was also cleared and authenticated by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi while replying to a question in Rajya Sabha that "basic mistrust between India and U.S.A. has been removed and only some questions, 'presumably unimportant', remained to be sorted out"⁴¹, like "American policy towards South Africa."⁴²

Russian Reaction

At this crucial and significant turn in their foreign policy, Indians were already expecting the Soviet concern. So, behind the scene, they attempted to "allay Soviet misgivings about the pro-American tilt and tried to convince that the "Indian relationships with the two super-powers will not be detrimental to Moscow's interest in the region."⁴³

Russians, on the other hand, did voice their concern over these developments, but in a very polite and unmistakable manner. The Soviet Vice-President, Mr. V. Kuznetsov, who led a parliamentary delegation to India in February, said: "the Soviet Union cannot complain, much less protest, against India's present policy to improve relations with the United States, so long as this does not affect the country's well-established friendship with it. But Moscow tended to take the view that the muffled Indian relation to current American policies and actions, which in its opinion is in sharp contrast with the strident tone of its criticism in the past, tends to give the benefit of doubt to Washington."⁴⁴

AFRICA

Although the exercise for reviewing bilateral relations with Africa was initiated by Ethiopia and Seychells, when the leaders of these countries visited India during the first quarter of 1986, but May could be called the African month in this exercise. It began with the visit of Mr. Oliver Tombo, President of the African National Conference (ANC) of South Africa. Jawaharlal Nehru University, in a

special convocation, conferred a doctorate on the ANC leader. Earlier, when SWAPO President, Mr. Sam Nujama, came to India, it was honoured as a state visit with a ceremonial welcome by the Prime Minister. The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was offered assistance in the fields of Agriculture and small scale industries, 300 fellowships in the Indian Universities and 100 experts from India and setting up of manpower development institute for the conference.

Thereafter, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi rode on a six-day extensive tour (May 13—18) of four front line states, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Tenzania. During this visit, India negotiated a Joint Commission with Zimbabwe; decided to set up a diplomatic mission in Angola; assured help in small scale industries to Zambia and offered academic and practical assistance to the Agriculture University of Tenzania.

INDIA AND THE WORLD

During this period, India's trade, economic and bilateral relations with other countries of the world, witnessed no major change except some new initiatives in the field of defence purchase from Sweden worth Rs. 1000 crores; the agreement for the purchase of Aircraft carrier from Britain and French supply of 27 Dauphin helicopters worth \$50 million. The bilateral developments with the rest of the world are as follows :

Nature of Development

Country

January

| | | |
|----|-----------------|---|
| 1 | Bangladesh | Commenced the sharing of Ganga water at Farakha according to the memorandum of understanding signed on November 22, 1985. |
| 2 | Nepal | Indo-Nepal treaty of trade and transit of 1978, extended till 1989. |
| 6 | Commonwealth | 8th Conference Commonwealth of speakers and presiding officers held in New Delhi. |
| 6 | Britain | British Legal team visited Delhi to discuss extradition arrangements. |
| 10 | Pakistan | Defence Secretaries of the two countries met in Islamabad. |
| 12 | Iran | Indo-Iran Joint Commission concluded its five-day session in Tehran. |
| 16 | USSR | Three-year trade agreement for 1987-90 signed in New Delhi. |
| 18 | Qatar | An agreement to improve working conditions for Indian workers signed in Qatar. |
| 22 | Thailand | Joint trade commission concluded its session at Bangkok and signed an agreement to promote trade and to identify new commodities. |
| 27 | Czecho Slovakia | Signed an agreement for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasions of taxes. |

| | | |
|----------|------------|---|
| February | | |
| 5 | Pakistan | Two Sub-Commissions on Culture, Information and Education concluded in Islamabad. |
| 10 | U.S.A. | Indo-U.S.A. Joint Economic Commission concluded its 4-day meeting in Washington. |
| 10 | USSR | Indo-Soviet working group on Oil Industry concluded its session (January 27-February 10) and signed a protocol. |
| March | | |
| 4 | UNICEF | Signed an aid agreement for U.S. \$1175 million for 1985-89 in Delhi. |
| 6 | Netherland | Signed an aid agreement for Rs. 90 crore in Delhi. |
| 7 | UAE | Agreement with UAE to increase trade from Rs. 700 crore to 1200 crore by 1990. |
| 15 | Pakistan | Premier Rajiv Gandhi met Premier Junejo in Stockholm. |
| 17 | Britain | Agreement to provide £119 million aid to India for 1986-87. |
| 19 | USSR | Signed a protocol and a working programme for cooperation in computer and electronics. |
| 24 | World Bank | Agreement for a credit of Rs. 400 crore to India. |
| | IDA | Agreement for Rs. 150 crore credit for agriculture and cement industry. |
| 25 | Sweden | Agreement to sell the Bafors 155 m.m. field Howitzer guns worth of Rs. 1000 crore to India. |
| 25 | France | Agreed to supply 27 Dauphin helicopters worth of \$50 million to India. |
| 30 | Britain | Agreement to sell design of Royal Navy's latest aircraft carrier the Ark Royal. |
| 30 | Britain | British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe arrived in New Delhi on a four-day visit. |
| 31 | Yugoslavia | Joint Business Council (JBC) concluded its seventh meeting and decided to set a two-way trade target of Rs. 200 crore for 1986 and double it by 1990. |

| | Country | Nature of Development |
|---------|------------------------|--|
| April 3 | Poland | The Joint Commission concluded its two-day session and signed a Protocol in Commerce, Trade. |
| 3 | Asian Development Bank | Approved a loan of \$100 million for India. |
| 3 | Switzerland | Swiss Foreign Minister Mr. Pierre Aubert held talks with Premier, President and Foreign Minister of India in New Delhi. |
| 5 | USSR | Signed a protocol providing for increased cooperation in the field of ferrous metallurgy. |
| 6 | Turkey | The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Turgut Ozal arrived in Delhi on a two-day visit. |
| 11 | Britain | Indo-British Joint-Steering Group concluded its two-days meeting in which Britain agreed to grant \$31 million to the Indian coal sector. |
| 16 | Sri Lanka | Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Mr. A.C.S. Hameed arrived in New Delhi. |
| 19 | Britain | India signed a £60 million contract for the purchase of aircraft carrier 'Hermes' from Britain. The vessel is expected to enter into active service with the Indian Navy in March 1987. |
| 25 | Seychelles | The President of Seychelles Mr. Rane arrived on a state visit to India. |
| 25 | Thailand | Indian and Thailand Commerce Ministers meeting concluded on an agreement for the sale of 20 railway bogeys to Thailand in exchange for rubber and edible oil for India. |
| 28 | Saudi Arabia | Indo-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission concluded its second meeting at Riyadh. According to the agreed minutes the Saudi Government would provide about \$ 50 million to the health projects to India and import bovine meat, fish and preparations from India. |

| | | |
|-------|--------------|--|
| 27-28 | West Germany | West German Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Kohl visited India. It was the first official visit by Bonn's head of government in 19 years. |
| 29 | USSR | Indo-Soviet Joint Commission, under the Co-Chairmanship of Mr. B. R. Bhagat, Indian Foreign Minister and Soviet First Deputy Premier Mr. I. V. Arkhipov, concluded its two-day session in New Delhi and signed a protocol for increasing cooperation. The protocol covers to increase and diversify on-going cooperation in the spheres of science and technology, electronics, computers, machine building and oil exploring. |
| May | | |
| 2 | ADB | Asian Development Bank signed a \$100 million loan agreement with India to meet part of medium and long term foreign exchange requirements of private enterprises in the Industrial sector. |
| 3 | USA | USA approved assistance worth of £124.8 million to help Indian import bill for vegetable oil. |
| 4 | USA | USA will give Rs. 575 crore in funds and food aid for India's child survival programme—the largest such programme ever undertaken by anyone, anywhere. |
| 14-16 | Bangladesh | Indo-Bangladesh signed trade pact to increase bilateral trade. The trade agreement is extended for a period of three years. |
| 15 | Zimbabwe | Rajiv Gandhi signed a protocol to station a squadron of Mig-215 to protect the rail line between Harare and Birare. |
| 22 | Pakistan | India and Pakistan agreed to reopen Khokarapar-Monabao checkpoint on Rajasthan-Sind border to facilitate rail traffic between the two countries. |
| 24 | SWAPO | South West African People's Organisation opened its Chancellery in New Delhi. |
| 26 | Bhutan | Indo-Bhutanese bilateral talks started at New Delhi. |

| | Country | Nature of Development |
|------|----------|--|
| June | | |
| 4 | FAO | India and FAO signed an agreement on collaboration of farm data for agricultural price policy and resource allocation. |
| 4 | Britain | It is reported that India has ordered an estimated \$4.2 million worth of training aid tactical and gunnery simulators from the British firm Solatron Defence Systems. |
| 6 | Nepal | India and Nepal signed an accord to supply 107000 tonnes of coal to Nepal during the year 1986. |
| 6 | USSR | Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) and the USSR have reached an understanding on cooperation for the production of electric locomotives. |
| 17 | Aid | Aid-India consortium announced at the end of its two-day meeting in Paris to provide \$4.5 billion aid to India for the fiscal year 1986-87. |
| 23 | Britain | Indian External Minister Mr. Shiv Shankar met British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe in London. |
| 29 | Thailand | India and Thailand have entered into a convention for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on Income. |

REFERENCES

1. A. S. Abrahan, *Times of India*, Delhi, March 29, 1986.
2. *Times of India*, Delhi, March 23, 1986.
3. Ibid., March 15, 1986.
4. *Amrat Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, March 28, 1986.
5. Ibid.
6. *Main Stream*, Delhi, March 22, 1986.
7. Ibid. Quoted in Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's address to the Young Presidents Organisation.
8. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, January 13, 1986.
9. Ibid., January 17, 1986.
10. *Morning News*, Karachi, January 21, 1986.
11. *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, January 21, 1986.
12. Ibid.
13. In an interview to *Telegraph*, Calcutta, the Indian Premier said on 11 March that "his trip looks very difficult now because of the slow progress in the efforts towards normalisation of relations between the two countries."
14. Rajiv-Junejo meeting at Stockholm on March 15, 1986.
15. The message was carried by Indian Ambassador, Mr. S.K. Singh who had earlier visited New Delhi. It was reportedly a reply to President Zia's message conveyed through Premier Mohammad Khan Junejo in Stockholm.
16. *Hindu*, Madras, January 16, 1986.
17. *The Sun*, Colombo, February 1, 1986.
18. "Deadlock" (Editorial), *The Sun*, Colombo, February 3, 1986.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. *Indian Express*, Delhi, March 3, 1986.
22. "... The Sri Lankan refugees who are now in India are staying on not because their return was made difficult by the Sri Lankan Government

but because of the continuing incidence of India-based terrorism in the area from where they had fled." *Indian Express*, Delhi, March 3, 1986.

23. Ibid.

24. *Times of India*, Delhi, March 15, 1986. The opposition parties who signed the joint statement were: Janata, BJP, Congress (S), Lok Dal, DMK, Muslim League, Telugu Desam, Tamil Nadu Congress (K) and National Conference.

25. Ibid. The statement said that "... If recognition (by India) could be given to SWAPO and PLO, why the same status could not be extended to the Tamil Eelam Movement."

26. *Indian Express*, Delhi, March 7, 1986.

27. *The Sun*, Colombo, March 9, 1986.

28. *Telegraph*, Calcutta, April 9, 1986.

29. *Indian Express*, Delhi, April 10, 1986.

30. *The Sun*, Colombo, April 18, 1986.

31. *Keesings Archives Reports*, Vol. XXXII, 1986, No. 5, p. 34359.

32. *Island*, Colombo, May 2, 1986.

33. Extract from Sri Lankan President, Junius Jayewardene's interview published in *The Sun*, Colombo, February 1, 1986.

34. *Island*, Colombo, May 2, 1986.

35. *Times of India*, Delhi, May 17, 1986.

36. Ibid. Quoted Jayewardene's interview to *Sunday Times*, London May 11, 1986.

37. *Times of India*, Delhi, May 24, 1986.

38. A. K. Agarwal—"Rajiv's U-turn Towards USA," *Organiser* (Weekly), Delhi, March 9, 1986.

39. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1986, p. 148.

40. A. K. Agarwal, op. cit., p. 3.

41. *Main Stream*, (Weekly), Delhi, March 22, 1986.

42. Ibid. Quoted Rajiv Gandhi's address to Young President's Organisation.

43. *Hindu*, Madras, February 17, 1986.

44. *Organiser*, Delhi, March 9, 1986.

Book Reviews

Frances Stewart, *Planning to Meet Basic Needs*,
The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1985, pp. 244, Price : £7.95.

Frances Stewart is a Senior Research Officer at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and a Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford. She is the author of *Technology and Under-Development* ; *International Financial Cooperation* ; and editor of *Employment, Income Distribution and Development* ; *Work Income and Inequality* ; and the *Economics of New Technology in Developing Countries*. She worked in different capacities : as an economist, a lecturer in Economics and as a consultant to the World Bank and various other international organisations like UNIDO, UNCTAD, ILO, OECD, the Ford Foundation and Appropriate Technology International.

The book under review is a useful work, especially for those who are involved in policy framing and the planners of a developing country like Pakistan. A fundamental objective of economic development is to meet the basic needs of the poor people, which includes the achievement of certain standards of nutrition, provision of health and education services, material needs, such as shelter and clothing, and non-material needs such as employment. This approach enables every one to have the minimum physical conditions necessary for a healthy and full life. This idea has an impressive effect and is being repeated in the speeches of almost every statesman in the developing countries and in the introduction to almost every development plan. The achievement of basic needs becomes more complicated when it comes to transforming the idea into action, into plans, policies and projects, in terms of indentifying suitable or proper measures.

The book under review is primarily concerned with the transformation of a simple human objective into plans and policies. One aim of this book is to establish the individuality of political economy, which tends to be successful in promoting basic needs. It is intended to set the scene for the analysis of planning by examining the meaning of a basic needs approach and its place in development thinking.

The Author describes that this basic need is an approach to development, not a strategy, in the sense that it consists of giving priority to a certain type of objective of development but does not indicate the means by which this objective is achieved, because different types of strategies may be effective in meeting basic needs. One should be clear that the basic needs approach is concerned with the objectives rather than the mechanism of development.

After discussing problems of defining the basic needs objective in an operational form, the book develops a planning framework, concerned with production, organisation and incomes. The three aspects focus on the critical planning and policy decisions pertinent to planning for basic needs.

This book adopts a 'full life' interpretation of the basic needs objective, that is, the quality of life. The minimal definition of a full-life concept restricts the objective to health and perhaps education. In the major part of this book health and some degree of education are picked out as the major dimensions. The Author explains in defence that while health and education do not tell the whole story, they are indispensable requisites for enjoyment of other aspects of a full-life in poor societies. It is usually accepted that most economic welfare is measured by income and therefore no attempt is made to identify how income gets translated into welfare.

The accounting Macro-Economic frame-work presented in this book clarifies some of the issues which are elaborately discussed in relation to basic needs. Apart from providing an orientation for research and data collection, it enables us to comment on the role and usefulness of a resource—planning approach. It also indentifies

the potential points of intervention and provides a frame-work in which to consider planning for policy change.

The book also examines the experience of a country in meeting basic needs. The Author briefly describes cases of Cuba, Taiwan and Sri Lanka's success in basic needs, whereas she has listed a wide variety of countries as poor performers in terms of economic development and political system. A very large number of the countries are in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Bhutan and Bangladesh are added to the list of poor performers, although in the case of these two countries the method is not really appropriate. The list also includes countries which have recently become socialist, for example, Angola and Ethiopia, semi-socialist countries like Algeria; and many examples of mixed economies, primarily of a capitalist nature, e.g., Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Bolivia and South Africa. The list also includes countries whose per capita income has grown hardly at all, e.g., Zambia and Central African Republic. The Author gives the sketches of developments in Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia as examples of types of countries which have had especially weak basic-need performance.

Frances Stewart examines the achievements on social and economic variables in relation to meeting the basic needs. The strongest finding is the very deep association between education, especially among females, and life expectancy in different countries.

Three chapters have been devoted to the macro frame-work of Nigeria. The Author pays special attention to the problems experienced in an oil producing economy which is the fifth largest amongst the group of thirteen oil producing and exporting countries.

All the indicators of Health show a very poor state of health among most Nigerians. Food production does not appear to have kept pace with population increase during the past fifteen years or so. Educational achievements among the adult population are very poor, with perhaps 10 per cent literacy. But recently education expanded and among the young achievements are much greater. The education sector is the one basic need sector which has

received substantial resources in recent years. A chapter on Tanzania considers ways of alleviating the problem of acute short term balance of payments without sacrificing achievements on basic needs. The Author compares such short term adjustment measures with the prescriptions of international institutions like IMF.

The investigations into the choices exhibited by the planning frame-work for basic needs and the rich variety of country experience suggest that there is considerable potential for improving basic need performance in most countries, including very poor countries.

The Author concludes that improvements in basic needs performance do not require extreme achievements with respect to income distribution, nor with respect to economic growth. These needs are potentially within the reach of most types of economy. The Author argues that improved basic needs performance involves changes at the level of the macro-economy. These changes, according to her, must occur simultaneously and consistently with respect to each of the aspects of the planning frame-work, i.e., production, organisation and incomes.

EJAZ ASLAM QURESHI

Assistant Professor

Punjab Engineering Academy

Lahore

A.H. Hanson and Janet Douglas, *India's Democracy*,

Vikas Publishing House, Pvt. Limited,
20/4 Industrial Area, Sahibabad 201010,
Distt. Ghaziabad, U.P. (India), 1986,
pp. 236, Price : Rs. 190.00

India's democracy is a subject of lively discussion among scholars and politicians. This is a study which analyses institutions as basic indicators to understand Indian democracy and its function more clearly. The comparative approach has been adopted to have a full view of its status in the political systems of the world.

The claim of those who have written on the subject is that such contributions would enable anyone visiting those countries, "to find his way about its governmental structure and to understand the way in which it might impinge upon his own concerns." From this angle this has been considered as a guide book on politics. This line of argument is visible in the introduction of the book which covers first ten pages. The British legacy is the title of the first chapter. The Author disagrees with Moris and Tiya Zinkin that Britain had lost more and gained less economically by its rule in India. In his review he takes the facts and figures to justify that Britain enriched itself at the cost of Indians. At the same time, he accepts the British contribution to modernising the Indian traditions and the creation of "civil services for running the administration of the country." He thinks that, "of all the legacies of British Rule, this has proved the least ambiguous." He recognises the principle of self-government which was gradually extended to the Indians and became a part and parcel of their lives. Briefly, the history of independence of India and Pakistan is discussed and the conclusion drawn is that what Britain achieved in India in the form of a united country it abandoned and allowed the partition. This line is what they feel pleased to claim for erstwhile British India as their greatest contribution.

The constitution has been discussed in the light of historical perspective. In this description, the main theme is that the Indians modelled their constitution on the frame-work which Britain gave to them. The contents of the constitution have been analysed and the British influences have been spotlighted. The impression one gathers is that the Indian constitution was produced under the shadow of the British contribution in this field.

Elections, parties and pressure groups are given a special treatment. One is made to believe that India is a replica of Western style of democracy. It is true that many features resemble the Western concepts but the actual functioning of institutions is quite another matter. The Author has not gone deep into the social ethos

of the Indian society and therefore the actual status and functioning of the political process have not been given any place. What is more interesting for common readers as well as serious students of political institutions are the discussions on parliamentary government and centre-states relations. The claim in India that they are running the biggest democracy in the world has become a debateable point. Dr. Smith, while writing on secularism in India, observes that India is trying to be a secular state. If this contention is to be believed then Indian parliamentary system, despite its apparent phraseology, is not what it looks. It has one face to show to the West and another to itself and its people for home consumption. The emergency powers have been discussed and in the opinion of K.V. Rao they are just like a frankenstein. It is clear that the centre could ride rough shod on the financial powers during the period when the emergency happens to be in operation.

Amazingly, it is claimed that India is a federal state, although it has been pointed out here that "nowhere in the Indian constitution does the word Federalism appear." Notwithstanding this omission, India is a federal state. Its federalism worked successfully because of the longer spell of rule of the Indian Congress, the political party which was responsible for getting independence for India. But the occasional departures took place and the provinces were placed under presidential rule, which showed that the Indian federation was labouring under severe restrictions because the centre was unwilling to allow sufficient autonomy to its units. This fact could also be substantiated from the recent history of the Indian Punjab.

The administrative machinery bequeathed by the British had done a great deal to keep the unity of India intact. In this regard the civil service, military and police are discussed. The anomaly has been noted while assessing the democratic subjects and the role of the services. The authors write : "the policies, therefore, are as essential to the preservation of India's democratic system as are the 'development' administrators ; and their task is certainly no less difficult." There are also comments on economic planning

and measures to improve the lot of the Indian people. But India is still not any nearer to the ambition of achieving success in providing a reasonable living standard to its people. Local government also created awareness in India through a new Panchayat Raj. But it appears as if the higher institutions have not allowed the institutions of local government to exert their influence in a big way.

The book comes up with its findings that whatever happened in India "it concerns everyone of us." This book falls a victim to the same fallacies as are in vogue about India in the Western countries. The myth and mystique of real India remain unreflected. The West, and those of the West who write about India, get only a partial picture and take it as a full view of Indian political life. What India is in its constitution is different from what India is in the functioning of its constitution. This difference between the two has not been fully discovered and therefore this book is yet another account of familiar ideas. At best, the book has the value of being a brief description of India's image as India would like to present to the West.

TAHIR KAMRAN

Senior Research Fellow

Pakistan Study Centre

University of the Punjab

New Campus, Lahore

Statements

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SAARC MINISTERIAL MEETING ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT—SHILLONG, MAY 6—8, 1986

In pursuance of the decision taken at the first Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation held at Dhaka in December 1985, the first Ministerial Meeting on Women in Development was held at Shillong on May 6—8, 1986 at the invitation of the Government of India.

The meeting was inaugurated by His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India. In his inaugural address, the Prime Minister emphasised the need to improve the status of women in the SAARC countries. He pointed out that this was a crucial area for regional cooperation since in South Asia while women are traditionally honoured and revered, their progress was restricted to some field and the majority of women continued to face discrimination. However, the Prime Minister cautioned that care should be taken to preserve our values so that economic advancement does not make us lose our roots. The Prime Minister also emphasised the need for a change of attitude towards women so as to enable them to broaden their horizons, since with women left behind our countries cannot march ahead. He expressed the hope that the meeting would be able to propose a time-bound programme for regional cooperation for the development of women.

On behalf of the Ministers, Her Excellency Barrister Rabiya Bhuiyan, Minister for Social Welfare and Women's Affairs, Government of Bangladesh thanked the Prime Minister for his illuminating

address. It was decided that the text of the speech of the Prime Minister of India would form part of the record of the meeting.

Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Alva, Minister of State for Women and Child Development, Government of India was elected Chairperson of the meeting. Mrs. Bhinda S. Shah, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal was elected Rapporteur of the Meeting.

The Ministers recalled that at Dhaka the Heads of State or Government had emphasised that women should increasingly participate in activities at the regional level within the framework of SAARC and Programmes and Projects should be devised to ensure their active participation in the development process. They further recalled that Heads of State or Government had directed the convening of a Ministerial Level meeting to identify the areas of activities and plan a Programme of Action.

The Ministers noted that one of the basic objectives of SAARC was to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life. They underscored that the decision of the Heads of State or Government to convene this meeting reflected their conviction that no meaningful progress could be achieved without the active participation and the enhancement of the status of women who form half the population in this region.

The Ministers reviewed the overall situation of women of the South Asian countries and noted that considerable progress has been achieved in several social sectors affecting women. However, greater attention was still required to be focussed on certain critical areas. Some of these were the low level of literacy, poor enrolment in schools coupled with high drop out rates ; lack of vocational and technical training, marketing and credit facilities, low level of political participation and involvement in policy-making and its implementation. It was felt that special efforts were also required to disseminate appropriate technologies to eliminate drudgery and thus improve the quality of life of women particularly in the rural areas. The

interdependence between women and the environment as a critical factor for policy planning was recognised. The need to establish linkages between women's NGOs at the national and regional levels and to strengthen the network of voluntary organisations was also stressed.

The Ministers considered and endorsed the report of the Official Level Meeting on Women in Development held in New Delhi from April 8–10, 1986.

The Ministers identified the following modalities through which specific activities relating to women in development could be taken up on a regional basis over a period of time :

- (i) Preparation of a report on the status of women of the SAARC Region.
- (ii) Exchange of national experiences, information and data relating to women.
- (iii) Sharing of institutional training facilities.
- (iv) Workshops and seminars on subjects of mutual interest.
- (v) Identification of resource institutions and persons to be used as focal points for the coordination of agreed programmes and activities.
- (vi) Publication of regional directories of :
 - (a) women's projects ;
 - (b) research and training institutions dealing with women's issues ;
 - (c) non-Governmental organisations involved in the implementation of women's projects ;
 - (d) select bibliography on critical issues and areas.
- (vii) Exhibitions, study tours, exchange programmes and non-institutional training.
- (viii) Regional projects for women's development.

- ix) An annual SAARC Newsletter on happenings and developments of interest to women in the areas to be prepared by Member States in rotation.

The Ministers recommended that the following initial Programme of Action be considered for implementation :

| Activities | Date | Venue/ Country | Remarks |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------|---|
| Sector : Women in Development | | | |
| <i>I. Workshops</i> | | | |
| (a) Workshop on Women and the Law | December 1986 | Bangladesh | |
| (b) Workshop on Women and Environment | March 1987 | Pakistan | |
| (c) Workshop on self-employed women and women in the unorganised sector | July 1987 | Sri Lanka | |
| (d) Workshop on Women and Employment | | | |
| (e) Workshop on Women's Education and Training, Non-formal and formal education programmes | | | Dates and venues to be decided by mutual consultations. |
| (f) Workshop on Women in Science and Technology | | | |
| (g) Workshop on Women in Agriculture, including extension and Social forestry | | | |
| | | | |
| <i>II. Training</i> | | | |
| (a) Training in Rural Management for Women | October/November 1987 | India | |

- (b) Training in Public Cooperation for Women

III. Exhibitions

- (a) Exhibition of handicrafts and designs by Women October 1986 Maldives
- (b) Exhibition of works by Women Artists 1987 Bhutan
- (c) Exhibition of Books by Women Writers

IV. Tours

- (a) Study Tours of specialised groups of Women

V. Seminars

- (a) Seminar on Women in Industry
- (b) Seminar on Women in Media and Communication

Mindful of the need to view regional cooperation as an evolutionary process which permitted the elaboration of cooperation activities, the Ministers recognised that it would be beneficial to promote cooperation in women's development and the enhancement of their status. They recommended to the SAARC Council of Ministers that this be included as an agreed area of cooperative activity within SAARC and that a Technical Committee be constituted in the area of women in development.

The Ministers recommended that the existing Technical Committees in the agreed areas of cooperation should give increasing emphasis to programmes specially pertaining to women in their respective areas. They noted that the areas of particular relevance to women would be agriculture, rural development, science and technology, health and population activities, sports, arts and culture.

The Ministers further recommended that in order to coordinate, monitor, evaluate and assist the programmes being undertaken under SAARC in the area of women in development, a special cell be set up in the proposed SAARC Secretariat.

The Ministers were of the view that in order to provide support for a sustained programme of activities including initiation of regional projects in the long-term, studies, research, dissemination of information and planning on women's issues were necessary within the SAARC framework. Towards this end they recommended that a network of institutions be identified to work together for regional projects and programmes.

The Ministers were of the view that they should meet at least once a year to review the progress in implementation of the activities pertaining to women in development. The venue and time of the next meeting will be decided through mutual consultations.

The Leaders of the Delegations of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka expressed their deep appreciation and gratitude to His Excellency the Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Gandhi for having inaugurated the meeting. They expressed their sincere thanks to the Government of India and the State Government of Meghalaya for the warm hospitality and care that were lavished on their delegations and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting. They expressed their special thanks to the Chairperson of the meeting, Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Alva, Minister of State for Women and Child Development, Government of India for so ably steering the meeting to a successful conclusion.

DECLARATION OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF SAARC COUNTRIES ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

The Ministerial Meeting of the SAARC countries was held in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 2—3, 1986, to discuss International Economic Issues in pursuance of the decision of the Heads of State

and Government of SAARC at their first Summit in December 1985. The Ministerial Meeting was preceded by a preparatory meeting of senior officials and experts on March 31 and April 1, 1986.

The Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that the objective of accelerated economic and social development of their countries, which had inspired the creation of SAARC, could best be achieved in conditions of peace and stability in the region. They recognised that while the primary responsibility for development was their own, the external environment was a vital factor. The Ministers expressed disappointment that the prevailing economic crisis has adversely affected the peace of development in South Asia and impeded the resolution of the fundamental problems of poverty and under development which continue to weigh heavily on all the countries of the region. They were convinced, however, that given appropriate conditions and support, the one billion people of the SAARC countries, a fifth of all mankind, who are endowed with renowned skills and vast energies, can overcome their developmental problems and also contribute significantly to world economic growth and prosperity.

The Ministers emphasised the SAARC countries have a vital stake in resolving the present economic problems which arise from persistent structural imbalance and disequilibrium in the world economy and in improving conditions for financial, trade, industrial and scientific cooperation between the developed and developing countries. Success in these endeavours would contribute to ushering in a New International Economic Order based on equity and justice. The Ministers believed that prospects for the resolution of the fundamental problems of world economy could be greatly improved by the collective approach and endeavours of the SAARC countries.

The World Economy :

The Ministers observed that the prolonged economic difficulties of the past decade were in a large measure the consequence and manifestation of the structural disequilibrium in the system of world

economic relations supported by the Bretton Woods institutions, which accorded inadequate recognition to the need for rapid economic and social development of the developing countries. International trading arrangements have failed to deal with the chronic instability markets. Agriculture and textiles have been excluded from the purview of the GATT and provided the example for other unjustified restraints against the competitive exports of the developing countries. As a consequence, over the past four decades, the terms of trade of the developing countries have registered a secular decline while the benefits from the expansion in world trade have accrued mainly to the developed countries. At the same time, the monetary arrangements have distributed world liquidity inequitably, favouring the developed countries. The unilateral pursuit of independent monetary policies by the more powerful industrial economies, in the wake of the failure of the Bretton Woods institutions to maintain orderly exchange rates, has led to high interest rates and consequently, has placed an inequitable burden on the weak and indebted economies of the developing countries, in particular the least developed countries. Chaotic monetary conditions have contributed considerably to the recession of the early 1980s and the present imbalances in world economic relations.

The prolonged economic recession of the early 1980s marked by contraction in world trade, depressed commodity prices, high interest rates and unavailability of adequate financial resources—concessional and commercial—has caused serious setbacks to the development of the developing countries. The burden of adjustment in the recession has been mainly by the developing countries. The partial economic ‘recovery’ in the developed countries during the past three years has been marked by major imbalances, limiting its scope and sustainability with only limited benefit for the trade of the developing countries. At the same time, the period of recovery has been marked by : a sharp decline in private and official financial flows ; reverse transfers of capital ; high real interest rates ; volatile exchange rates ; failure of commodity prices to recover ; mounting protectionist policies in the

developed countries and severe adjustment policies with adverse impact on the developing countries, particularly the least developed among them.

The Ministers, taking into account the increasingly interdependent character of global economic relations, expressed their deep concern at the continuing erosion of multilateralism due to the policies of some countries and urged all Governments to recommit themselves to strengthening the multilateral framework for negotiations and international economic co-operation for development.

Any further slackening of growth in the world economy will exacerbate the existing inter-related problems of money, finance, debt and trade and quickly turn into a severe development crisis, particularly for the least developed and low income countries, including the SAARC countries. Even if present trends continue, the per capita GDP of the developing countries in 1990 will be barely above the 1980 levels and, for many of them, it will be below such levels. The debt and development crisis will aggravate further. Clearly, without major policy changes, the world economy is on a course which is perilous and unsustainable.

The reluctance of developed countries to live up to their commitment to transfer resources to the developing countries is all the more regrettable since their financial positions have substantially improved due to the reduction in the real prices of commodities and raw materials, including oil, while the prices of their manufactured exports have not substantially declined.

The Ministers reiterated that peace, disarmament and development were closely inter-related. They called for a halt to the arms race, including nuclear arms race and effective disarmament measures, especially by the major powers. The additional resources thus released, used for the purpose of development, beneficial for all, would usher in the beginning of a new peaceful, just and equitable era.

The Ministers stressed the need for urgent adoption of the following proposals to ensure sustained and balanced growth in the world economy :

I. International Monetary Measures :

The growth and development prospects in the developing countries could be significantly improved through the implementation of the following measures within the International Monetary Fund.

- (a) The Ninth General Review of IMF quota should be completed at an early date and lead to a substantial increase in quotas ;
- (b) access of developing countries to the Fund's resources should be enhanced ;
- (c) IMF conditionality and adjustment programmes should be modified with a view to supporting programmes of growth and development ;
- (d) greater emphasis by IMF on low conditionality resources to promote growth-oriented structural adjustment.
- (e) in order to ensure adequate international liquidity commensurate with the needs of the developing countries in particular and to promote the SDR as the principal reserve asset, there should be an annual allocation of £ 15 billion in new SDRs, at least partially linked to development assistance and ;
- (f) compensatory financing to developing countries should be expanded and liberalised.

II. Transfer of Resources and ODA :

The Ministers expressed their concern that at present there was a reverse transfer of more than \$ 20 billion annually from the developing to the developed countries. They noted that the contraction in real terms of financial flows to developing countries have sharply constrained their development efforts. The decline in official development

assistance had a particularly severe impact on the least developed and other low-income countries. ODA flows remained below half the agreed target of 0.7 per cent of the GNP of industrialised countries and have fallen in real terms since 1980. Despite strong international commitment, ODA flows to the least developed countries have remained below half the target of 0.15 per cent agreed to in the Substantial New Programme of Action for the least developed countries.

The Ministers observed that the Development Committee Task Force on concessional flows had suggested that donor governments should exert redoubled efforts to increase the supply of ODA as a matter of urgency. In achieving this objective, poverty should continue to be the primary developmental criterion for allocating scarce ODA resources. Thus, as stated by the Task Force "low income countries still need concessional assistance and the poor among them need more of it than ever." The Ministers underlined the importance of the transfer of an adequate quantum of resources on appropriate terms to enable the countries of the SAARC region to redress the acute problem of poverty that they are facing.

The Ministers called for the implementation of the following measures relating to the transfer of resources to the developing countries on a priority basis :

- (a) the adoption of a time-table by the developed donor countries for—
 - (i) achievement of the 0.7 per cent ODA target, at least by the end of the decade and ;
 - (ii) attainment of the target of 0.15 per cent of their GNP or doubling of their current ODA for the least developed countries urgently in the context of expanding ODA flows ;
- (b) agreement on the Eighth Replenishment of IDA by September 1986 at a substantially higher level in real terms to meet the needs of the developing countries ; and

rejection of efforts to harden IDA terms which will severely impair the effectiveness of IDA assistance ;

- (c) an expansion in the IBRD's lending programme, at an annual rate of at least 6 per cent in real terms and, to this end, an early agreement for general capital increase of the Bank and doubling its gearing ratio ;
- (d) increase in the resources of the regional development banks in particular the Asian Development Bank ;
- (e) strengthening the resources base of multilateral financial institutions and technical assistance agencies ;
- (f) improvement in the quality ODA including larger programme and commodity assistance, local and recurrent cost support and untying of procurements to make it more flexible and responsive to the needs of the recipient countries ;
- (g) enlarged access for developing countries to private capital markets.

III. International Conference on Money and Finance for Development :

The Ministers believed that reform of the monetary and financial system has now become essential to resolve the problems of development and debt. They reaffirmed the proposal of the non-aligned and developing countries for an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development and urged that preparations for this must commence as soon as possible. The objective of this should include :

- (a) establishment of a stable, realistic and flexible exchange rate structure with target zones for currency fluctuations supported by financial intervention and enforced by macro-economic policy coordination ;
- (b) The promotion of an equitable international monetary *inter alia* through symmetric surveillance, particularly on the surplus and reserve currency countries, adequate

creation and distribution of liquidity and balance of payments support on appropriate terms in order to ensure an effective and balanced international adjustment process ;

- (c) evolving means to ensure the transfer of resources to developing countries on an increasingly assured, continuous and predictable basis ;
- (d) substantial increase in the voting share of the developing countries in order to ensure that international financial institutions reflect the diversity of the economic and social systems and structures of the members of these institutions.

IV. Macro-economic policies :

The industrialised countries must assume a leading role in stimulating world economic growth. The world's largest economy should reduce its high fiscal deficits and easy monetary policies in order *inter alia* to reduce interest rates and its demand for funds in world capital markets. In parallel expansionary measures should be taken by other industrialised market economy countries, especially those with large trade surpluses, to contribute to world economic growth, particularly in the developing countries, and more balanced international trade. Therefore, their trade, fiscal and monetary policies should be more supportive of development in the developing countries.

V. External Debt :

The Ministers were of the view that the trillion dollar external debt of the developing countries had become unmanageable due to the combined effects of sharply higher interest rates, the prolonged world recession, growing protectionism and inconsistent policies of the commercial banks. The *ad hoc* measures adopted so far have placed the burden of adjustment on the debtor countries, eroding their economic growth and transmitting deflationary pressures throughout and world economy and have aggravated the development crisis. The Plan for increased lending of \$ 20 billion by the commercial banks and \$ 9 billion by official institutions over the next three years

will be, in itself, insufficient to overcome the debt crisis or revive economic and social development in the debtor countries.

The Ministers were convinced that no strategy on debt could be viable unless it contained a commitment to restore growth and development. They proposed that a solution of the debt problem should be based on the following principles :

- (i) equity in the distribution of the burden involved in the resolution of the debt crisis ;
- (ii) the primacy of development and growth objectives ; and
- (iii) special treatment for the low-income and the least developed countries.

The Ministers reiterated that a political dialogue among all interested parties aimed at resolving the debt problem must include the government of debtor and creditor countries, multilateral financial institutions, and the commercial banks and that the dialogue must be collective, sustained and comprehensive. Debt service payment should be limited to a percentage of export earnings compatible with the development needs and the economic and social requirements of each country.

The Minister noted with concern the high debt service ratios of the low income and least developed countries including the SAARC countries. Bearing in mind that tied aid does not fully compensate for flexible foreign exchange resources repaid as debt servicing by these countries, the Ministers urged that aid flows to these countries be expanded urgently and their debt service burden reduced through long-term rescheduling on concessional terms, in full conformity with TDB Resolution 165 (S—IX) on ODA debt and in accordance with the recommendations of the mid-term review of the SNPA.

VI. International Trade and Multilateral Trade Negotiations :

A growth-oriented recovery programme requires expanding world trade and an open trading system. The Ministers therefore noted

with concern the deterioration in the world trade environment, rising protectionism and declining commodity prices.

To help ensure stability in commodity markets, the Minister emphasised the need for fuller implementation of the integrated Programme for Commodities and early ratification of the Agreement on the Common Fund with a view to making it operational without further delay. They noted that in regard to commodities of interest to SAARC countries viz., cotton, hard fibre, jute, tea and rubber, either no international commodity agreement had so far emerged or they did not contain meaningful mechanisms to deal with the specific problems of these commodities. They emphasised the particular importance that they attached to the developmental measures for commodities which would be covered by the second account of the Common Fund. The Ministers called for appropriate action to promote the export interests of the SAARC countries in other commodities such as rice and leather. The Ministers proposed that early action should also be taken for :

- (a) Expansion and liberalisation of the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility ;
- (b) Establishment of an additional complementary facility to compensate for the export earnings shortfalls of developing countries and ;
- (c) The formulation of frameworks of international cooperation for securing increased participation of commodity producing countries in the area of processing, market in and distribution including transportation.

The Ministers noted that the access to markets for the exports of developing countries was becoming more insecure. There had been proliferation of sectoral arrangements, "voluntary" export restraint agreements and other restrictions applied discriminatorily to exports of developing countries, circumventing GATT rules or violating them. The principle of special and differential treatment to developing countries was being increasingly ignored and they were being

required to undertake new obligations. Extraneous elements were being sought to be built into the GSP schemes. The Ministers stressed the importance of urgent measures for significantly improving the access to markets for the exports of developing countries by *inter-alia* improvement of the GSP schemes, adhering strictly to the principles of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity. In this context the Ministers emphasised that it was vital for the SAARC countries that trade in textile and clothing was brought within the framework of normal GATT rules within a short time frame. They also urged the developed countries to respond to the longstanding demand of the developing countries for granting unrestricted duty-free access to tropical products, in primary and processed forms.

The Ministers felt that the major objective of any new round of MTNs would have to be preservation and strengthening of the multilateral trading system which would *inter alia* promote rapid growth and diversification of the trade of developing countries and accord full protection to their interests and rights based on an effective differential and more favourable treatment to them. As a prerequisite for the commencement of a new round, it was necessary that there was a firm and credible commitment for a standstill and that developed countries undertake a commitment to 'rollback' restrictive measures not consistent with GATT within a short time frame not exceeding three years. There was also need for an undertaking to negotiate on a priority basis a comprehensive understanding on safeguards based on GATT principles. The Ministers stressed that beside safeguards, dispute settlement, trade in agriculture, textiles and tropical products were items of high priority for them for inclusion in the agenda of the proposed New Round. The Ministers also emphasized the need for simultaneous and complementary action in the monetary and financial fields. They emphasised that during the New Round, the GATT provision and decisions on differential and more favourable treatment should be implemented meaningfully and effectively, with special attention given to the particular situation and problems of the least developed among

developing countries. Moreover, the negotiations should be genuinely multilateral in nature, ensure transparency and include adequate surveillance of the balanced and equitable nature of benefits resulting from trade liberalisation.

The Ministers recognised that GATT did not have the jurisdiction in the areas of services, intellectual property and investment.

They felt that services covered a range of economic activities, very heterogenous in character. Some of them involved establishment or movement of people, or were closely interlinked with the socio-economic structure of a country. Furthermore, international agencies already existed for dealing with certain specific services. In the light of this, the questions whether and what international action was necessary or feasible with regard to any service sectors, and their implications for developing countries, therefore, needed to be fully examined.

The Ministers declared emphatically that no linkage should be established between access for goods of developing countries and concessions by them in the areas of services, as this would *inter alia* accentuate the existing asymmetries in the international economic order.

VII. Development :

The Ministers, while recognising the encouraging expansion in agricultural and food production in most of the SAARC countries, affirmed that continued growth in this sector, which employs the vast majority of the peoples of developing countries, was indispensable for balanced development and to eliminate poverty. They noted that agreement for the second replenishment of IFAD has finally been reached and called for its full and early implementation.

The Ministers reiterated that industrialisation was a pre-requisite for balanced development and prosperity, to reduce their dependence on the developed countries as well as to bring about an improvement in their trade. They urged the industrialised countries to adopt

appropriate industrial adjustment policies based on dynamic comparative advantage.

The Ministers acknowledged that the development and acquisition of science and technology were indispensable for economic dynamism. They called for strengthened international cooperation in science and technology in order to enable the developing countries to derive advantages from the rapid technological developments taking place. They urged the acceptance of the Code of Conduct for the transfer of technology elaborated in UNCTAD. The Ministers recommended that the SAARC countries should wherever feasible, work together to improve the conditions for the transfer of technology to the SAARC countries.

VIII. Least Developed Countries :

The Ministers noted that four of the seven SAARC countries were least developed. They deplored that despite the adoption of the Substantial New Programme of Action in 1981, the economic and social conditions in the least developed countries had continued to deteriorate. In recent years their development had been severely retarded by global economic recession and natural disasters. They called for full and expeditious implementation of the SNPA. In this context the Ministers expressed their support for the conclusions and recommendations of the mid-term Global Review of the SNPA held in Geneva from September 30—October 11, 1985, and urged their urgent implementation.

IX. Land-locked Countries :

The Ministers noted with concern the serious constraints for economic and social development of the land-locked developing countries and recommended that the international support measures contained in the relevant resolutions adopted by the UN System should be strictly adhered to with a view to overcoming their difficult structural problems which hampered the development efforts of these countries.

X. International Development Strategy for Third UN Development Decade :

The Ministers observed that the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade represented the broadest consensus yet achieved in the international community on international cooperation for development. It also provided a general framework and a major instrument for co-operation not only amongst states but also within the UN System itself through the establishment of related goals for the decade, linking economic, social and political issues, short and long term perspectives and domestic and international policy measures in specifically defined areas. The Ministers expressed serious concern over the fact that there had been no progress towards the attainment of the targets set forth in the Strategy even after five years of its adoption. They called for the initiation of immediate appropriate measures by the developed countries for the realization of these targets.

XI. Global Negotiations :

The Ministers were concerned that the current problems in the world economy confirmed the need to launch the Global Negotiations sought by the developing countries since 1979. They regretted that this major objective had not been realised due to the resistance of a few developed countries and urged them to reconsider their positions. They affirmed the central role of the United Nations in the context of Global Negotiations.

XII. International Economic Coordination :

The Ministers noted the growing interdependence among countries as well as between the various sectors of the world economy. In this context, they reaffirmed their support for the continuing role of UNCTAD in the inter-related areas of money, finance, trade and development.

While supporting the on-going endeavours to resolve economic issues in the relevant specialized agencies and organizations, they reiterated the necessity of a comprehensive and high level dialogue

to redress the present imbalances and to promote sustained and balanced growth in the world economy. The Ministers welcomed the growing recognition of the desirability of such a dialogue. They proposed that such a dialogue should be conducted in an appropriately structured multilateral forum with the full participation of the developing countries and the support of all the concerned international institutions and organizations, including the United Nations.

XIII. Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries :

The Ministers reaffirmed that economic cooperation among developing countries constituted an important element in the strategy of collective self-reliance by developing countries to take full advantage of existing and potential complementarities in their economic and solidarity in order to promote their economic development. This would facilitate meaningful negotiations with the developed countries on the establishment of a New International Economic Order. In this context the Ministers stressed the need for intensifying economic cooperation among the SAARC countries which would be a dynamic input in fostering South-South cooperation. While ECDC was an integral part of efforts to restructure international economic relations, it was not a substitute for economic cooperation between developed and developing countries nor should it be seen as diminishing the responsibilities of developed countries for establishing just and equitable economic relations with the developing countries and contributing to their development.

The Ministers noted with satisfaction the important steps that have been taken to intensify cooperation among the developing countries under the Caracas Programme of Action and the Non-aligned Action Programme on Economic Cooperation. A number of initiatives have been developed in the fields of trade, information exchange, science and technology, money and finance, among others, that have given a new sense of dynamism to the development of mutually beneficial economic relations among the non-aligned and other developing countries. In this connection, they noted with

satisfaction the finalisation of the statute of the non-aligned Centre for science and technology and urged non-aligned and other developing countries, which have not so far done so to ratify the statute with a view to the early commencement of the work of the Centre.

The Ministers recalling the decision for the harmonisation of the two Action Programmes, also stressed their complementarity and urged that the fullest coordination should be developed so as to make the two Programmes mutually supportive in order to realise fully the collective self-reliance of the developing countries. In this connection they urged that developing countries should strive to give preferential treatment in regard to their economic exchanges with other developing countries.

The Ministers expressed their conviction that the conceptual framework has now been evolved for the rapid expansion of economic, technical, commercial and cultural relations among the developing countries. They called for the further intensification of efforts to identify action-oriented projects and programmes that would lead to an increasing impact of ECDC on the development momentum of these countries.

The Ministers, however, noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in implementation of the G-77 Ministerial Declaration of 1982 on Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). They welcomed the decisions of the Ministerial Meeting held in New Delhi in July, 1985, which had imparted momentum to the efforts of developing countries for evolving GSTP by identifying general approaches to the negotiations and by laying down a time frame for elaboration of the Framework Agreement, techniques and modalities and negotiating plan. They further welcomed the decision that the first round of negotiations should commence in May 1986 to be completed by May 1987.

*XIV. Modalities of Coordination among SAARC Countries
in International Organizations on Economic Issues :*

The Ministers recognized the need for appropriate follow up action on international economic issues. In this connection they agreed that the representatives of SAARC countries should coordinate their positions at the headquarters of international and regional organizations as well as in relevant international conferences to further the common objectives of member countries.

A Select Bibliography of Books and Periodical Literature on South Asia

January to June 1986

BOOKS

BANGLADESH

Westergaard, Kirsten, *State and Rural Society in Bangladesh : A Study in Relationship*, London, Curzon Press, 1985.

INDIA

Allen, Charles and Dwivedi, Sharada, *Lives of the Indian Princes*, New York, Crown Publishers, 1984.

Borthwick, Meredith, *The Changing Role of Women in Bengal 1849-1905*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.

Horiharananda Aranya, Swami, *Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali*, New York, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1983.

Mason, Philip, (ed.) *India and Ceylon : Unity and Diversity*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967.

Mirza, Sarfaraz Hussain & others, *The Sikh Question*, Lahore, Centre for South Asian Studies, Punjab University, 1985.

Mohammad Sarwar, *Indian General Elections 1984*, Lahore, Centre for South Asian Studies, Punjab University, 1985.

Schaller, George B., *Stones of Silence : Journeys in the Himaliya*, London, Ander Deutsch, 1980.

Shan Mohammad, *The Aligarh Movement ; Basic Documents 1864-1898*, (3 Volumes), Lahore, Islamic Book Service, 1986.

Sinha, V. M., *The Superior Civil Services in India*, Jaipur, The Institute for Research and Advanced Studies, 1985.

The above Bibliography including on SAARC has been prepared by Mrs. Farzana Anwar Cheema.

NEPAL

Agarwal, Govind Ram, *Fundamentals of Nepalese Foreign Policy*, Nepal, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, 1985.

Agarwal, Govind Ram & others, *Transport Linkages in Nepal : Prospects for Regional Cooperation*, Kathmandu, Centre for Economic Development and Administration, Tribhuvan University, 1986.

PAKISTAN

Baxter, Craig (ed.), *Zia's Pakistan ; Politics and Stability in a Frontline State*, Lahore, Vanguard, 1985.

Ray, Santinay, *Freedom Movement and Indian Muslims*, Lahore, Peoples Publishing House, (n.d).

Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan Failure in National Integration*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.

Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah : Myth and Reality*, Islamabad, National Institute of Historical Research, 1985.

بیدار ملک - یاران مکتب (سوانحی خاکے) لاہور ، پاکستان سٹڈی سنٹر ،
پنجاب یونیورسٹی ، ۱۹۸۶

منشی عبدالرحمن - کردار قائداعظم - لاہور ، شیخ اکیڈمی ، ۱۹۸۳ .

— معماران پاکستان ، لاہور ، شیخ اکیڈمی ، ۱۹۷۶ .

شاہین ، رحیم بخش - نقوش قائداعظم - لاہور ، شیخ اکیڈمی ، ۱۹۷۶ .

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

BANGLADESH

Abul Qasham, Hassan, "Indo-Bangladesh Trade : Alarming Imbalance," *Holiday*, Dhaka, May 30, 1986.

— "Poll alliance runs into heavy weather," *Holiday*, Dhaka, April 11, 1986.

Ahmed, Salehuddin, "Rural-Urban Migration : Policy Stimulations in Dual Economy Model of Bangladesh," *The Developing Economics*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1986, pp. 26-43.

Amanullah, "Divided Politics," *Holiday*, Dhaka, April 11, 1986.

— "Legitimacy and Politics," *Holiday*, Dhaka, January 17, 1986.

- Ataus Samad, "Opposition Thinking of Electoral Front : Hard Choices," *Holiday*, Dhaka, March, 14, 1986.
- "Bangladesh—The Military Factor," (Editorial), *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1986, pp. 3-11.
- Dhar, Sujit, "Mortal Danger to West Bengal : Tackle Infiltration—Now or Never," *Organiser*, New Delhi, April 13, 1986.
- Fazal, Ahmad, "Guarantee Clause again Forsaken," *Holiday*, Dhaka, November 11, 1985.
- "Foreign Aid and We," (Editorial), *The Bangladesh Observer*, Dhaka, April 11, 1986.
- "General Ershad's Interview with *Defence Journal*," *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1986, pp. 13-22.
- Hossain, Golam, "Bangladesh Power Politics ; Ziaur Rehman's Syndrome," *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1986, pp. 27-42.
- "Lieut. Gen. Hussain Muhammad Ershad : A Profile," *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1986, pp. 23-26.
- Mohammad, Abul Khair, "The Price of Aid," *Holiday*, Dhaka, February 21, 1986.
- Montu, Kazi, "Khaleda Zia says : BNP is the Target," *Holiday*, Dhaka, January 17, 1986.
- Mujeri, Mustafa K., "Growth and Change in the Crop Sector of Bangladesh : A Disaggregated Analysis," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1986, pp. 55-74.
- Pachpore, Virag, "Continuing dispute over the Tin Bigha corridore," *The Sentinel Guwahati*, April 6, 1986.
- Patra, Saral, "A new irritant in India-Bangladesh ties," *Patriot*, New Delhi, June 11, 1986.

BHUTAN

- Kohli, Manorama, "Bhutan's Strategic Environment : Changing Perceptions," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 142-153.

INDIA

- Abraham, A. S., "Indo-Pakistan Dialogue : Some Crucial Questions," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, February 7, 1986.

- Abraham, A.S. "Local Parties to the Fore : Growing Challenge to Congress Primacy," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 27, 1985.
- Agarwal, A. L., "On Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production Function in Selected Indian Industries," *Artha Vijnana*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 152-170.
- Ahluwalia, Rambir Singh, "Nuclear Arms and India's Security," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, January 8, 1986.
- Barman, Ashis, "Whither New Economic Policy ? *Patriot*, New Delhi, April 30, 1986.
- Bhargava, G. S., "Afghanistan : What India can do?" *Indian Express*, New Dehli, January 5, 1986.
- "India can live without the Bomb," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 12, 1985.
- "India's Neighbours : (I) Set attitudes in South Block, (II) Blowing hot and cold over Pakistan," *The Statesman*, Delhi, January 14, 15, 1986.
- Bhatia, B. M., "Punjab Agriculture close look," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, June 24, 1986.
- Bobb, Dilip, "The New Offensive," *India Today* New Delhi, January 22, 1986.
- "The Resignation Story," *India Today*, New Delhi, March 15, 1986.
- Chacko, Arun, "Rise of North-East Student Power," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, December, 28, 1985.
- Chakravarty, Nikhil, "Beware the new U. S. Strategy in South Asia," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, January 24, 1986.
- Chawla, Prabhu, "Zail Singh : Grounded President," *India Today*, New Delhi, January 31, 1986.
- Chopra, Pran, "Assam has meaning for all," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, January 22, 1986.
- Chopra, S. N. "Rajiv's Pak policy : Giving way to Confusion," *Prob India* Allahabad, May, 1986.
- Dalal, Burjor J., "Shooting down defence Costs," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, April 27, 1986.

- Datta, Bhabatosh, "Budget and Fiscal trap," *The Statesman*, Delhi, March 4, 5, 1986.
- "Deadlock on Mizoram," (Editorial), *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, January 29, 1986.
- Deshpande, V. N., "Sociology of Indian Sociology : Ramakrishne Mukjerjee's Paradigm, *State and Society*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1985, pp. 49-60.
- Dhar, O. N., "The Undeclared War," *Patriot*, New Delhi, June 14, 1986.
- Dua, H. K., "Rajiv's Pakistan Dilemma," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 4, 1985.
- Dutt, Vijay, "The Troubled President," *Prob India*, Allahabad, April 1986.
- Gandhi, Rajmohan, "Why India is devalued," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, May 20, 1986.
- Ganguli, Amulya, "Congress (I) in Bengal : Setback for Party and its President," *The Statesman*, Delhi, January 3, 1986.
- Ganguly, Tarun, "CPI(M) Twelfth Party Congress : Marxism, the Pragmatic Way," *Sunday*, Calcutta, January 5, 1986.
- Gunasinghe, P.A.T., "For India to encourage Separatism in others is to destroy itself," *The Island*, Colombo, March 9, 1986.
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen, "Foreign Policy is Changing but," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 1, 1986.
- Haq, Mozammel, "Impediments which delayed Muslim Progress in Education in Bengal 1900-1911," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-32.
- Hasan, Javed, "Sikh Struggle for Identity—Perspective and Prospects," *The CITADEL*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1986, pp. 59-87.
- "Indo-Maldives ties" (Editorial), *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, February 10, 1986.
- "Is the Congress (I) Supporting Muslim Fundamentalism," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 31, 1985.
- "Is the Congress Party Democratic," *Sunday*, Calcutta, December 29, 1985.
- Jain, Girilal, "Politics of Rajiv Gandhi : (I) An outsider's view of India, (II) Business a criminal activity," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, February 19, 20, 1986.

- Jetly, Nancy, "Sino-Indian Relations : a Quest for Normalization," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 1, 1986, pp. 53-68.
- Jit, Inder, "Integration : Hard Facts, *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, April 15, 1986.
- Joshi, Manoj, "Toning up Army Force Structure," *The Hindu*, Madras February 1, 1986.
- Kakati, Satis C., "Youth Power in Assam : Regionalism vs. National Parties," *The Statesman*, Delhi, January 10, 1986.
- Kant, Krishan, "Disturbing trends in Foreign Policy," *Mainstream*, New Delhi, February 22, 1986.
- Kar, Joyashree & Chakraborty, Debesh, "Interfuel Substitution Possibilities in Indian Manufacturing Industries—a Transtog approach," *Artha Vijnana*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 131-151.
- Katyal, K.K., "Zig-Zag Course on Trade," *The Hindu*, Madras, February 3, 1986.
- Khan, Mohammad Jahangir, "Sikhs at Cross Road : a Study of Hindu-Sikh Relations (1948-53)", *Journal of Research*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1985, pp. 35-44.
- Khare, Harish, "Rajiv Gandhi's World View, anti-Congressism to anti-Politics," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, January 24, 1986.
- Kumar, Ajay & Ahmed, Farzand, "Congress (I) Woes," *India Today*, New Delhi, January 15, 1986.
- Lakshmi Devi, K.R., "Sex Discrimination in work ; the case of Kerala," *State and Society*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1985, pp. 29-35.
- Lakshmi, Y., "Defence and development ; an empirical study of India," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1986, pp. 1139-1151.
- "Defence Expenditure—An Asset or a Burden," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. X, No. 2, 1986, pp. 213-235.
- Mehta, Pradeep Kumar, "Two decades of Economic Cooperation between India and Singapore," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 111-129.
- "The Minorities Problems in India," (Editorial), *The Bangladesh Observer*, Dhaka, April 4, 1986.
- Mishra, S.N., "Protection versus Under Pricing of Agriculture in the developing countries : a Case Study of India," *The Developing Economies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1986, pp. 131-148.

- Mitra, Ashok, "Punjab can be saved only by shifting the focus to Economic Issues," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, April 9, 1986.
- Mitra, Nirmal, "Unto Haryana, the lands that are Haryan's," *Sunday*, Calcutta, January 19, 1986.
- Mohan, C. Raja, "India's Nuclear Diplomacy: the Need for Clarity," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1986, pp. 1076-1087.
- Mukerji, Nirmal, "Policy making in India," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 5, 6, 1985.
- Muni, S.D., "Rajiv Gandhi's Neighbourhood Policy," *Mainstream*, New Delhi, February 22, 1986.
- "Sino-Bhutanese Boundary and Implications for India," *Mainstream*, New Delhi, June 14, 1986.
- Namboodiripad, E.M.S., "Is Rajiv Gandhi's New Economic Policy all that New?" *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 23, 1985.
- Nayar, Kuldip, "India's terms for no-War Pact," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, February 9, 1986.
- Noorani, A.G., "The Indo-Pak Treaty," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, January 10, 1986.
- "PM & Shah Bano's case—I" "Reforming Muslim Personal Law—II," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 27, 28, 1985.
- "Our lifestyles must change—Document Rajiv Gandhi," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, Bombay, January 19, 1986.
- Parimoo, J.N., "India Plans to make combat Plane," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 21, 1985.
- Pasricha, P.M., "Indo-Pak Nuclear Accord," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 12, 1986, pp. 1217-1227.
- "Nothing to Lose and Lot to Gain in Indo-Pak Accord," *Link*, New Delhi, January 26, 1986.
- Perera, Jehan, "Best Chance for durable peace," *The Hindu*, Madras, June 19, 1986.
- "Prospects in Assam," (Editorial), *The Statesman*, Delhi, December 14, 1985.
- Ramesh, Chand, "Estimating effects of Input and Output prices on input demand in Punjab Agriculture—A Profit function approach," *Artha Vijnana*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 1986 pp. 181-192.

- "Relations with Neighbours," (Editorial), *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, March 28, 1986.
- Rizvi, Hasan Askari, "The Indian Military," *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1986, pp. 426-434.
- S., H.N., "Foreign Policy : Faculty Implimentation," *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, January 23, 1986.
- Sahay, S., "A Close Look : Congress (I) and Guided Democracy," *The Statesman*, Delhi, January 23, 1986.
- "A Close Look : Rajiv Gandhi's New India," *The Statesman*, Delhi, January 9, 1986.
- Sareen, Rajendra, "National Debate on Defence," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, April 25, 1986.
- "On road to normalisation," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, January 13, 1986.
- Sethi, J.D., "Budget and Public Sector," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 14, 1986.
- "Is history taking revenge on us ?" *Indian Express*, New Delhi, April 11, 1986.
- "Summit Lessons for India," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 6, 1985.
- Sharma, T.R., "The Indian Bourgeoisie ; its Ambivalent Nature," *State and Society*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1985, pp. 36-48.
- Singh, Amrik, "Hawks on both sides : remaining misgivings in Punjab," *The Statesman*, New Delhi, December 9, 1985.
- Sriram, K., "P M's Stand new twist to Indo-Lanka ties," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 27, 1985.
- Subramanian, R.R., "India's relations with Nuclear China," *Strategic Analysis*, New Delhi, November, 1985.
- "The Nuclear option," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, Bombay, February 16, 1986.
- Surjeet, Harkishan Singh, "Accord in Danger; both Akalis and Congress (I) to blame," *The Statesman*, Delhi, February 7, 1986.
- Thubral, Gobind, "Grin Portents," *India Today*, New Delhi, February 28, 1986.

- Tiwari, R.S., "Constant-Market Share analysis of Export growth : The Indian Case," *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1985, pp. 101-120.
- "Trouble in Punjab," (Editorial), *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, December 31, 1985.
- Tyabji, Badr-ud-Din, "(I) Questions on Foreign Policy, (II) Building apt Structures," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, May 26, 27, 1986.
- Udayashankar, B., "Indo-Sri Lanka accord," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 12, 1986, p. 1240-1252.
- Venkatesh, S., "Friends and Neighbours, I : Limits of Understanding with India, II : Aspects of General Zia's Democracy," *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 11, 12, 1986.
- Verghese, B. G., "Tomorrow's Defence," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 31, April 1, 1986.
- Victor, Cecil, "Kashmir factor in National Defence," *Patriot*, New Delhi, May 30, 1986.
- "Military Management : Foreign Models," *Patriot*, New Delhi, January 31, 1986.
- Viswan, S., "Promises and Reality," *Sunday*, Calcutta, January 19, 1986.
- "Will Congress live for another Hundred Years?" *Link*, New Delhi, December 29, 1985.
- Zarina Salamat, "The Development of Imperial Railways in British India," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1986, pp. 47-66.

NEPAL

- Acharya, Rameswar, "Accelerating Development," *The Rising Nepal*, Kathmandu, January 22, 1986.
- Dahal, S., "Second General Elections : Voters Awareness," *The Rising Nepal*, Kathmandu April, 22, 1986.
- "Growing Cooperation," (Editorial), *The Rising Nepal*, Kathmandu, March 21, 1986.
- Kharel, P., "The National Scene : Clear-cut Course," *The Rising Nepal*, Kathmandu, January 29, 1986.
- Lama, Mahendra P., "Contents of Indian Assistance to Nepal," *Patriot*, New Delhi, March 25, 1986.

Sharma, Gopal, "Royal address : Goals and Challenges," *The Rising Nepal*, Kathmandu, June 30, 1986.

Shrestha, Nisha, "Nepal—Britain trade and cooperation," *The Commoner*, Kathmandu, February 18, 1986.

PAKISTAN

Afaf, M., "Pakistan's Nuclear Power Programme," *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1986, pp. 419-425.

Ahmad, Ehtisham & Stern, Nicholas, "Tax reform for Pakistan overview and effective Taxes for 1975-76," *The Pakistan Development Review*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, 1986, pp. 43-72.

Ahmad, Nuzhat, "Biases in Tax assessment of residential properties in Karachi," *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1985, pp. 53-68.

Ali, Mehrunnisa, "Pakistan Foreign Policy—Challenges and trends of the Eighties," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 43-56.

Anwar, Mohammad & Ijaz, Kishwar, "Sociology of Maternity and Child Health : Some observations in the context of Pakistan," *Journal of Research*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1985, pp. 5-14.

Anwar, Sajid, "Export functions for Pakistan : a simultaneous equations approach," *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1985, pp. 29-34.

Aslam Muhammad & Azid Tuseef, "Determinants of changes in wage share in manufacturing Sector of the Punjab," *Economic Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 & 2, 1986, pp. 37-56.

Ayub, Mohammad, "Planning Strategies and future development of Fisheries in Punjab," *Journal of Rural Development and Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 & 2, 1985, pp. 23-41.

Bhimaya, Kotera M., "September 1965 : Professional Debate on the other side of the Hill," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. X, No. 2, 1986, pp. 109-128.

Bokhari, A. S., "Rural Development Strategies in Pakistan Past, Present and Future," *Journal of Rural Development and Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 & 2, 1985, pp. 42-48.

Bokhari, S. A. S., "Customs and festivals of the North-West Frontier Province," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 25-38.

- Chatterji, Rakhahari, "Time not yet ripe for a peace treaty with Pakistan," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, March 8, 1986.
- Chaudhry, Khalid Masud, "Working of the Agricultural extension services in Rural Islamabad," *Journal of Rural Development and Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 2, 1985, pp. 61-67.
- Cheema, Aftab Ahmad & Malik, Muhammad Hussain, "Income—specific inflation rates in Pakistan," *The Pakistan Development Review*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, 1986, pp. 73-84.
- Cheema, Zafar Iqbal, "Pakistan's case study for a Nuclear Security Guarantee," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 57-73.
- Chopra, Pran, "Pakistan's Afghan Crisis, (I) : Rejection of Indian offer, (II) : Fear of Indo-Iranian friendship," *Times of India*, New Delhi, December 12, 13, 1985.
- "Why the Pakistan opposition is against better ties with India," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, February 18, 1986.
- "Dealing with Zia," (Editorial), *Mainstream*, New Delhi, January 18, 1986.
- Dieckmann, Manfred, "Pakistan's intelligence concept—Year 2000," *The CITADEL*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1986, pp. 26-38.
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen, "Spring in Winter India—Pakistan relations," *The Island*, Colombo, January 2, 1986.
- Hasan, Javed, "Pakistan and the Afghan Refugee Problem," *The CITADEL*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1986, pp. 70-91.
- Hasnat, Syed Farooq, "Military intervention and the Third World ; a Case Study of the coup d' etats in Pakistan," *Journal of Research*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1985, pp. 15-34.
- Iqbal, Mahmood, "Estimates of Gasoline demand in Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1985, pp. 35-46.
- Jaffery, Sajjad Masood, "The Female Beggars in Lahore (a Socio-economic Study)," *Journal of Research*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1985, pp. 45-46.
- Jit, Inder, "Pakistan's Hand in Punjab," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, May 6, 1986.
- Joshi, V.T., "Pak Stand on militants casual," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, June 21, 1986.
- Kaniyalal, John, "The Pak Lank Connection," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1986, pp. 1069-1075.

- "Pakistan : Martial Law and after," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 12, 1986, pp. 1228-1239.
- Kant, Krishan, "Punjab, Pakistan and U. S.," *Mainstream*, New Delhi, March 22, 1986.
- Karim, Arshad Syed, "The Soviet Political Strategy in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent : 1947-1971," *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. II, No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-18.
- Katyal, K.K., "Big Gulf, Uphill Task," *The Hindu*, Madras, June 2, 1986.
- Khan, Ahmad Nabi, "Mausoleum of Shaikh Bahauddin Zikarya at Multan and introduction of Central Asian Art tradition in South Asia," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 13-24.
- Khan, Badiuddin A., "Conceptual Trends in Labour Policies in Pakistan," *Pakistan Mangement Reveiw*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1985, pp. 61-76.
- Khan Sahabzada Yaqub, "Pakistan Policy Statement in the Parliament," *Pakistan Horizan*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 20-42.
- Lall, Philip S., "Career goals of Junior and Middle Level Pakistani Marketing Professionals," *Pakistan Mangement Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1985, pp. 1-12.
- Malhotra, Inder, "India-Pakistan Dialogue : Some further setbacks," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, March 20, 1986.
- "Parleys with Pakistan : Harsh realities vs. Soft options," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, February 28, 1986.
- Malik, Shahnawaz, "The Impact of Economic Growth on Distribution and Sectoral Productivities in Pakistan" *Economic Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 & 2, 1986, pp. 90-96.
- Meals, Donald W., "Manpower development for increased production in Pakistan : Policy and infrastructure priorities," *Pakistan Mangement Review*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-13.
- Menon, N.C., "Pakistan-Sri Lanka axis," *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, December 18, 1985.
- "What is General Zia up to ?" *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, February 5, 1986.
- Moosa, Muhammad, "Information needs of Mangement and computerization in Pakistan," *Pakistan Mangement Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1985, pp. 42-60.

- "More US arms to Pakistan," (Editorial), *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, March 12, 1986.
- Nagy, Joseph G., "The overall rate of return to Agricultural research and extension investments in Pakistan, *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1985, pp. 17-28.
- Nayar, Kuldip, "Pak's No to Joint Survey," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, December 12, 1985.
- "Thoughts on Zia-Rajiv Talks," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, December 19, 1985.
- Noorani, A.G., "Thou Shalt not covet the neighbour's bomb," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 2, 1986.
- "Not Interviewable," (Editorial), *Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 18, 1986.
- O, Ballance, Edgar, "Pakistan and its Defence Forces," *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1986, pp. 19-26.
- "Pakistan on the front Porch of Conflict," *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1986, pp. 413-418.
- "On Zia's side," (Editorial), *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 19, 1985.
- "Pak-Indian Understanding," (Editorial), *The New Nation*, Dhaka, March 1, 1986.
- "A Pak Policy, Please," (Editorial), *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 4, 1985.
- "Pakistan Army: an unkind critique," (Editorial), *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1986, pp. 3-9.
- "Pakistan infiltrators," (Editorial), *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, March 17, 1986.
- "Pakistan's absurd claim," (Editorial), *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, January 16, 1986.
- Pandit, C.S., "What holds back Indo-Pak amity," *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, March 6, 1986.
- Pash, Hafiz A. & Bengali, Kaiser, "Impact of Fiscal insentives an Industrialisation in backward areas: a Case Study of Hub Chawki in Baluchistan," *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1-16.

- Patra, Saral, "Whither Indo-Pak Mutual Understanding,?" *Patriot*, New Delhi, February 18, 1986.
- Sabiha Hasan, "Pakistan Foreign Policy—a quarterly Survey," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 3-19.
- Sareen, Rajendra, "Hard look at Indo-Pak ties," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, December 23, 1985.
- Sethi, Najam, "Significance of the Zia regime," *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1986, pp. 304-315.
- Shah, Syed Imdad, "Pakistan's Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany," *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. II, No. 1, 1986, pp. 131-145.
- Sherwani, Latif Ahmad, "Review of Sino-Pakistan Relations (1981-85)," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 92-106.
- Siddiqi, A.R., "Pakistan's Case for Force Modernisation," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 107-119.
- Singh, Narendra, "The Pakistan Bomb," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, January 5, 1986.
- Sondhi, M.L., "Fact Sheet on Pakistan," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, December 30, 1985.
- Subrahmanyam, K., "Indo-Pak Nuclear Equation: Questions Zia should answer," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 17, 1985.
- "Trade with Pakistan," (Editorial), *The Statesman*, Delhi, June 19, 1986.
- Wajihuddin, Nasir F., "The Pakistan Army; Two Rival Views," *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1986, pp. 13-18.
- Wirsing, Robert G., "The Pakistan Army; Two Rival Views," *Defence Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1986, pp. 11-12.

SRI LANKA

- Abraham, Thomas, "The Repatriation Riddle," *The Hindu*, Madras, April 16, 1986.
- Amaratunga, Artie, "Negotiations . . . Gaps . . . and India," *The Island*, Colombo, June 16, 1986.
- "Another Openning," (Editorial), *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 5, 1985.
- Arjuna, "Protents of New Alignments," *The Island*, Colombo, Jaunary 26, 1986.

- Arjuna, "Setting the tone for 1986," *The Island*, Colombo, January 5, 1986.
- "Spirit to give and take needed," *The Island*, Colombo, February 16, 1986.
- "Waiting for Mr. Bhandari," *The Island*, Colombo, February 9, 1986.
- "Who is to stop first?" *The Island*, Colombo, March 16, 1986.
- "Will the new year bring good news?" *The Island*, Colombo, April 13, 1986.
- Chopra, Pran, "Good initiative on Lanka," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, May 10, 1986.
- "Deadlock," (Editorial), *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, December 4, 1985.
- Dua, H.K., "Challenge for Diplomacy," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 26, 1986.
- Gamini-Weerakoon, Zia—a true friend of Lanka," *The Island*, Colombo, December 12, 1985.
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen, "India's new diplomacy in Sri Lanka," *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March 28, 1986.
- Gupta, Swapan Das, "Options in SRI LANKA : Can TULF play a more active role?" *The Statesman*, Delhi, May 19, 1986.
- Jayewardene, J.R., "The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka : Two Views," *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1986, pp. 20-26.
- Kaniyalil, John, "Sri Lanka's Pak Connection," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, February 5, 1986.
- Kautiliya, "Sri Lanka, India and US Policy," *The Island*, Colombo, June 8, 1986.
- Khan, Rahmatullah, "Would Intervention in Lanka be illegal?" *The Statesman*, Delhi, May 21, 1986.
- Krishna, Akbar, "Blueprint for Peace," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, Bombay, April 20, 1986.
- Malhotra, Inder, "Foreign Policy Debate : Focus on Sri Lanka," *The Times of India*, New Delhi, March 28, 1986.
- Nayar, Kuldip, "Jayewardene Closes Options," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, February 6, 1986.

- Nayar, Kuldip, "SRI LANKA : Military Solution,?" *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, May 29, 1986.
- Ockersz, Lynn, "India on the offensive," *Sun*, Colombo, March 22, 1986.
- "Options on SRI LANKA," (Editorial), *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, March 15, 1986.
- Silva, Fred, E. De., "Gandhi ignores India's Penal Laws," *The Island*, Colombo, April 6, 1986.
- "SRI LANKA—A Conversation with J. R. Jayewardene," *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1986, pp. 316-338.
- "Stalemate in Sri Lanka," (Editorial), *The Statesman*, Delhi, February 24, 1986.
- Werake, Mahinda, "Lanka-Sino relations never so Good," *The Island*, Colombo, March 12, 1986.

SOUTH ASIA

- Cheema, Pervez Iqbal, "Soviet-American Rivalry in South Asia," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1986, pp. 112-131.
- "Will South Asia go Nuclear,?" *The CITADEL*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1986, pp. 61-69.
- Karnad, Bharat, "U.S. South Asia Policy : Roots of Change," *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, January 11, 1986.
- Malik, Iftikhar H., "Early South Asian immigrants in North America," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1986, pp. 79-111.

A Select Bibliography

SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

January to June 1986

Afsar, Raja Muhammad, "SAARC Summit and after," *Pakistan Times*, January 20, 1986.

Ali, Mohsin, "SAARC line-up on trade and aid," *Dawn*, April 29, 1986.

Arora, V.K., "SAARC : Prospects of cooperation," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 1, 1986, pp. 69-84.

"As SAARC heads into future," (Editorial), *The Bangladesh Observer*, Dhaka, June 7, 1986.

Chopra, Pran, "Facts and fiction of inequality," *The Island*, Colombo, December 5, 6, 1985.

— "Great Expectations," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, Bombay, January 5, 1986.

Chopra, S.N., "Will SAARC Survive,?" *Pakistan Times*, February 19, 1986.

— "Will SAARC Survive,?" *Probe India*, Allahabad, January, 1986.

Datta-Ray, Sunanda K., "The Six and the Seventh : Down to Earth from SAARC Summit," *The Statesman*, Delhi, December 29, 1985.

Ghosh, Partha S., "SAARC and the Chakmas : Little Scope for Delhi—Dhaka Effort," *The Statesman*, Delhi, February 16, 1986.

Gupta, Bhabani Sen, "Cooperation between SAARC and ASEAN," *Muslim*, June 13, 1986.

— "Japan ready to help SAARC," *Muslim*, April 19, 1986.

— "South Asian Cooperation and Global Change," *Muslim*, January 28, 1986.

Khan, Abdul Majid, "Rural Energy—Pakistan among SAARC Countries," *Muslim*, February 2, 1986.

- Khan, Rashid Ahmad, "1985 : An eventful Year for South Asian," *Muslim*, January 21, 22, 1986.
- Kukreja, Veena, "Parliamentary Democracy in a South Asian Regional Comparative Perspective," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 2, 1986, pp. 166-176.
- Muni, S.D., "India's neighbours expect it to cultivate new Habits of Coexistence," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 18, 1985.
- "Will the Summit facilitate a no-war pact between India and Pakistan,?" *Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 17, 1985.
- Noorani, A.G., "SAARC and Terrorism," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, February 21, 1986.
- Patra, Sanj, "Pakistan blocks ; South Asian Cooperatcon," *Jang*, March 14, 1986.
- Qureshi, Saeed, "New Forum urged to conduct talks with North," *Muslim*, April 3, 1986.
- Razvi, Mujtaba, "South Asia and SAARC," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, pp. 120-127.
- Sareen, Rajendra, "SAARC Summit at Dhaka," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 11, 1985.
- Shamsul Huq, Muhammad, "Perspectives on South Asian Cooperation," *The Bangladesh Observer*, Dhaka, December 30-31, 1985.
- "Stamp of Contention," (Editorial), *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 11, 1985.
- "Text of SAARC Charter," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, December 9, 1985.
- Udayashankar, B., "Limits and Limitations of SAARC," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1985, pp. 1059-1068.

سرور ، ایس۔ایم "سارک کے سات رکن ملکوں کے ایک ارب عوام کو اقتصادی ترقی کے مناسب مواقع میسر نہیں"

روز نامہ امروز ، ۱۵ اپریل ، ۱۹۸۶ء

جاوید ، قاضی "جنوبی ایشیا میں امن و استحکام" (عالمی پریس کی رائے)

روز نامہ امروز ، ۱۱ فروری ۱۹۸۶ء

— "سارک سربراہی کانفرنس کے بعد جنوبی ایشیا میں امن و استحکام" (غیر ملکی پریس کا ہفتہ وار جائزہ)

روز نامہ مشرق ، ۱۵ فروری ۱۹۸۶ء

خورشید ، عبدالسلام ”سارک کا اکیس نکاتی اعلان“

روز نامہ مشرق ، ۸ اپریل ۱۹۸۶ء

زائر ، عبدالرشید ”جنوبی ایشیا کے سات ملکوں میں علاقائی اشتراک کے امکانات“

روز نامہ مشرق ، ۲۱ مارچ ۱۹۸۶ء

زیدی ، نیئر ”سارک کے متعلق واشنگٹن میں سفارت کاروں کے تبصرے“

روز نامہ جنگ ، ۱۴ اپریل ۱۹۸۶ء

”سارک کانفرنس کا اعلان“ (اداریہ)

روز نامہ امروز ، ۵ اپریل ۱۹۸۶ء

”عالمی اقتصادی نظام میں تبدیلی کی خواہش“ (اداریہ)

روز نامہ جنگ ، ۴ اپریل ۱۹۸۶ء

علی ، شوکت ”سارک ، بھارت اور پاکستان“

روز نامہ جنگ ، ۵ جنوری ۱۹۸۶ء

Chronology of Important Events

SOUTH ASIAN REGION

January—June 1986

BANGLADESH

January 1 In Bangladesh, the ban on political activities was lifted, therefore, anti-government agitations were resurrected by the country's political parties.

It was also reported that Martial Law Government had formed its own party named "Jatiyo League" a coalition of five pro-government parties under the leadership of General Ershad.

Bangladesh had started taking its share of Ganges Waters at Farakha according to a mutual agreement signed on November 22, 1985.

13 General Ershad expressed his own intention of becoming a civilian head of Bangladesh after holding general elections.

February 3 The opposition in Bangladesh went on a complete strike to force government for acceptance of their demands.

6 An agreement was signed in Dhaka, between EEC and Bangladesh government. EEC pledged food aid and financial assistance for cereal, seed and cotton development.

10 President Ershad held a detailed meeting for discussing his election plans, with top military officers.

13 General Ershad expressed his determination to hold free elections within the first half of the year (1986). He asserted opposition parties to take part in the coming elections.

The above Chronology has been prepared by Mr. Tahir Kamran, Senior Research Fellow of the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

- February 15* In Bangladesh, the opposition called for a mass rally for a 'direct action' programme against the military regime.
- 16* IDB also announced \$ 356 million loan to Bangladesh for its development programmes.
- 19* The seven-party alliance urged General Ershad to quit within two weeks or violent demonstrations throughout Bangladesh would be organized to make him quit.
- 24* Fifteen-party alliance, in a huge rally announced a 22-day agitational programme. The basic demand of alliance was 'no member of the present government should take part directly or indirectly in the elections.'
- March 3* General Ershad had to announce that polls could be held on 26 April. He assured his government's neutral role in elections.
- 23* Seven-party alliance proclaimed that it would not participate in elections, because release of political prisoners and complete freedom of 'fourth estate' had not been included in political concessions granted by the government.
- Chinese Premier Li Xianivan arrived in Dhaka on four-day visit. Li said that China would always remain a reliable friend of Bangladesh.
- Beijing extended 50 million Yuan (\$ 16 million) interest free loan to Dhaka for economic development programmes.
- April 5* Hasina Wajid, Leader of Awami League, asked opposition parties to get united against four-year military rule. She also offered to drop many of her own candidates in favour of other parties if they joined hands with her.
- 13* Bangladesh government imposed restriction on campaign expenses of political parties contesting the election. \$ 3,200 was set as the limit for each candidate's electioneering campaign.
- 13* Indian and Bangladesh troops exchanged fire over disputed territory situated on the banks of Muhuri River in remote Tripura state. Bangladesh objected to the construction work started by India on the embankment.
- 20* General Ershad re-affirmed the schedule date and also made it clear that Army must have a role to play in the national affairs.

- May 3* In Chittagong Hill Tracts, Shanti Bahani terrorists, crossed the border reportedly with the help of BSF ; rounded villages of Taidong, Tankkapara, Asalong and Chantila, and killed 34 people including children and women.
- 7 Elections were held in Bangladesh, the third since 1972. Out of 120 political parties, 92 boycotted on the plea that elections were held under Martial Law. 25 people were killed and 500 injured in clashes between pro-Ershad and Awami League supporters on the election day.
- 14 Dawn to noon strike was observed, called by Awami League alliance to protest against vote rigging and violence. Strike was observed in Dhaka, Chittagong, Dinajpur, Rajshahi and Khulna. Protesters were demanding immediate resignation of General Ershad to honour people's mandate, against Martial Law.
- 1973 Trade Pact between India and Bangladesh was renewed. Under the agreement, India would import urea, leather, bambo pulp, newsprint and books.
- 16 Election Commission ordered fresh polling in 99 constituencies to be held from 19-21 May.
- A Trade Pact was signed between India and Bangladesh in order to promote bilateral trade. The time and duration of the pact was assumed to be three years.
- June 6* A captured member of an outlawed Bangladesh guerrilla group, confessed that he was trained in guerrilla warfare with hundreds at camps in India.
- 12 US State Department official stated that US economic assistance to Bangladesh remained one of the largest in Asia and US remained committed to assist Bangladesh.
- 14 The Election Commission gazetted the following results :
- | | | | | | |
|----------------|----|-----|--------------|---|----|
| JP | — | 153 | JSD (Rab) | — | 5 |
| AL | — | 76 | BASKAL | — | 3 |
| Jamat-i-Islami | 10 | | Worker Party | — | 3 |
| CPB | — | 5 | NAP (M) | — | 2 |
| NAP (4) | — | 5 | Independent | — | 32 |
| Muslim League | — | 4 | | | |

- June 23* General Ershad announced that Martial Law would be lifted soon but he did not announce any specific date.

INDIA

- January 10* Defence Secretary of India visited Islamabad, where he held a meeting with the Defence Secretary of Pakistan.
- 16* In New Delhi, a new trade agreement for 1986-90 was signed between India and Soviet Union.
- 26* The Sikh extremists took over the Golden Temple. Consequently Akali government of Punjab state had to bear severe criticism because of their inability to control the violent situation. The communist leaders and ex-members of the state assembly seemed to be more tantalizing for Akali government.
- February 1* A large number of Muslims protested as a reaction to a verdict of Indian court in Bhopal regarding direct infringement of Muslim Personal Law.
- 3* In the bi-elections of the state of Maharashtra in Sangli constituency, Congress had to face a defeat. Congress had also lost its Assembly seat (held since 1952) to a candidate of Janata Party.
- 10* New treaty concluded a \$ 500 million deal with a U.S. computer company, which would enable U.S.A. to cut down the Indian dependence on the Soviet Union. It would be helping Indian Scientists of accelerate India's nuclear programme.
- In Washington, Indo-U.S. Joint Economic Commission ended its 4-day meeting.
- Indo-Soviet working group on Oil Industry concluded its session (January 27—February 10) and signed a protocol.
- 11* After remaining closed for 35 years, Babri Mosque in Ayodha was re-opened for *Puja*, since court verdict went in favour of Hindu community. As a result the communal riots revived once again.
- 14* Due to partial verdict announced by the court in favour of the Hindus, 'Mourning Day' was observed by Indian Muslims to launch protest over the changing of mosque into a temple.

Jihad was called and large demonstrations were taken place in the neighbouring vicinity of *Jamia Masjid* in New Delhi.

- February 16* In Anandpur Sahib, head priests of Akal Takht at Sarbat Khalsa, (general convention of Sikhs) passed a resolution, condemning the activities of the followers of Damdami Taksal and AISSF who took over the Akal Takht in Amritsar. They demanded Akali Dal to take all necessary steps to liberate the Golden Temple.
- 26 According to B.B.C. sources, India had demanded Sri Lanka to solve the ethnic problem causing turbulence in the island and to order an inquiry into the large-scale killings of Tamils. Few of the Indian parliament members called the killing 'genocide.'
- 28 Indian government had allocated Rs. 8,728 crore on defence, an increase of 11 per cent from the last national budget. The 15 per cent increase in the prices of essential commodities provided a cause for strike and protests by opposition groups and labour unions in many Indian cities. Opposition boycotted the budget session.
- March 4* Right wing Bhartaya Janata Party demanded Indian government to remove G.M. Shah's administration in Indian occupied Kashmir and asked for immediate investigation of communal riots.
- UNICEF signed an aid agreement with India in Delhi for 1985-89 of 1175 million U.S. dollars.
- 5 Prime Minister of India, while making speech in Rajia Sabha, said that India wanted Sri Lankan government to take practical step in order to solve ethnic problem instead of merely professing their desire for a political solution of the problem.
- 6 An aid agreement of Rs. 90 crore was signed between Netherland and India in Delhi.
- 7 India reached an agreement with VAE for trade promotion from Rs. 700 crore to 1200 crore by 1990.
- Governor rule was imposed and G.M. Shah's state administration was terminated.

- March 7* Governor ordered major innovations in state administration to make it efficient and capable to deal with the law and order situation.
- 15 In Stockholm, Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi met Premier Mohammad Khan Junejo of Pakistan.
- 17 A protest strike from Hindu militants was called to urge the resignation of Chief Minister Barnala, in state capital.
- According to an agreement signed at Delhi, India would get 119 million pound aid for 1986-87 from Britain.
- 21 Congress (I) was shocked when it managed to win only 5 of 19 seats in the elections to the Upper House (Rajia Sabha).
- 6000 Sikh militants attacked Punjab Assembly. They were demanding Sikh youth to be released from prison and general amnesty for Sikh army fugitives. In all that process, six Sikhs were killed and nine injured by police firing.
- 24 According to an agreement, India would get a loan of Rs. 400 crore from World Bank.
- Three cabinet ministers of Nagaland and three ministers of state submitted their resignations following police firing incident in the state. Earlier, Rajiv government deployed 25,000 to 50,000 para-military police to suppress guerrilla separatist groups fighting for independent tribal nation in the states of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura.
- 25 Sweeden reached an agreement with India. According to it, she would sell the 'Bafora 155 mm field Howitzer guns worth of Rs. 1000 crore to India.
- France agreed to supply 27 Dauphin helicopters worth of \$ 50 million to India.
- 28 Sikh militants killed 16 Hindus when they opened fire on a click of fundamentalist Hindu National Volunteer Force in Ludhiana.
- 30 Britain had reached an agreement with India to sell design of Royal Navy's latest aircraft carrier the 'Ark Royal.'
- 31 Joint Business Council concluded its seventh meeting and decided to set a two-way trade target of Rs. 200 crore for 1986 and double it by 1990.

- April 1* Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign Secretary, arrived in India on a five-day visit. Howe offered to deal with Sikh militants residing in Britain but bilateral extradition treaty could not be made.
- Complete strike was observed by Janata Party, ruling Sikh Akali Dal Party and non-communist opposition parties to protest against violence in which 36 people were killed in four days.
- 3 A loan of \$ 10 million for India was approved by Asian Development Bank.
- Mr. Pierre Auburt, Swiss Foreign Minister held talks with the Prime Minister, President and Foreign Minister of India in New Delhi.
- 4 \$ 1.14 billion contract was signed between India and Swedish arms firm. Swedish was to deliver field guns to Indian Army.
- 5 In Tripura, 12 supporters of the separatist Tripura national volunteers sprayed machine gun fire in a crowded market. five people were killed in firing.
- An agreement was signed between USSR and India for increased cooperation in the field of ferrous and metallurgy.
- 7 World Bank would lend India \$ 485 million for a \$ 1.28 million project designed to alleviate electricity shortage.
- 8 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi accused Pakistan and Israel for providing military assistance to Sri Lanka, which would be used for the "genocide of Tamil population."
- 11 Seven Sikh extremists were killed by police firing.
- 12 It was reported that India was to buy 21 helicopters against £ 65 mn. British aid. The delivery was to begin in May.
- Sewa Singh, Amritsar district, Leader of Congress (I) was shot dead.
- 13 4,600 Sikhs held a meeting during *Besakhi*, festival in Golden Temple launching an appeal to their 14 million compatriots to take up arms for separate and "independent homeland."

April 15 Pro-Hindu Bhartia Jan Sangh, President, Balraj Madhok and other leaders demanded division of Jammu, Ladhak and Kashmir valley region of Indian held Kashmir into three different administrative Units and deletion of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

- 19 India signed a contract with Britain for the purchase of aircraft carrier Hermes. The Vessel was expected to enter into active service with the Indian Navy in March 1987.

G.M. Shah of Indian occupied Kashmir, proclaimed that he would form a Muslim League or Muslim Conference to give vent to Muslim feelings.

- 21 Due to police firing on violent mob which attacked a police station, 19 Nexalites died in eastern Bihar.

- 27 Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany payed visit to India. It was the first official visit by any German head of the government in the last 19 years.

The Committee for protection of rights of Muslim women met in New Delhi, and adopted a resolution describing the Muslim Women Protection of Rights or Divorce Bill as 'grave' and called for its immediate withdrawal.

Hindu Muslim riots sparked off in Navada, a town of Bihar. As a result two persons were killed, and curfew was imposed.

- 28 In a second meeting of Indo-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission that concluded at Riyadh, Saudi government would provide about \$ 50 million to the health projects to India and import bovine meat, fish and preparations from India.

- 29 Five Sikh militants declared Independent Sikh State and demanded world governments to recognise it. They also shown their intention to submit a request to UN to send their representative to the world body.

Under the Co-chairmanship of Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. B.R. Bhagat and Soviet First Deputy Premier Mr. I.V. Arkhipov, Indo-Soviet joint commission signed a protocol for increasing cooperation in the fields of science and technology, electronics, computers, machine building and oil exploring.

- April 30* 2,000 Indian para-military police and commandos entered shrine and evicted the extremists and secessionists.
- Firing between Muslims and Police took place and 11 people were killed.
- On the occasion of an anniversary celebration of inter governmental Soviet-Indian Commission on economic, scientific and technological cooperation, a protocol was signed between Soviet Union and India in New Delhi. (It covered wide-ranging fields, including oil, coal, power, electronic metallurgy, machine building and agriculture and it also provided for expansion of bilateral trade).
- May 2* French arms manufacturer firm had announced that India would get last batch of Mirage-200 combat aircraft from France. (India had placed the order for 40 aircrafts from France).
- 100 million loan agreement was reached by Asian Development Bank with India in order to meet part of medium and long term foreign exchange requirements of private enterprises in the Industrial Sector.
- 3 USA had consented to extend 124.8 million aid to help Indian import bill for vegetable oil.
- 4 USA will give Rs. 575 crore in funds and food aid for India's child survival programme. It is the largest programme of its kind ever undertaken by any one.
- 6 In London, Sikh community, outraged by police action, in thousands marched towards Indian High Commission and delivered a protest letter.
- As a protest, six members of Legislative Assembly resigned in Punjab.
- Law was passed which denied alimony to Muslim women beyond three months of divorce. The legislation is in accordance with the dictates of Muslim Personal Law. It was approved by 307 members of Lower House after 12 days of bitter debate.
- 8 At Shillong, capital of Meghalaya state of India, a three-day ministerial meeting of SAARC on "Women in Development" was held.

May 9 Dr. Farooq Abdullah, former Chief Minister of occupied Kashmir announced that 33 legislators of the National Conference would resign from the Assembly to pave way for the dissolution of the Assembly. He also demanded fresh elections.

Indian authorities quoted that 10,000 tribesmen have taken refuge in Tripura. Bangladesh assured India that if nationality of refugees could be ascertained, it would take them back. But India failed to produce the list of emigrants.

10 27 members of Akali Dal seceded from the ruling party in Punjab led by former Chief Minister, Parkash Singh Badal and formed their own party named Akali Assembly Party.

11 35 members of National Conference (Farooq group) decided to submit their resignations to the Assembly.

According to Western officials statement, India made an attempt to buy sophisticated industrial cameras amounting to £ 300,000 from a British firm. (That deal was enough to worry British government to make sure that India had resumed development of nuclear weapons. Consequently that sale was blocked).

Indian authorities stepped up security in hill district of Darjeeling during three-day strike called by Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) to press for a separate state 'Gurkhaland' in India. (They were suffering from discrimination in business and government jobs in India).

12 Indian Prime Minister made some reshuffling in his cabinet in order to give more representation to minority Sikhs and Muslims. (Now there are 2 Sikh and 4 Muslims in 17-member cabinet).

13 In western state of Maharashtra, nine people were killed or wounded in a Hindu Muslim clash.

14 In Indian Gurkhaland, 72-hours protest was observed by GNLF, demanding for autonomy and official status for their language. One demonstrator was shot dead by police firing while 100 were arrested.

Mr. Vishwanath Partap Singh, Indian Finance Minister visited Saudi Arabia to hold talks with Saudi Commerce

Minister for promotion of technical cooperation and commercial ties in public and private sectors.

May 17 Barnala, the Chief Minister of Punjab, was called *Tankhaiya* (one who is condemned by Sikhs) for religious misconduct and also asked him to clean shoes to pay the cost as a punishment ; recite 25 verses of Sikh scriptural and donate 500 rupees to Sikh temple. Barnala accepted the verdict in a bid to narrow the differences between moderate and extremist Sikhs.

22 India was reported to set up missiles testing range in south-eastern state of Orisa. (The missiles testing range was reported to be the biggest in India which would be used for launching rockets and missiles).

24 South West African People's Organisation opened its chancellery in New Delhi.

25 US Congress analysis report confirmed Rajiv's policy which revealed that India and Brazil were acquiring the ability to deploy self propelled guided ballistic missile technology which can be both nuclear and conventional.

United News of India told that Indian Navy would buy 26 West German Dorwern-218 planes fitted with sophisticated surface-to-air missile for its coast guard. 23 planes would be assembled at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., whereas three planes had been purchased in fly away condition.

Mr. Neil Kinnock, British Labour Party leader arrived in India on his 11-day tour on the invitation of Indian Congress Party. (BBC sources told that Indian government made him clear that there was a possibility of India to quit from Commonwealth. India had made her relations uneasy with Britain because of latter's failure to curb the activities of Sikh militants in Britain and her refusal to stop economic sanctions to South Africa).

26 Indo-Bhutanese bilateral talks started at New Delhi.

Indian government gave their consent to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab by 21 June.

In India, five Gurkhas were killed in police firing as 1,000 supporters of GNLF clashed with police.

- May 28* Punjab government accepted the proposals of Venataramiya Commission for giving 15,000 acres of land to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh, including Hindi speaking Rajpura tehsil of Patiala district.
- Two-day strike was observed in Indian Gorkhaland to protest against police killing of Gorkhas.
- June 4* Mizo students organization called 24-hours strike to press for an early settlement of their demands. Minister of State for Home Affairs Ram Niwaz held talks with Laldenga, the leader of banned Mizo National Front (MNF). (Talks focussed on the amnesty for MNF guerrillas fighting for independence and full statehood for Mizoram, which is currently called 'Union Territory').
- 6 USSR and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited reached on an agreement on production cooperation in electric locomotives.
- Recent amendment in Public Safety Act of Indian held Jammu and Kashmir was bitterly criticised by high level emergency meeting of National Conference. (The amendment was called an effort to curb the civil and democratic rights of Kashmiris and a conspiracy against the Kashmiri Muslims).
- 7 Bansi Lal was elected Chief Minister of Haryana. (His government agreed that Chandigarh should remain capital of both states till the new capital of Haryana was built).
- Mr. Li Shu, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister claimed that 90,000 sq. km. of traditional Chinese territory was in Indian occupation. He warned if India was willing to make concession in the east, China would certainly consider making the same in the western border.
- 12 According to the recommendations of single judge commission, 70,000 acres of Punjab land was to be given to Haryana in exchange of Chandigarh.
- 14 Mr. Shiv Shanker, Indian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commerce arrived in Moscow. (US arms supply to Pakistan was discussed between Shankar and Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachev).
- 16 Curfew was imposed in Allahabad after four people were killed and 17 injured.

- June 17* Aid-India Consortium announced in Paris to provide \$ 4.5 billion aid to India for the fiscal year 1986-87.
- 19 Mr. Burnala, Chief Minister of Punjab agreed to deliver a vast area of a territory with Hindu majority. Sikh legislators did not agree, therefore, clash between moderate and extremist Sikhs occurred.
- 21 Punjab Haryana land swap was postponed for the third time. 15 July was set as the next tentative date.
- 25 An accord was signed between MNLF and Indian government. MNLF abandoned arm resistance and withdrew its demand for separate state. Mr. Laldenga was installed as the Chief Minister of the state.
- 28 Federal military forces raided Gurdwara Darbar Sahib at Tarn Taran and arrested 20 Sikh 'separatists.'
- 30 "Shiv Sena" Hindu militant organization called for a general strike to protest continuing violence against Hindus in Punjab. Curfew was imposed in Amritsar and Gurdaspur and 147 members of Shiv Sena were arrested.

NEPAL

- January 2* Treaty of Trade and Transit signed between India and Nepal in 1978 was extended uptill 1989.
- May 10* Nepalese Home Ministry was reported to have said that it had "taken up the issue" of bombing on the cities bordering India, with government of India. (It was believed that anti-monarchist group (Janabadi Morcha) by Ramraja Prasad Singh, was responsible of bombing).
- 12 In Nepal, second general elections were held. 1500 candidates contested for the 108-member Assembly—Rashtria Panchayat.
- June 6* An accord was signed at Delhi between India and Nepal regarding supply of 10,7000 tonnes of coal to Nepal by India during the year 1986.
- 13 Marich Man Singh Shrestha, was nominated Prime Minister by the recently elected Assembly.

SRI LANKA

January 1 India urged Sri Lanka to give TULF proposals a closer and serious consideration. President Jayewardene announced that proposals were being considered by his government.

19 According to Sri Lankan Defence Ministry sources, 27 people including five security men had been killed in three days, during clashes between troops and Tamil separatist guerrillas.

February 21 The state of emergency was once again extended for a month as a consequence of a massive killing in eastern part of Sri Lanka. (Sources reported that 80 farmers, most of them were Tamils had been shot dead).

President Jayewardene, exhorted Tamils to accept Sri Lanka's Constitution and abandon the repeated demand for a separate state.

March 1 Sri Lankan government sent a protest note, complaining that Indian government was issuing unfriendly and malicious statements concerning the sensitive internal problems of Sri Lanka.

3 The TULF leader appealed Indian government to take some precautionary measures in order to stop 'genocide' of Tamil minority on humanitarian grounds.

Sri Lankan government once again showed its willingness for Indian Foreign Secretary to visit Sri Lanka so that dialogue could be made to settle political and ethnic problems.

9 A spokesman of Tamil militant reported that Tamil militants would keep the offer of Sri Lankan government for a ceasefire into their serious consideration. Leader of Tamil militants said that two conditions ought to be met before any ceasefire, i.e.,

1. "Military forces, must retreat to their *status quo* position.

2. Any person belonging to any international agency should be appointed to supervise the truce."

20 Sri Lankan Defence Ministry spokesman reported that as a result of Tamil guerrillas' attack at convoy, 35 civilians and four soldiers were killed.

- April 1* The Sri Lankan government appealed Britain to curb the activities of Tamil separatists living in Britain.
- 16 Mr. A.C.S. Hameed, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka arrived in New Delhi.
- May 3* Bombs exploded in Air Lanka Tristar Jet, killing 26 people, mostly Europeans.
- 7 In Colombo, 10 people were killed and 40 injured, when a powerful bomb exploded in main telegraph office.
- 11 President Jayewardene appealed to the west for arms and money to suppress the separatists. Otherwise, he warned, Sri Lanka would be divided.
- 24 Tamils killed 32 Sinhalese in two days of massacre in Trincomalee district.
- 28 Sri Lanka offered to hold informal talks with Tamil separatists on the line of Geneva proximity talks between Pakistan and Kabul government with an independent mediator but ruled out involvement of United Nations. India and militant groups rejected that offer.
- June 4* In Sri Lanka curfew was imposed in Kilinochchi because of massive killing of Sinhalese population.
- 6 President Jayewardene decided to call a conference of registered political parties to discuss the ethnic situation in Sri Lanka.
- 8 President Jayewardene authorized left wing Sinhalese party to hold talks with Tamil separatists in Madras and to arrange three months truce between government and Tamil rebels so that political solution could be found through negotiation.
- 11 In Sri Lankan city of Trincomalee, 70 people were killed by Tamils, when bombs planted in two buses.
- 14 President Jayewardene accused opposition Freedom party of planning to topple him down and his government illegally. The party denied the allegation.
- 16 Curfew was lifted in Kilinochchi. President Jayewardene launched an appeal to Buddhist clergy the 'Maha Sangha' to help ending the conflict in which more than 3,000 people had been killed since July 1983.

- June 25* In Colombo, government and opposition leaders met and the President unveiled a plan to end the bloody conflict going on in Sri Lanka. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and main opposition Freedom party boycotted the session.
- 29 Tamil blew up a bridge connecting the main road linking Jafna.
- 30 Sri Lankan Navy smashed a boat carrying Tamil militants 150 miles off Colombo. During the operation, 33 people were killed.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

1981-86

Research Aid Series

- Rafiq Ahmad *Documentation on South Asia.*
Mohammad Sarwar
Rafiq Ahmad *South Asia : A Select Bibliography of*
Mohammad Sarwar *Theses and Dissertations, University of*
the Punjab, 1947-1979.
- Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza *South Asian Politics : 1931-42*
(Selected References from the *Daily*
Tribune, Lahore).

Country Paper

- Prof. Mian M. Nazir *Agricultural Development in Pakistan.*
(Prepared at the Centre for Applied Economic
Studies, University of Peshawar).

Report

Cooperation for Development in South
Asia—Proceedings of the Seventh Meet-
ing of the Committee on Studies for
Cooperation in Development in South
Asia, April 1982.

Country Information Series

- Rafiq Ahmad *India : No. 1, June, 1981.*
Mohammad Sarwar
Rafiq Ahmad *Nepal : No. 2, April, 1982.*
Fayyaz Ahmad
Rafiq Ahmad *Sri Lanka : No. 3, December, 1982.*
Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza
Mohammad Sarwar
Rafiq Ahmad *Bangladesh : No. 4, January, 1983.*
Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza
Fayyaz Ahmad

| | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>Maldives</i> : No. 5, March, 1984. |
| Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza | |
| Fayyaz Ahmad | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>Burma</i> : No. 6, December 1985. |
| Mohammad Javed Iqbal | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>Bhutan</i> : No. 7, December 1986. |
| Musarrat Javed | |

Current Affairs Series

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 1, (1981). |
| Rahim Yar Abbasi | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 2, (1982). |
| Rahim Yar Abbasi | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 3, (1982). |
| Rahim Yar Abbasi | |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 4, (1982) and No. 1, (1983). |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 2, (1983), and No. 6. |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 1, (1984), No. 7. |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Sohail Mahmood | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 1, (1985), No. 8. |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Sohail Mahmood | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 2, (1985), No. 9. |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Sohail Mahmood | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 3, (1985), No. 10. |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 4, (1985), No. 11. |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | |

Monographs

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| Rafiq Ahmad | <i>The Assam Massacre</i> : 1983 |
| Mohammad Jahangir Khan | (A Documentary Record). |
| Mohammad Sarwar | <i>The Assam Agitation</i> , (Urdu) (A Politico-economic Analysis) . |

Mohammad Sarwar
Ayaz Mohammad Rana

Indian General Elections : 1984.
Pak-Nepal Relations, (1986).

Books

Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza
Syed Farooq Hasnat
Sohail Mahmood

The Sikh Question
(From Constitutional Demands
to Armed Conflict).

Seminar Paper

Theodore P. Wright (Jr.)
Syed Farooq Hasnat (Ed.)

Seminar 1984
Methodology of Research on
Indian Muslims.

Journal (Bi-annual)

Rafiq Ahmad (Editor)

South Asian Studies : Vol. I, No. 1,
January 1984 ; Vol. I, No. 2, July 1984 ;
Vol. II, No. 1, January 1985 ; Vol. II,
No. 2, July 1985 ; Vol. III, No. 1,
January 1986.

Notes to Contributors

Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcomed.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

Bibliographical references should be complete in respect of the title of the book, the name of the author, the year and the place of publication.

Utmost care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

Abstracts

Authors should submit abstract of their articles, not exceeding 100 words. The first page of the paper should include the title of the paper as well as the name and institutional affiliation of the author.

The Editor reserves the right to make editorial revisions.